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THESIS ABSTRACT
Philosophers who work on time often ignore the implications then doctrines have for the 
common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who 
work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common 
sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have 
upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, 
seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and 
static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so 
called 'pur e' foims of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal 
symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The ‘pure’ B-Theoiy, with its denial of 
objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non­
fixed. The ‘pme’ A-Theoiy, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges 
the robustness of the asymmetiy, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of 
my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists 
and the fiiture does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic 
arguments which rely upon the deteiminateness of future tmth as their key premise, and 
ai’gue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because 
they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more 
detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can 
also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for 
the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future is non-fixed.
Similaidy, those who work on fatalism, and whose ai'guments often imply an assertion 
or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit 
dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take this intuition 
about the asymmetry o f fixity, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. It is my 
purpose in this thesis to discover what conception of time allows for, and does justice 
to, the intuition. I will, therefore, be taking the intuition for granted, and will be using 
it as a guide throughout the ensuing investigation. In this Introduction, I will first 
discuss some terminological issues, and then provide a sketch o f the organization and 
direction o f the thesis.
I. Temiinology
A. ‘Fixity’
First, what does the guiding intuition tell us? What is the asymmetry of fixity? My 
thesis will have much to say about that, but, in order to get us started, I should offer 
an initial, rough characterization of it. One fairly non-controversial candidate for such 
a characterization is that the past is (in some temporally relative sense) necessaiy, 
while the future is (in a corresponding sense) merely possible.^ This characterization 
has two virtues: it is sufficiently vague to avoid begging the question against the 
mainstream of analytic philosophers, yet it is also sufficiently intuitive to motivate the 
current project. Unfortunately, however, I do not wish to endorse this modal 
characterization of the asymmetry. In fact, as I will make cleai' in subsequent
‘ Here I do not intend for ‘merely possible’ to be rendered as ‘non-actual’, since that would beg the 
question against the etemalist. But such a rendering of ‘merely possible’ is only required by an 
absolute (and so tenseless) modality (since, according to tenseless possible worlds semantics, an event 
that will actually occur is not merely possible). Given, however, the temporal relativity of the modal 
expressions here, my inclusion of the modifier ‘merely’ should be uncontroversial—even for an
chapters, I think it is misleading and fundamentally inaccurate.  ^ Another candidate 
for characterizing the asymmetry can be derived from Aristotle’s act/potency 
distinction; the past is actual, while the friture is merely potential.^ Of course,
Aristotle did not use this distinction to characterize temporal asymmetry. In fact, he 
thought that the present and past were both necessary, but we may boiTow the 
distinction while applying it differently than did Aristotle.
Now, while I think the actuality/potentiality characterization of the asymmetry 
is also highly intuitive, it does suffer from being more controversial than the temporal 
necessity/possibility characterization. This is because many contemporary 
philosophers, namely, those who endorse a B-Theoiy of time"*, think that events can 
only be actual simpliciter, not actual at (or as oQ a time. In other words, these 
philosophers (the B-Theorists) think that all events that have occuned, are occumng, 
and will occur are actual. Whereas, according to the actuality/potentiality 
characterization o f the asymmetry, events ai e actualized or become actual at a time. 
So, if  I argue in this thesis that the B-Theory cannot account for the asymmetry of 
fixity, where the latter is chaiucterized in teims of an actuality/potentiality 
asymmetry, then I will not have achieved much, since the B-Theorists do not embrace 
such an asymmetry. For this reason, when I discuss the B-Theory and its implications 
for the asymmetry of fixity (in Chapter 1), I will allow the modal characterization (i.e. 
in terms o f temporal necessity/possibility) for the sake of argument, with the 
understanding that I neither approve of, nor intend to retain, that characterization.
So the initial, rough characterization of the asymmetry of fixity is that the past 
is actual and the futui'e is potential, UNLESS you are a B-Theorist; then it is that the
etemalist. To make my intention clear, I will often refer to the modal characterization of fixity as 
‘temporal’ necessity/possibility. For a smvey of temporal modality, see Chapter 3.
 ^See Chapters 3 and 4.
 ^This seems to be Ockham’s characterization of the asymmetiy (see Adams and Kretzmann (1969: 
Introduction), and Zagzebski (1991; 18)). Though Ockham also attributed an ‘accidental’ necessity to 
the past. See Ch. 3, Section II.B.
past is (in some temporally relative sense) necessary, while the future is (in a 
corresponding sense) merely possible.^ For the time being, then, I will characterize 
fixity and non-fixity disjunctively as ‘actuality (or temporal necessity)’ and 
‘potentiality (or temporal possibility)’ (respectively), allowing the reader to choose 
which of the two characterizations they prefer. Whichever one prefers, the common 
sense idea that both characterizations aie meant to capture is that the past is over and 
done with, and so inexorable, in a way that the future is not. Developing a more 
specific account of the fixity o f the past and the non-fixity of the future will constitute 
a significant part of the investigation in Chapters 1 and 2. Nevertheless, I should also 
say, here, a little bit more about what I do not mean by ‘fixity’. I am keen to 
distinguish the concept of a fixed event fiom what I take to be other distinct—though 
possibly related— concepts; namely, those of a causally determined event and a fated 
event.
With respect to causal determinism, there does not seem to be any necessary 
connection between a future that is actual (or temporally necessary), and one that is 
causally deteiinined. Nor does it necessarily follow fiom the futuie’s being potential 
(or temporally possible) that it is not causally detennined. In making these claims at 
this stage, o f course, I am relying upon the vagueness of my initial characterization of 
fixity. Deteiminism is the doctrine that a complete description of the state o f the 
world at any time, could, in principle, be derived fi-om i) a complete description of the 
state of the world at any earlier time, and ii) a specification of the laws of nature. 
Clearly this is not a vague doctrine, and so it should come as no surprise that—absent 
some substantive argumentation—it cannot be immediately inferred from the fixity of
 ^For a description of ‘A-Theoiy’ and ‘B-Theory’, see Section I.D., below.
 ^I do not wish to imply that tlie modal chaiacterization is necessarily a ‘B-Theoretic’ one, nor that my 
prefeiTed characterization is necessaiily an ‘A-Theoretic’ one. Mellor, at least, is a B-Theorist who 
endorses the modal characterization of the asymmetiy (see Ch. 1, Section I). But many other B- 
Theorists are loath to acknowledge any ‘common sense’ asymmetry whatsoever. Similarly, tliere aie 
many A-Theorists who actually prefer the modal characterization—I just happen not to be one of tliem.
the future (as I have thus far characterized it), nor that its denial cannot be 
immediately inferred from the non-fixity of the future (as I have thus far characterized 
it),*^  Perhaps if  determinism is incompatible with free will, then there might be a 
stronger comiection between a fixed event and a causally determined one, but I will 
not be investigating that possibility in this thesis. Nevertheless, I stand by the claim 
that the fixity and the non-fixity of the frrture ar*e distinct from the doctrines of causal 
deteiminism and indeterminism (respectively), and will be treating them as such from 
the outset. As a matter of fact, I will not be saying much at all about causal 
determinism, except to reiterate and bolster the claim that the concept of a causally 
determined event is distinct from the concept of a fixed event. The bolstering, in 
particular, will come in Chapter 2, where I will derive a fuller specification of the 
asymmetry of fixity, thus resolving the vagueness of my initial characterization.
With respect to fatalism, the distinction between it and the fixity o f the future 
seems not to be so crisp and clear as it is in the determinism case. Although there are 
several different varieties of fatalism, I take it that the claim they shai e in common is 
the denial of human freedom. The reason that fatalism and a fixed future are often 
identified with one another, is that there tends to be a very strong common sense 
intuition that a denial of the potentiality (or temporal possibility) of the future implies 
a denial o f human freedom. But even if  this intuition is con ect, the doctrines of 
fatalism and the fixity of the fritm e are distinct. Fatalism is, by definition, an agent 
centered doctrine. The guiding intuition I will be appealing to tluoughout this thesis, 
however, is not, as such, an intuition about human agency, it is an intuition about the 
nature of events in time. If the intuition is correct, then events ai e not fixed before 
they occur; rather, they become fixed when (or after) they occur. It is an altogether
 ^Of course, if one characterizes a non-fixed future in terms of a contingent future, where ‘contingent’ 
is read as ‘not necessitated by the state of die world plus the laws ofnatme’, tlien, trivially, a non-fixed 
future implies indeterminism. But it is precisely this characterization tliat I wish to avoid.
different—though perhaps related—question, whether the fixity/non-fixity of events 
has any implications for the agency of human beings. I take it, for example, that if  the 
future is fixed, then it would be fixed regai*dless of whether or not human beings 
existed. Perhaps this claim is not in keeping with the common sense origin of the 
guiding intuition, given that common sense rarely considers what the world would be 
like without human beings. Still, the claim is, I think, a ramification of the intuition I 
am trying to elucidate. It, however, is not to claim that the following counterfactual 
might not be tine o f a world in which the fiiture is fixed and there aie no human 
beings (or any other agents): if  there had existed agents, then fatalism would have 
obtained. But the truth o f this counterfactual will depend upon different 
specifications of ‘fixity’ and ‘fatalism’.^  Again, I am not denying that the doctrines of 
the fixity/non-fixity of the future, detenninism/indeteiminism, and fatalism/fi ee will 
might be related, but am simply claiming that they are all distinct doctrines.
B. Fatalism’
Thus far I have offered a rough, and somewhat vague, characterization of what I thinlc 
fixity is, and have distinguished it fiom what I think it is not: a fixed event is neither 
equivalent to a causally determined event nor to a fated one. And, as I said, I will not 
be dealing much more with causal determinism and any relationship it might have 
with a fixed future—it is not the focus o f my thesis. But the relationship between a 
fixed future and fatalism strikes me as being a more intimate one, and it does play a 
central role in my thesis. In order to motivate this role, I fiist need to say more about 
fatalism and what I take to be its different forms. The description and taxonomy that 
follow are my own, and represent only one way of delineating the different fonns. 
This way will no doubt prove objectionable to some; but providing it at this stage will 
clarify my usage o f terms, and help guide the reader through my subsequent
See Section LC., below.
arguments. It is my hope that the some of the more controversial aspects of the 
taxonomy will be less so by the conclusion of the thesis.
So, how should we understand an assertion of fatalism? One helpful way to 
understand it is by analogy with the past. Most of us accept fatalism about the past—  
‘there is no point in crying over spilt milk’. We don’t think there is any point in 
deliberating about what we did yesterday, at least not with respect to forming 
intentions for acting. But we do deliberate about the future, because we often think 
that we have some power (albeit limited) over the way the future goes—a power that 
we take ourselves to lack with respect to the past. So, if  fatalism obtains, then just as 
human beings lack power over the past, they also lack power over the future.
But how should this lack of power be spelled out, and what is its source? 
Answers to these two questions will yield two different ways, respectively, of 
categorizing fatalism (see Figure Intio.l, below). Answers to the latter question (call 
it the ‘source’ question) provide us with at least thiee broad categories of fatalism: 
logical, ontological, and theological.^ Logical fatalism, probably the most commonly 
discussed o f the three, claims that the source of our lack of power over the future is 
the logic o f future directed propositions. The timeless application of the laws of logic 
to all propositions demands that even future directed propositions admit of 
determinate truth values, and, given that we do not have the power to change the truth 
values o f propositions, we do not have power over the futui e. We can further divide 
this category of fatalism if  we offer more specific answers to the source question. We 
can either claim that it is the present tmth o f future directed propositions that yields 
logical fatalism, or that it is the temporal necessity of past tmth about the future that is 
the source. Call the foimer the argument from antecedent tmth value, and the latter
By ‘source’, here, I simply mean tlie idea or piinciple from which fatalism has seemed to follow.
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the argument from temporal necessity. We will look at these arguments in much 
greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
The second category o f fatalism is what I refer to as ‘ontological’ fatalism.
The answer this category provides to the source question is that it is the ontology of 
future events that nullifies human freedom; perhaps because such events are causally 
determined (assuming incompatibilism), or perhaps because they exist eternally. The 
thought here is that ontological fatalism is meant to follow directly fiom the nature of 
fiiture events, and that this implication is independent of any implications aiising fi om 
the status o f propositions about those events. Thus, when we consider in Chapter 1 
whether an eternally existing future implies fatalism, it will be the ontological 
category that we are dealing with. I am aware, of course, that the bifurcation between 
propositions and events that supports the distinction between logical and ontological 
fatalism will seem unnatural to some, but if  the reader will indulge me for the time 
being, I will attempt to motivate such a bifurcation in Chapter 3,
As for theological fatalism, it answers the source question by claiming that it 
is an omniscient God’s Imowledge of the future that nullifies human fieedom. It is 
interesting to note that this is a unique category o f fatalism, in that it can come in the 
fonn of either of the other two categories. That is, one can claim that God’s 
omniscient knowledge of the future is prepositional (as in logical fatalism), or one 
might claim that God’s knowledge of the future is perceptual, or perhaps causally 
deterministic. In the perceptual case, we would think of God actually seeing future 
events; whereas, in the detenninistic case, we might think o f him as knowing the 
causally determined future based on his own divine intentions. In either of these latter 
cases, the supposed fatalistic implications can be thought of as taking the foim of an 
ontological fatalism. For these reasons, it might seem more appropriate to delete the 
categoiy of theological fatalism, and simply add it as an additional subdivision of the
other two categories. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the viability o f theological fatalism 
depends upon the existence of an omniscient God, it is a special case and (I think) 
deserving of its own category, even if  the distinction with the other two categories is 
not hard and fast.^
The other question we asked, above, was how the lack of power over the 
future was to be spelled out. Essentially, this question is asking for the object of our 
lack o f power—what is it that we lack power over when fatalism obtains (call this the 
‘object’ question)? There ai e at least two different ways of answering the object 
question, and these answers will yield a different means of categorizing fatalism than 
that provided by the source question. The first answer is that we lack the power to 
cause future events—our actions aie causally inefficacious. For example, though I 
am free to choose to take shelter during an air raid, if  I am fated to be killed, then my 
taking shelter will not cause me to suiwive. Thus, there is no point in even 
deliberating about what actions to choose. This type of reasoning is often called the 
Lazy Argument. The other answer—what I will call the traditional answer—to the 
object question is that I lack power over my actions themselves. For example, if  I, as 
a hypothetical Naval Commander, give the order for a naval battle, the battle will 
occur. But if  the battle was fated to occur, then I was unable to exercise autonomy in 
giving the order. So, my actions are causally efficacious, but they are not freely 
willed. We will look at examples of both of these types of arguments in Chapter 4.
I should note that many of the distinctions, and their placements, in the taxonomy are not hard and 
fast. The taxonomy is not meant to be definitive, but is meant to give the reader a sense of the range of 
options, and to pave tlie way for my discussion of some of tliose options.
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c. The Relationship between Fixity and Fatalism 
Given this taxonomy of fatalism, then, and given that I take the fixity of the future to 
be distinct fiom fatalism, in what way do I take the two doctrines to be related? One 
fairly obvious answer is that, given the existence of agents, a fixed future implies 
fatalism, but is not a consequence of it. The reason a fixed future would not be a 
consequence o f fatalism is that the domain of events associated with the latter is much 
more restricted than in the case of a fixed future: fatalism is only a doctrine about 
events involving agents. So, according to this answer, if all future events are fixed, 
then human beings lack fi*eedom; but if  fatalism obtains, then fi’om this we can only 
infer that future events involving human beings are fixed, not that all future events are 
fixed.
Unfoitunately, however, this characterization of the relationship between a 
fixed future and a fated one is an oversimplification. In the first place, it does not take 
into account the range of possibilities with respect to different categories o f fatalism. 
For example, if  the type of fatalism that is meant to follow from the Lazy Argument 
obtains, then even some human involving events would not be fixed, since the 
argument assumes that we can make oui* own choices. More importantly, though, the 
above characterization of the relationship also fails to take into account different 
specifications o f fixity. In Part I o f this thesis, I will be attempting to aii'ive at a 
determination of what metaphysically grounds the asymmetry of fixity; and different 
grounds for the asymmetry are not only going to result in different specifications of it, 
but also in different ways in which fixity might be related to the different categories 
of fatalism. And, of these different ways, it might be that some prove more plausible 
relationships than others.
Take, for example, the causal detei*ministic variety of fatalism: if  we discover 
in the ensuing investigation that fixity is grounded in ontology (according to which a
10
fixed event is one that exists)^^ then the fixity of the future would not only fail to be a 
consequence of this variety of fatalism, but it would also not imply it. This is because 
we can conceive of a future that, though (causally) deterministically related to the 
present/past, does not exist; just as we can conceive of an existent fliture that is 
nonetheless (causally) mdeterministically related to the present/past (surely it is not a 
necessary condition for an existent future that it be related to the present and past in 
the way specified by causal determinism). On the other hand, i f  we conclude that 
fixity is a causal notion, according to which the direction of causation determines the 
asymmetry of fixity, then it would appear that fixity and the causal deterministic 
variety o f fatalism not only lack a conditional relationship, but that they are actually 
contradictory. On such a view, the potentiality (or temporal possibility) of the future 
would be assured by the same causal laws that aie supposed to yield causal 
deteiminism (and thus, ex hypothesis fatalism).
If, however, we are considering the variety o f fatalism that is meant to follow 
from a temporal etemalism (whereby all events exist eternally).; awJ fixity is grounded 
in ontology, then it is plausible that that the fixity of the future both implies, and is a 
consequence of, (this variety of) fatalism. In such a case, an existent future would be 
the source (ground) both for the fixity of the future, and for ontological fatalism.
What about logical fatalism? Here, regardless of which variety o f logical 
fatalism we are considering, the specification of the metaphysical ground o f fixity 
seems not to be relevant, for precisely the same reason that logical fatalism is 
supposed to be a worry: because the laws of logic are thought to be independent of 
temporal considerations like the asymmetry of fixity. That is to say, the logical
One might think, given my characterization of a fixed fiiture as ‘actual’, that a fixed future follows 
immediately (i.e. absent any argument) fi-om an existent fiituie. This, however, would be to beg the 
question against the B-Theorist who believes the future is non-fixed; since such a theorist takes this 
position to be compatible with her belief tliat all events exist eternally and aie actual simpliciter. This 
is my reason for allowing tlie modal characterization of fixity for the time being.
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fatalist infers that the futm*e is just as inexorable as the past, given that truth about the 
future is just as determinate as truth about the past. So, logical fatalism tells us that 
humans lack freedom because of the laws of logic and independently of whatever 
gi-ounds fixity. Thus, regaidless of whether we take fixity to be grounded in ontology 
or causation, and regardless of whether such giounds, by themselves, support an 
asymmetry o f fixity; if  the logical fatalist's argument goes thiough, and the laws of 
logic do nullify human freedom, then it is likely that they also determine that all 
future events aie fixed. Here too, then, we would also be confronted with the 
possibility that the fixity of the future and fatalism imply one another.
Of course, it is yet to be established that fatalism follows intelligibly from any 
of these purported sources. The taxonomy merely presents them as options. We will 
see to what extent they are viable options (witli the exception of causal determinism) 
as we proceed. What I want to establish at this point is simply that, in some cases, it 
is plausible that there is an intimate relationship between a fixed future and fatalism, 
even though the two doctrines are distinct. Therefore, when confr onted with these 
cases, I will speak of a fixed future both in tenus of itself, as well as in terms of any 
fatalistic implications it might have, implicitly acknowledging both the distinction, as 
well as the relationship, between the two concepts.
A  ‘A-Theory’and ‘B-Theory'
We now move to a discussion of the teiminology associated with different 
conceptions of time. Throughout Part I o f the thesis, I will frequently make reference 
to the ‘A-Theory’, and its rival, the ‘B-Theory’. Very basically, the A-Theory of time 
takes what McTaggart (1908) famously referred to as the class o f A-determinations as 
the most fundamental aspect o f time (or at least as an essential aspect of it, depending 
on tlie version). These A-determinations are simply those of past, present, and future. 
Given that what is past, present, and future is constantly changing, the A-Theory
12
emphasizes the dynamic nature of time. The B-Theory takes McTaggart s ^-relations 
as the most fundamental aspect of time. These are the relations of earlier than, later 
than, and simultaneous with. Since these temporal relations are static, the B-Theory 
emphasizes the eternal nature o f time. Now, there are many different versions of both 
the A-Theory and the B-Theory of time. In their ‘purest’ forms, they both reduce the 
opposing class of determinations (or relations) to their own class. But even among 
these ‘purists’, in both camps one can find quite an aiTay o f disparate tenets. For this 
reason, one might think that the terms ai e misleading and no longer o f any gi eat use. 
Nevertheless, I will retain the use of them, but will specify in different contexts what I 
intend them to refer to.
For my initial purposes, I will stipulate that the A-Theory of time is embodied 
in two key tenets: i) the affirmation of the dynamic nature o f time, according to which 
temporal becoming is an objective feature o f reality, and ii) the denial of the existence 
of the futm e. There are, of course, many A-Theorists—known as presentists—who 
also deny the existence o f the past. But we will not be considering their doctrine until 
Chapter 2, so the more generic version of the A-Theory that I have stipulated will 
serve to get us stalled. The B-Theory, then, stands in opposition to i) and ii), and 
claims that time is static and ontologically symmetrical (past, present, and futuie are 
all equally real). So, initially at least, I wish to maintain no distinction between the A- 
Theorist who is a presentist and the one who also admits the past into her ontology. 
Similarly, I wish to maintain no distinction between these A-Theorists and someone 
such as Tooley, who endorses i) and ii), above, but denies other common tenets of the 
A-Theory, such as that all tenseless concepts can be analyzed in terms of tensed ones. 
For my purposes, Tooley is as much an A-Theorist as any other. Again, I should note 
that the discussion in Chapter 2 will require further refinement of my generic 
chai acterization of the A-Theory, given that that discussion comes in the context of a
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debate among A-Theorists. But the initial debate in Chapter 1 will be between the A- 
and B-Theorist, and thus the generic characterization will serve us well there, since it 
is sufficiently narrow to distinguish it firom any form of the B-Theory.
Not only is it a consequence of carving up the distinction between the A- and 
B-Theory in the way I have done, that certain hybrid A-B Theorists (such as Tooley) 
are included in the A-Theory camp, but also that other hybrid theorists are excluded 
from either camp. Here I am thinking of McTaggart himself, as well as McCall. Both 
of these philosophers affiiin the dynamic nature of time, but they do not cash it out in 
terms of the coming into existence o f present events. In McTaggart’s case, becoming 
consists in fiiture events becoming present and then past.  ^^  Of course, McTaggart 
thought that time was unreal, but he deduced this conclusion from a conception of 
time according to which both the A-determinations and B-relations aie essential 
aspects of time. For him, even though the dynamic nature of time is more 
fundamental, its static nature is also essential. So his picture is one of a B-series of 
events strung out in time, all equally real, and only being differentiated by their ever 
changing instantiation of the properties o f pastness, presentness, and futurity (and 
degrees thereof).
There are two reasons why I have chosen to exclude this conception of time 
from the discussion. First, regardless o f what sort of consequences it has with respect 
to the asymmetry of fixity, there are a great many commentators who agi*ee with 
McTaggart that it leads to paradox (they, however, choose either to reject or to modify 
the conception, rather than rejecting the reality o f time).^  ^ Here I will refi*ain fiom 
passing judgment on whether or not this is right, since I fear that the controversy
“ Here, and throughout the thesis when I make reference to ‘McTaggart’s conception’, I intend the 
conception of time from which McTaggart deduced its unreality.
Although McTaggart’s Paradox will not be the focus of this thesis, I do discuss it briefly in Chapter 
2, Section I, and in the Epilogue. Pliilosophers who accept, to varying degrees, that paradox follows 
from McTaggart’s conception of time include Craig (1998,2001b), Dummett (1980), Le Poidevin
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regarding the coherence of McTaggart’s conception would cloud the issue as to its 
implications for the asymmetry of fixity. Second, in the present context, McTaggart’s 
conception does not provide a stark enough contrast to the B-Theorist’s position, 
since they both agiee that past, present, and future events are all equally existent; and 
it is precisely the question whether such an ontology allows for the asymmetry of 
fixity, that I will be discussing when I look at the 5-Theory in Chapter 1.
As for McCall, he cashes out the dynamic nature of time in teims of the 
annihilation of all future possibilities other than the one made actual in the present.
This model is also motivated by A-Theoretic intuitions about temporal asymmetry 
and temporal becoming, but it satisfies those intuitions at the cost o f an extreme 
realism about future possibilities. For this reason, it, too, resists a neat juxtaposition 
with the way I have distinguished the A- and B-Theoretic ontology (i.e. between a
non-existent and existent future). Furthermore, it would seem to violate the common
1
!
sense which presumably gives rise to the A-Theoretic intuitions in the first place. jI
Common sense not only tells us that time is dynamic, and that the present and past are |
actual in a way that the future is not; it also tells us that the reality o f future I
possibilities is merely an abstract reality, not a reality that is every bit as concrete as ■
present actualities. Of course, McCall designed his model not only to allow for 
temporal asymmetry and becoming, but also to allow for the solutions to a number of 
other, wide ranging philosophical problems. Neveifheless, given the limited scope of 
this thesis, and for the other reasons stated, I will also exclude McCall’s model fiom 
the discussion.
II, Organization of the Thesis 
With those terminological preliminaiies out of the way, let us take a look at the 
organisation and direction of the thesis. In Pait I, I investigate the relations between
(1991: 24-35), and Mellor (1998: 70-81); and those who deny it include Broad (1938: 309-17), Lowe
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the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition about the 
asymmetry of fixity, on the other. I argue that the so called ‘pure’ forms of these 
theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do 
justice to the guiding intuition. The ‘pure’ B-Theoiy, with its denial of objective 
temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. 
The ‘pure’ A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the 
robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Paif I of 
my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past 
exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those 
fatalistic arguments which rely upon the deteiminateness of future truth as their key 
premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal 
concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the 
Epilogue, I identify some questions that remain to be answered, and outline an 
approach to answering them. In particular, I provide a more detailed sketch of the 
account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more 
thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument. That is the general 
structure of the thesis. In what remains of the Inti oduction, I will provide a summary 
o f each chapter.
In Chapter 1 ,1 investigate the relation between an existent future and a fixed 
one, and whether the former implies the latter. The A-Theorist claims it does, while 
most B-Theorists claim it does not. After considering arguments on both sides of the 
debate, I conclude that it will only ever end in an impasse. I then diagnose this 
impasse as resulting fi om different conceptions o f what a fixed future consists in, and 
claim that these two opposed conceptions aie based on the assertion (on the A- 
Theorist’s part) and denial (on the B-Theorist’s part) of objective temporal becoming.
(1998: 91,2002: 318-9), Prior (1967: 4-7), and Sider (2001: 35n.l9).
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I conclude that the robust asymmetry of fixity endorsed by the A-Theorist is not even 
intelligible if  there is no objective temporal becoming.
In Chapter 2 ,1 investigate whether the presentist A-Theorist, given her 
doctrine o f ontological sy m m etry is  able to account for the asymmetry o f fixity. 
Given that presentism is, to a large extent, motivated by common sense, and given 
that the asymmetry of fixity is so fundamentally a part of that common sense, this 
challenge is an especially important one for the presentist to meet. The investigation 
involves considering different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, that might be 
said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry. I argue that the presentist 
cannot avail herself of these, and that therefore her doctrines of ontological symmetry 
and asymmetry of fixity aie inconsistent. I go on to suggest that only an ontological 
asymmetry, according to which the past exists and the fiitui'e does not, can giound the 
asymmetry o f fixity; and, further, that the former asymmetiy is, in turn, grounded in 
objective temporal becoming. In offering, however, an A-Theoretic account of time 
that affirms the existence of the past, I find that I must be cautious in navigating 
between the two extremes of presentism and etemalism. This caution leads to the 
rather surprising conclusion that the only events that exist are past events. This is not 
to claim (as the presentist does about the past) that the present is umeal. Rather, the 
present does not designate a temporal region at all, it is the ever shifting boundary 
between what is real (the past) and what is unreal (the future). On this ‘pastist’ 
account of time, past events come into existence when they are fully actualized, and 
then exist tenselessly. This tenseless existence is manifested in the existence o f their 
logical traces at all times subsequent to their actualization. What aie these logical
On my use of the terns ‘ontological symmetry’ and ‘ontological asymmetry’: unless othei-wise 
stated, I will use these terms to refer to an a/symmetry of existence. I recognize that one might also 
postulate an ontological asymmetry of properties (such as in McTaggart’s conception and McCall’s 
model), but it is the more robust rendering that I intend.
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traces? They are the ‘thisnesses’ of the events in question, where a thisness of x is the 
property of being x, or the property of being identical to x.
In Chapter 3 ,1 introduce the two most common logical fatalistic ai'gument 
types: the argument from antecedent truth value, which most contemporary 
philosophers claim is guilty of an obvious modal fallacy; and the argument fr om 
temporal necessity, winch is widely regarded as the most woirying argument for 
fatalism, I then provide an analysis of the concept of temporal necessity which calls 
into question its modal legitimacy, thus rendering the argument from temporal 
necessity ineffective. In Part 11 will have been pushing for the idea that the concept 
of fixity is fundamentally an ontological concept, not a modal one. Considerations 
derived from my analysis of temporal necessity bolster this idea, and point to the 
argument fr om antecedent truth value as actually being the more worrisome.
Having just defended the ar gument from antecedent truth value fr om the 
modal fallacy charge, in Chapter 4 1 analyze a couple of different manifestations of 
the ar gument, and claim that they rest on an undefended assumption. The assumption 
is that events ar e fixed by the truth values of their corTesponding propositions. I 
question this assumption, and claim that the fatalistic conclusion cannot go through 
without an argument in defense o f the assumption. I also claim, however, that the 
anti-fatalist who embraces determinate truth about the future could provide a more 
thoroughgoing rejection of the argument by saying i) why the truth values of 
propositions do not fix their corresponding events, and ii) how events do get fixed.
In the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the pastist account of time 
suggested at the end o f Chapter 2. The account involves endorsing a hybrid theory, 
according to which both static and dynamic aspects are constitutive of the concept of 
time, neither being reducible to the other. I will suggest a way that this hybrid theory 
can provide answers to questions i) and ii), raised at the end of Chapter 4, and then
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State how it is different from Tooley’s hybrid theory. If the suggestion is a promising 
one, then my account will not only have justified the intuition about a robust 
asymmetry o f fixity, but it will also have provided for the compatibility of that 
intuition with another highly intuitive idea, namely, that the laws of classical logic^  ^
apply timelessly and universally to all propositions.
Here, I am collectively refening to the law of identity, law of non-contradiction, and law of excluded 
middle (where die latter is interpreted as implying die principle of bivalence)
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PARTI
TIME, FIXITY, AND ONTOLOGY
CHAPTER 1
B-THEORY AND ONTOLOGICAL SYMMETRY 
Introduction
One of the reasons that A-Theorists offer for rejecting the static B-Theory is that it 
cannot account for our experience of temporal becoming. They take this experience 
as evidence of a fundamental and objective feature of reality; and there has, of course, 
been a great deal of discussion and debate between A- and B-Theorists as to whether 
temporal experience really does provide such evidence. The abundance of discussion 
with respect to temporal becoming stands in contrast to another oft cited, though 
much less discussed, reason for rejecting the B-Theory, namely, its alleged 
implications for the asymmetry of fixity. The B-Theory, in all of its different forms, 
not only postulates that time is static (as opposed to dynamic), but also that time is 
ontologically symmetrical: there is no ontological distinction between past and future. 
The A-Theoretic woiTy regarding this doctrine is that if the future participates in the 
same degiee of existence as the past (and present), then how can the future be non­
fixed and merely potential (or, if  you prefer, temporally possible^)? Or, more 
concretely, if  the event of the Third World War exists eternally, then in what sense is 
that event—prior to its occuirence—not inexorable?
The A-Theorist’s intuition is that there is no sense in which it is not 
inexorable; and so, in order to preseiwe the potentiality of the future, many 
philosophers of time have rejected the B-Theoretic doctiine of an existent future. 
Although this is a motivating factor for such philosophers, not much is said in the way 
of explaining or defending their belief that an existent future implies a fixed one. As 
for the B-Theorist’s part, she will simply claim that an existent future, though actual, 
is not necessary, and that therefore tliere is no worry about the future being fixed. The
 ^ See the Introduction to tlie thesis, Section LA.
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eternal existence of the Third World War simply implies that there Mdll be a Third 
World War, not that there necessarily will be. Is this response all that is required to 
allay the concerns of the A-Theorist? Obviously the A-Theorist does not think so; but 
what should she say in her defense? In this chapter, I will be considering arguments 
on both sides of the debate, in an attempt to get clear about the relationship between 
an existent fiiture and a fixed one, and to deteimine whether the foimer does, indeed, 
imply the latter. One point of interest that will emerge fi'om the debate is that this 
question, though often not discussed in any great detail, is closely related to, and 
hinges upon, the much more widely debated question of temporal becoming.
Before beginning in earnest, I need to make two points about the discussion in 
this chapter. First, as I mentioned in the Intioduction to the thesis, throughout this 
investigation I will not be concerned with the issue of causal deteiminism. This point 
is worth reiterating in the present context, since some might take the debate in this 
chapter to be about the deterministic implications of an existent future. But as Tooley 
(1997: 20-7) has pointed out, causal indeteiminism is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the non-existence of the future. A non-existent future may 
nonetheless be a causally deteimined one (Tooley’s own view), and an existent future 
need not necessarily be causally determined. These claims seem much less 
conti'oversial to me than claims about the relationship between,/bc/(y and existence of 
the ftiture, and I am therefore interested in the latter. Second, though the general 
question at hand is whether an existent futuie implies a fixed one, the discussion will 
sometimes take the form of whether an existent future implies fatalism. As I argued 
in the Introduction, if  an existent future does imply a fixed one, then it also implies 
ontological fatalism; similarly, if  ontological fatalism obtains, then the future is fixed
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in virtue o f its existence? So, even though I generally take the fixity of the future and 
fatalism to be distinct, given their specific forms in the context of this chapter, they 
are intimately related and I will treat them as such.
Though there is not a great deal of discussion in the literature either defending 
or attacking the belief that an existent future is fixed, in spite of the fact that the belief 
is a key motivational factor for the A-Theorist (just as its denial is a pre-requisite for 
any B-Theorist who wishes to affiim the temporal possibility of the future); some of 
what little extant discussion there is I will cover in Section I. From this discussion my 
position alongside the A-Theorist will emerge, and in Section III will offer some 
additional aiguments for that position. I will also, however, be considering how the 
B-Theorist might object to these arguments, and will eventually conclude that the 
debate must end in an impasse. Finally, I will diagnose this impasse by making some 
concluding remarks about the asymmetry of fixity and its relation to temporal 
becoming—remarks that suggest that the fonner concept is unintelligible on a B- 
Theoretic conception of time.
I I. Some Representative Arguments
I
: In this section, I will begin with a discussion of the B-Theoretic arguments against the
idea that an existent future is a fixed one, making reference to the works o f Smart 
 ^ (1981) and Mellor (1998). I will then discuss Tooley’s (1997) arguments against an
' existent future, one of which is based on the common sense idea that at least some
future events are preventable.
A. Smart
Most of Smart’s ar guments against the umeality of the future focus on issues arising 
fi'om special relativity and reference to future individuals. According to Smart, 
special relativity has shown us that one man’s future could, theoretically, be another
I also held out the option that causal detemiinism might be the source of ontological fatalism. Here,
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man’s past; and so if  we believe existence to be an absolute, the idea of a non-existent 
future is incoherent? Furthennore, arguments which claim that since we cannot refer 
to fixture individuals, they must not exist, ar e merely confixsing ontology and 
epistemology. But, of course, here we are concerned neither with the scientific, nor 
with the epistemological, ramifications of an existent future; rather, we are concerned 
with the modal ramifications (according to the characterization of fixity I am offering 
the B-Theorist). And Smart does briefly consider this aspect of the question, though 
he only devotes a single paragraph to it. Nevertheless, it will be of benefit to briefly 
mention what he has to say.
He considers whether the opponent of an existent future might not be 
motivated by considerations of free choice and the ability to alter the futur e. But, as 
Smart rightly points out, if  one tries to alter the fixture by doing A rather than doing B, 
then A just is the future—nothing whatsoever has been altered. So we should not 
speak of altering the future any more than we would speak of altering the past. But 
then Smart says that ‘There are no alternative futures just as there are no alternative 
pasts’ (1981: 149). Notice the shift here fi'om what is alterable to what has 
alternatives. Surely there is room to deny the former while affirming the latter with 
respect to the future? That is to say, whatever way things go, certainly they will go 
that way, but presently there is still a number of alternative ways things might go. 
Nor is this to confuse ontology and epistemology, as Smart claims. One’s belief in 
the temporal possibility of the future need have nothing to do with one’s lack of 
certainty about the future. Of course, it seems straight foiward that a non-existent
given the context, I am discounting that option.
 ^For the record, I share Markosian’s ambivalence about special relativity and its puiported 
ramifications for the A-Theory (2004: 73-5). For one possible way of reconciling special relativity 
with the A-Theoiy, see Chapter 2, Section II.B. For another, see Tooley (1997: 335-71). Of course, 
my ambivalence about special relativity is probably just as perplexing to a B-Theorist like Smart, as his 
ambivalence about common sense is to me. As Smart remarks elsewhere, ‘it may be tlie case that a 
“Heraclitean” will find things quite intelligible which are quite obscure to a “Pamienidean” like me’ 
(1980: 82-3).
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fixture is not knowable^; but if  Sinait does not see this epistemological point as 
providing evidence for the um*eahty of the fixture, then we need not cite it as such. 
Surely it is enough to cite the possibility of prevention, such that if the pi eventive 
factor had not been present, a different possible fixtui*e would have occurred. Smart 
also says that even if  there were alternative fixtures, this would point to a ‘multiplicity 
of fixtures, n ot... an unreal fixture’ (ibid.). But the nihilist about the fixtui e believes 
that the existence o f fixture possibilities is merely an abstiact existence, and so is not 
forced to choose between the concrete existence of one actual fixture (Smart’s view), 
and the concrete existence of a multiplicity of fixtxxres (as in McCall’s model), fix the 
same manner, the modal actualist can admit that there are possibilities without being 
forced to adopt modal lealism.
Given Smaxt’s obstinate denial that there are alternative fixtures, pexhaps he is 
not the sort of B-Theorist that we should look to in our investigation. We are trying to 
discover whether the coimnon sense idea that the fixtixie is non-fixed, not inexorable, 
and replete with (abstract) possibilities is sustainable on a view of time according to 
which the actual fixture exists. One almost senses that Smait does not share tliis 
common sense idea, or at least that he is indifferent regarding it. So let’s move on to 
Mellor, a B-Theorist who does seem to take the asymmetry of fixity seiiously, and 
who, neveitheless, sees no conflict between this asymmetiy and the B-Theory of time.
B. Mellor
Mellor acknowledges that while at any present moment there axe ‘many possible 
futures, there is only one possible past, the actual one’ (Mellor 1998: 20). Of course, 
he does not actually believe that there is such a thing as the present, since the present 
moment is an A-nioment, and he thinks only B-moments exist. So at any ^ -moment, 
say, 5 PM on January 16, 2004, it is tme that thei*e are many possible fixtures (l elative
 ^I should note that I take tliis claim to be distinct from the claim that propositions about a non-existent
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to that B-moment), but only one past (relative to that B-moment). In the same breath, 
however, Mellor wishes to maintain that at that B-moment there is only one actual 
future, ‘containing all and only the B-facts that will eventually be first present and 
then past’ {ibid). So ‘B-possibilities’ vary over time, even though B-facts do not.
Are these claims consistent?^ Mellor thinks so. This is because, for him, the future’s 
being non-fixed and the past’s being fixed  ^are not constituted by an asymmetry of 
ontology, rather they are constituted by the unidirectionality of causation {ibid.\ 35). 
The latter is what deteimines both the direction of time and the modal asymmetry 
between past and future events. Mellor is quick to point out that this asymmetry does 
not depend upon, or hold between, events that actually instantiate pastness and 
futurity; rather, it simply depends upon whether, at any B-moment t, events are earlier 
or later than t {ibid). If they ai e earlier, then at t they are fixed, if  later, then at t they 
are non-fixed.
Setting aside, for the moment, the claim that the asymmetry of fixity is 
constituted by the unidirectionality of causation, what should we make of Mellor’s 
other claims? He believes it is consistent to claim that at t all events later than t are 
actual and existent, even though there also exist at t possible alternatives to those 
actual future events. But if there is only one series of actual events, and these exist 
eternally and tenselessly, then in what sense can there be other possibilities as o f any 
time r? Consider two events, E\ and £"2 , which occur at t\ and t2 , respectively. 
Regardless of where (when?) one’s current temporal experience is located on the 
timeline, E\ and E2 eternally exist and occur at ti and t2 . Suppose that fa is present.
friture cannot be tmtli apt. The latter claim is one that I should like to deny. See the Epilogue.
 ^One should not think that, if there is any inconsistency, it must lie in his use of A-teims when he 
doesn’t believe that A-properties exist. He still thinks that A-temiinology is useful and, indeed, 
required, even tliough it does not refer to anything real. So when he uses these teims, one should 
understand tliat upon demand he could offer a consistent (if not altogether satisfying) paraphrase using 
only B-teniiinology.
 ^Mellor does not actually refer to tlie asymmetry in terms of fixity, but in terms of the modal 
characterization (temporal necessity/possibility) that I have been offering the B-Theorist.
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then clearly there is no sense in which E2 could (at 3^) fail to occur at t2 . It already has 
occurred! But what if  ^  is present, how is it now the case that it is possible that E2 not 
occur at 2^? Nothing has changed! Our location on the timeline does not change the 
ontology of events in time. That ontology, according to the B-Theorist, is perfectly 
symmetiical with respect to past and future (or with respect to earlier than/later than 
the present moment).
Perhaps Mellor would claim that I am confusing actuality with necessity. The 
fixture is actual, but this does not mean that it is necessaiy. This reply would force me 
to aclmowledge that at t\ it is, in some sense, possible that E2 not occxxi* at t2 . But it 
seexus to me that the sense in which it is possible fails to do justice to our intuition 
that the fixture is non-fixed. It is only possible in the sense that there is some possible 
world in which the seiies of events in time is fixed diffexontly. And all this means is 
that in the actual world, though the fixture is not fixed necessarily, it is fixed 
contingently.^’^  The past is also thus contingently fixed, and yet this fact does not 
give us any comfort when we find ouiselves legietting a past event. It is not as if  
someone could console us by saying, ‘Just because the past is actual, doesn’t mean it 
is necessary. Things might have gone diffexently.’ The appropriate I'cply would be, 
‘But they didn’t! And the occurrence of that event is now inexorable.’ So, too, at t\ 
E fs  occuiTence at t2 is inexorable, even z/there is a possible world in which E2 does 
not occur at t2 \ since, in this world, E2 is eternally at t2 .
Although I believe the foregoing considerations cast doubt on Mellor’s ability 
to reconcile an actual and real fixtixre with a non-fixed one, they ai*e by no means 
conclusive. In the next section I will expand on them as well as consider possible B-
 ^The contingency of the fixity I am refeiing to here should be read as broadly logical, not causal or 
deterministic, contingency.
 ^This is the reason that I eschew the modal characterization of the asymmetry, since, if I am right, it is 
possible that the future be fixed in a way that thr eatens fatalism witlrout it being fixed—or fixed in just 
that way—in all possible worlds. See Chapter 3, Section IV and Conclusion.
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Theoretic objections. In the mean time, this is a natuial point at which to return to 
Mellor’s claim that the asyimnetry of fixity is grounded in the unidirectionality of 
causation; since it is on the basis of this claim that Mellor thinks an actual future is 
possible in a way that the actual past is not. The idea is that even though there is no 
ontological difference between past and future events, there is an asymmetry in the 
direction of causation (from earlier to later), and this asymmetry results in a fixed past 
and non-fixed future {ibid). I will ai*gue in Chapter 2 that the presentist’s attempt to 
ground the asymmetry of fixity in the unidirectionality of causation cannot succeed. 
But the arguments I rely upon in that context assume an A-Theoretic account of 
causation— one according to which the direction of causation is gi ounded in the 
direction of time and objective temporal becoming. Clearly, however, arguments 
based on this account would not cany any weight against Mellor, since his account of 
causation is obviously jwt an A-Theoretic one. According to Mellor, causal order 
determines temporal order, not the other way around {ibid.: 106-8); so causation is the 
most fundamental aspect of time, not—for obvious reasons—temporal becoming. 
Nevertheless, in the present context, I am happy to allow Mellor’s views regarding the 
nature of causation; for if I can shed doubt, even upon these giounds, on his ability to 
account for the asymmetry o f fixity, then so much the worse for the grounds.
One reason for dissatisfaction with Mellor’s attempt to base the asyimnetry of 
fixity on the fact that causes temporally precede their effects, is that it is not clear that 
that fact isn’t a mere manifestation of the asymmetry in question, as opposed to a 
detenninant of it. For Mellor, at any B-moment t, all events earlier than t are fixed, 
and some events later than t are non-fixed; and this is because nothing at or later than 
t could be a cause of anything earlier than t, whereas many things at or earlier than t 
can be causes of things later than t {ibid.: 35). But this is simply an observation about 
the nature of causation, and in no way explains what makes the past fixed and future
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non-fixed. There is, of course, a sense in which this objection is unfair, since it seems 
to demand of the B-Theorist something she cannot offer; namely, an explanation of 
how past events acquire the property of fixity. This is unfair because B-Theorists do 
not think past events have any special properties in virtue of which they are past—all 
events ai e ontologically on a pai*. In spite o f the unfairness of this demand, however, 
it is a natural one to make if one endorses a robust asymmetry of fixity. And once this 
point is aclaiowledged, one begins to wonder whether A-Theorists and B-Theorists 
are really agreeing, rather than equivocating, when they both affirm the non-fixity of 
the fiituie. We will return to this point later in the conclusion to the chapter.
Another reason for disputing Mellor’s account, is that he has not shown that an 
event tliat can be causally effected might not also be a fixed one. Consider an 
example fiom fatalism. Suppose that I am able, at i^, to cause E2 to occur at The 
fact that I am able to do so, but am unable, at t2, to cause E\ not to have occurred at t\, 
in no way implies that I was able, at i^, to avoid causing E2 to occur at t2 . In short, it 
is perfectly conceivable that events which we are able to causally effect might, 
nevertheless, be fixed; since the intention to cause such events might be every bit as 
fixed as the effects themselves. In connection with this point, recall fi*om the 
Introduction to the thesis the distinction between the Lazy Argument for fatalism and 
the traditional version. Here, in making the point that the unidirectionality of 
causation does not mle out fatalism, I am appealing to the latter. That is, I am not 
appealing to the argument that says, for example, ‘Since it is fated that you will either 
be killed or not be killed tomonow, there is no point in taking precautions against 
being killed’; because this argument implies that our actions—though freely willed—  
are not efficacious. I am, rather, appealing to the argument that says, ‘Though your 
actions affect the future, they (the actions) ai*e fated and so aie not performed with 
autonomy.’ According to this version of fatalism, the effects of our future actions ai*e
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fated not because of a breakdown in the causal process, but because that process 
itself—beginning with our deliberations and volitions, and ending with our actions 
and their effects—is fated. Thus, as long as I can get the B-Theorist to acknowledge 
the possibility of this type of fatalism, then my point—that an event caused by an 
agent might nevertheless be a fixed one—follows. If these arguments have any merit, 
then the mere fact that causes precede their effects cannot constitute the asymmetry of 
fixity; in which case, the B-Theorist cannot appeal to this fact in trying to account for 
the temporal possibility of the future.
So my line o f ai'gument against Mellor and the B-Theorist is to claim that a 
real and actual futui e does threaten to underaiine the asymmetry of fixity, and that the 
unidirectionality of causation does not entail otherwise. Again, however, I wish to 
stress that these considerations aie merely suggestive, and that they will need to be 
reinforced in the next section. Before moving on to that section, we will first see what 
Tooley has to say in favor of a non-existmt future.
C. Tooley
Tooley {pp. cit.) does not tackle straight on the issue of whether an existent future 
entails a fixed one. Instead, he offers an argument which puiports to show that if  
future events are preventable, then those events camiot exist until they are made actual 
in the present. So rather than arguing directly that an existent future entails a fixed 
one, he argues, in effect, for the conti apositive. That is, he argues that the non-fixity 
of the future (i.e. a preventable future) entails a non-existent future. Thus, although 
his discussion is indirect with respect to the question at hand, I will take it as 
equivalent. Interestingly, however, he eventually finds this ‘argument from 
preventability’ unsatisfactory, and goes on to replace it with an altogether different 
argument for the non-existence of the future. I, too, think the initial argument is 
unsatisfactory, but for different reasons than does Tooley. In the remainder of this
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section, I will first present the argument, then briefly discuss Tooley’s criticisms and 
the direction they lead him, before offering my own critique of the argument. His 
criticisms and the resultant new argument for the non-existence of the future involve 
in-depth analyses both of the possibility of backwai'ds causation and of the nature of 
causation itself. In Chapter 2 I will provide a critique of the latter analysis. Here I 
will not be treating either analysis, but will simply sketch an outline of his discourse. 
As I hope to show, my criticisms of Tooley’s argument from preventability will delete 
the requirement—in the cuiTent chapter—for a thoroughgoing treatment of these 
analyses anyway.
Tooley’s argument from preventability starts fr om the assumption that the 
existence of a fr ee and omnipotent person is logically possible; and then claims, given 
a world that contains three distinct times ri, 2^ , and fa, and a state of affairs S' existing 
at to, that such a person could, at time t\, have ensuied that S not exist at time 
However, it is logically impossible for such a person, at time to,, to ensure the non­
existence of S at time ti (assuming the impossibility of backwards causation). Thus, 
since S’s existence could still be prevented as of fi, and since S’s existence cannot be 
prevented (or rescinded) as of to>, the past exists while the fixture does not.*® Tooley 
lodges two complaints against this ai'gument. First, he claims that the argument is 
fatally flawed, in that it must assume the impossibility of backwards causation. This 
assumption is unacceptable because, of the arguments that one might use against the 
possibility of backwards causation (Tooley surveys six), they all either assume a 
dynamic view of time**, in which case the argument from pieventability begs the
 ^ ‘Could have ensured tliat S not exist’ is Tooley’s own paraplirase of ‘could have prevented S’ {ibid.\ 
46).
Perhaps Tooley’s ‘prevent’ and my ‘rescind’ are not useful temis in this debate, since they seem to 
presuppose a dynamic conception of time. I assume, however, that tlie appropriate subjunctive 
conditionals could be reworded so as to retain the original meaning but without begging the question 
against the static conception of time. See Tooley’s second objection to the argument, below.
It is worth noting that Tooley’s definition of a dynamic world is one in which different states of 
affairs exist at different times.
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question against a static view of time; or they assume that the impossibility of causal 
loops entails the impossibility of backwards causation. That is to say, those 
arguments against backwards causation that are neutral with respect to the nature of 
time, in fact only establish the impossibility of causal loops. And Tooley goes on to 
argue that backward causation does not entail the possibility of causal loops; in which 
case, the assumption against backwards causation in the argument from preventability 
is not well supported. So, either way, the latter argument fails on the basis of the , 
assumption against backwards causation.
His second objection to the argument is that the inference from 5”s 
preventability as of t\, to the conclusion that the world is a dynamic one, depends 
upon how ‘preventability’ is being explained. Tooley has explained it in tenus of 
certain subjunctive conditionals, and his worry now is that the B-Theorist could 
provide an account of the tmth conditions of subjunctive conditionals which allows 
her to agree that S is preventable as o f t\, but disagree that this implies that the world 
is a dynamic one. As Tooley puts it, this is because ‘first,... any standard account of 
the truth conditions of subjunctive conditionals will provide satisfactory truth 
conditions for the preventability conditionals in question, and, secondly, ... standaid 
accounts are all formulated entirely in tenus of states of affairs in a static world’
(ibid.: 69).
What this latter objection suggests to Tooley, is that he should try to show that 
all standard accounts of the tmth conditions of subjunctive conditionals are either 
inadequate or implicitly presuppose dynamic worlds. Of the standai d accounts, he 
claims that Jackson’s causal account is least susceptible to charges of inadequacy, and 
so he thinlcs the most promising move is to show that that account implicitly 
presupposes dynamic worlds. His strategy for doing this is to provide a lengthy 
analysis of causation, one which purports to show that that relation can only obtain in
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dynamic worlds in which the present and past exist, but in which the futui'e does not. 
Notice that this conclusion would also deal with the first objection to the argument 
from preventability, since it would now be legitimate to assume a dynamic world in 
arguing against the possibility of backwards causation (given that the account of 
causation being utilized in the argument is one which can only obtain in a dynamic 
world). But once he has done this, he sees himself as having provided a much more 
frindamental objection to the existence of the future than did the argument from 
preventability. Namely, he takes himself to have shown that causation is not possible 
in a static world. So, in rescuing the ai'gument fr om preventability, he has made it 
superfluous.
That is the complex dialectic that eventually leads to Tooley’s desired 
conclusion. For him, just as for Mellor, causation is ultimately the most fundamental 
aspect of time, deteimining all of its characteristics. But his account o f causation is 
one that can only obtain in a dynamic world, and he goes to great pains to show that it 
is the only satisfactory account. As I said above, I will reserve a critique of Tooley’s 
account of causation for Chapter 2, but I will simply remaik in passing here that I 
disagree that causation is the most fundamental aspect of time; and, in particular, I 
think that any A-Theoretic account of causation must presuppose temporal becoming 
and the asymmetry of fixity. As a matter of fact, I will ai'gue in Chapter 2 that the 
postulates upon which Tooley bases his account do just that. But even were we to 
gi ant that his account succeeds, what has become of the common ground that the A- 
and B-Theorists initially possessed in debating the existence of the future? The 
question we began with was, ‘Does an existent future entail a fixed one?’. We 
assumed all parties to the debate agreed that the future is not fixed—and so endorsed 
the asymmetry of fixity—and then we set about trying to discover whether a B- 
Theoretic ontology could allow for that asymmetiy. But now Tooley has taken us
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from that common ground, along a complex path, to a controversial position that is 
miles away from the simple intuition with which we began—a position that we must 
endorse in order to deny the existence of the future. But surely if the futui e is, indeed, 
non-existent, then the simple intuition that the future is preventable is not a 
superfluous consideration in the debate, and can do the work without having to make 
way for controversy. Accordingly, let’s take a look at the argument from 
preventability again, with a mind towaids critiquing and salvaging it in a way that 
acknowledges shared ground with the B-Theorist, while at the same time keeps the 
motivating intuition of the A-Theorist closely in view.
Tooley’s presentation of the argument from preventability went something 
like this (where A = Tooley’s ‘free and omnipotent person’):
(1) At ri, could have ensured that S not exist at t2 . (Assumption)
(2) Necessarily, causes precede their effects. (Assumption)
(3) So, at 3^ , A could not make it the case that S does not exist at Î2 .
(From (2))
(4) Therefore, as of t^ , S exists (in the past), but as o f^ ,S  does not
exist (in the future). (From (1) and (3))
His first objection to this argument was that the assumption of (2) amounts to an 
assumption of the conclusion, since (2 ) can only be demonstrated by assuming a 
dynamic conception of time. Although Tooley argues extensively for this latter claim, 
it is controversial and one that most B-Theorists are going to reject. So, since we are 
trying to allow for as much shared ground as possible between A- and B-Theorists, 
we should consider how the B-Theorist might object to Tooley’s presentation of the 
argument from preventability, rather than relying on Tooley’s own, controversial 
objection. In the first place, she would probably not target the assumption that an 
existent past is one that is fixed, since this is an assumption that she would likely
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gi ant. Rather, she would focus on the assumption that a preventable state o f affairs is 
one that cannot exist, as ( 1 ) seems to suggest. (1 ) is supposed to capture the non- 
fixity of the future, and therefore, it is supposed, should be agreed to by all those who 
endorse the common sense intuition. But surely the B-Theorist could—indeed, 
should—affirm the non-fixity of the futuie without embracing the characterization of 
it in (1). The extent to which an existent future is unpreventable is precisely the 
question at stake, not the much more widely accepted claim that the past is both 
existent and fixed.
So the B-Theorist is going to object that (1) assumes what the argument fiom 
preventability is supposed to demonstrate; that is, it assumes that a preventable event 
cannot exist, which, in turn, implies that an existent event cannot be prevented. Thus 
the problem with Tooley’s presentation of the argument fiom preventability is that it 
assumes what the proponent of the A-Theory needs to demonstrate: that an existent 
future is fixed, unpreventable, temporally necessary, etc. Is there a way to salvage the 
argument that exposes, as opposed to presupposes, a direct link between existence and 
fixity? In the next section I will attempt to do just that.
II. Some New Arguments—and an Impasse 
In the last section, I suggested that there are several considerations that favoui' the A- 
Theorist’s belief that an existent future is a fixed one, but that these by no means 
conclusively demonstrate this. To recapitulate briefly, those considerations involved 
the following thiee claims: First, the A-Theorist can acknowledge that the future will 
be what it will be, and that we certainly camiot alter the future; while still maintaining 
that there are alternative possible futures that, nonetheless, do not exist concretely. 
Second, the only sense in which an actual future can also admit of alternative possible 
futures is a trivial one; since, i f  the future is actual but not necessary, then—though 
not necessarily fixed—it is still contingently fixed, and how is contingent fixity any
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less counter-intuitive than necessary fixity? And, finally, the B-Theorist’s appeal to 
the direction of causation cannot insulate an actual future fiom the claim that it is a 
fixed one, since it is not clear that a future effect is any less fixed than a past or 
present cause. So how can we reinforce these considerations with more conclusive 
arguments? We saw that we should not, as Tooley did, attempt arguments that beg 
the question against the B-Theorist, or that make the above considerations 
superfluous; therefore, in this section I will offer two aiguments that purport to show 
in a non-circular way that the fixity of the future follows directly from its existence. I 
will also, however, consider forceful B-Theoretic objections to these arguments, and 
these will leave us in the rather unsatisfactory position of an impasse. I will conclude 
with some comments on the conceptual relation between fixity and temporal 
becoming—ones that will suggest a diagnosis of the impasse.
A. The Road Analogy 
The first ai'gument I will consider adapts an analogy suggested by Lewis (1986a: 202- 
3).*^  Lewis, in trying to explain the concept o f a temporal part, says it is like a part of 
a long road cut crosswise. Although the road may pass thiough Village A and Village 
B, some of its crosswise parts are only in A, others only in B, and many others in 
neither. So, too, according to Lewis, with objects spread out in time. Some of my 
temporal parts are located at the year 1969, others are located at the year 2004, but no 
temporal part of mine is wholly present at more than one time. This is the account of 
persistence known as perdurance, according to which objects persist by having 
different temporal parts at different t im es .G iv en  the B-Theorist’s emphasis on the 
static nature of time, one can see how she might be fond of such spatial analogies.
Sider (2001: 2ff.) also makes use of the analogy.
Lewis says that those people who fail to grasp tlie concept of a temporal pait are like the villagers (in 
Village A, say) who claim that all of tlie road’s parts are in their Village, ‘for not one single lane of it is 
missing’ (ibid.).
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Let’s adapt this road analogy in such a way that it offers a picture of the B-Theoretic 
timeline of static events and our subjective experience of ‘moving’ along it.
Suppose I am moving along the road from Village A to Village C, which runs 
via Village B, and my current location is Village B. This description o f my spatial 
location does not imply that Village C, or indeed Village A, are any less real than 
Village B. On the total spatial picture, my location along the road has no bearing on 
the ontology of the places that lie along it. The fact that I am ‘here’ in Village B does 
not say anything about Village B. ‘Here’ is just an indexical that derives its meaning 
fr om the context o f utterance. So, too, according to the B-Theorist, there is nothing 
objectively special about one’s subjective temporal location. ‘Now’ is just an 
indexical, and does not pick out any special propeity instantiated by the time at which 
I utter it. World War Tlnee (if actual simpliciter) is just as real as my writing of this 
thesis, as is World Wai* Two. For the B-Theorist, a maximal description of existence 
includes all times along the one dimensional timeline, just as anyone would agiee that 
it includes all places in three dimensional space.
But now consider the repercussions of the road analogy with respect to fixity, 
and specifically, with respect to fatalism. If the future is non-fixed, then we have at 
least a limited power over how things go for us in the future. According to the road 
analogy, however, the road is an analogue for the one dimensional timeline, so there 
is no getting off the road, and its track is already laid—its destination unavoidable. 
Given this analogy, if  I am currently located at Village B, how can it make any sense 
to say that I am able to avoid Village C? Here we must resist the temptation to thinlc 
the term ‘Village C’ is merely a variable for a future time, so that the claim that I am 
unable to avoid Village C is as innocent and trivial as the claim that I am unable to 
avoid a friture time fr, where fr is eai lier than, or simultaneous with, my death. If the 
analogy is to maintain its consistency, ‘Village C’ must be a specific event located on
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the timeline (‘the road’) at a specific time (say, ‘mile marker 30’). If the event 
corresponding to ‘Village C’ is, for example, my bmshing my teeth, then there is no 
possibility of declining to brush my teeth at the time denoted by ‘mile marker 30’.
The B-Theorist will no doubt reply in the same manner as we have already 
seen. She will say, ‘Of course it is tme that you will pass thiough Village C at mile 
marker 30. But what is false, and what must be tme if  a fixed future follows fiom an 
existent future, is that necessarily, you will pass through Village C at mile marker 30. 
The road does not have to pass thiough Village C, it is perfectly possible that it pass 
through Village D instead. But that possibility is not actual. The actual road does 
indeed pass through Village C. So what?’ My reply to this line of reasoning is to 
agree that the road does not necessarily pass thiough Village C, but to disagiee that 
such a necessity is, itself, a necessary condition for a fixed future. I can acknowledge 
that there are some possible worlds in which the road does not pass thiough Village C, 
and still think that in this world Village C is inexorable, and so fixed. And, as I have 
already said, the metaphysical contingency of the fixity does not make it any less 
counterintuitive; for past contingent events are also thus contingently fixed, given that 
there are possible worlds in which they never occurred. And, again, this contingency 
does not give us any sense that we have a power over the past, or that the past is 
somehow not inexorable.
Given a B-Theoretic ontology, the pai ameters of the road analogy are such 
that, i) it is impossible to get off the road, ii) it is impossible to stop moving along it, 
iii) the road is not under constiuction, but is complete and cannot be destroyed, 
rerouted, etc., and iv) it passes through Village C at mile marker 30. Thus the 
existence o f the road m its entirety, and the existence of Village C at a deteiminate 
location on that road, ensure that I cannot avoid passing through Village C, regardless 
of whether I choose to or not. The possibility of my avoiding Village C at mile
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marker 30 may exist in a world in which the road takes a different course, but there is 
nothing that I can choose to do that would make such a world accessible. So, too, 
given the tenseless existence of all events in histoiy, the possibility that another 
history is the actual one is not one that I am capable of realizing, so the possibility of 
an alternate history containing an alternate future is not a possibility for me, as an 
agent who wills and acts in order to bring certain things about—any more than it is 
possible for me to bring about an alternate past.
Apart from objecting to my distinction between a necessary future and a fixed 
one, how else might the B-Theorist object to this argument? There are two further 
objections I would like to consider. The first is to my adaptation of Lewis’ road 
analogy. Smart (1953,1955) distinguishes between two different senses of the word 
‘space’, and argues that in one sense of that word we must not spatialize time, 
whereas, in the other, it is perfectly appropriate. The first sense of the word ‘space’ is 
that o f ordinary language, according to which ‘space is something that endures 
through time, and in which “space” has something of the logic o f “thing” or 
“substance”’ (Smart 1955: 241). The logic Smart is referring to here is that which 
allows for change and endurance through time. The second sense of the word ‘space’ 
is ‘that in which we use the word in geometiy, where we talk of two-, thiee-, four- or 
n-dimensional space, or in which we refer to the space-time of the Minkowski world 
as “a space’” (ibid). According to the logic o f three dimensional geometry, for 
example, things do not change or endure through time—in fact, they are timeless.
And though in the logic of four dimensional geometry—when interpreted as a 
geometry of Minkowski space-time—time enters into the picture, change and 
endurance do not. In the geometry of the four dimensional Minkowski representation, 
‘thing’ has the logic of a perduring space-time worm consisting of a series of
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instantaneous three dimensional cross-sections. According to such a logic, ‘things’ do 
not endure or change, they just are}^
Now, according to Smait, it is perfectly acceptable to spatialize time in the 
latter sense of ‘space’, since this is precisely what we do in representing space and 
time as a Minkowski ‘space’. Such a representation is free of any implications of, or 
commitments to, notions of change, endurance, passage, etc. But, Smart cautions, 
when we spatialize time in the ordinary language sense of ‘space’, then we do commit 
oui'selves to an en oneous conception of time according to which it endures. That is, 
we ‘think of time as an extended something along which we can move. For this to be 
so it would have to endure through a hyper-time’ (ibid.). Clearly, then, Smart would 
object to my use of Lewis’ road analogy; since Lewis was spatializing time in the four 
dimensional sense of ‘space’ (whereby the road depicts a perduring object with 
temporal parts), whereas I was spatializing time in the ordinary language sense of 
‘space’ (whereby the analogy depicts time itself and our ‘moving’ along it). In fact. 
Smart even claims that it is the inappropriate spatialization of time that leads to the 
‘metaphysical error ... o f consciousness crawling up world-lines’ (ibid.: 240), and he 
would no doubt accuse me of coimnitting the same eiTor in my use o f the road 
analogy.*^
My response to this objection has two parts. First, I will acknowledge that in 
my adaptation of Lewis’ road analogy, I am importing a notion of passage that is not 
part o f the B-Theoretic ontology (though I did acknowledge the subjective nature of 
the ‘movement’). Nevertheless, that notion is part of oui* experience of time, and 
when we talk about the thi eat of fatalism and the fixity o f the future, it is not clear that 
our experience o f events in time does not provide evidence about the nature of events
I should note that this B-Theoretic picture does not imply that B-Theorists deny change altogether, 
they just redefine it in a way that the pictiue allows.
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in time (i.e. whether they are fixed). At least, it is not clear that it is appropriate to 
discuss the thieat of fatalism—given that it is an agent centered doctrine—without 
taking into account the human perspective. Perhaps it is an eiTor to speak of 
‘consciousness crawling up world-lines’, but I am not sure what the alternatives are 
on a B-Theoretic ontology. If one endorses a physicalist view of the mental (which 
Smart certainly does), then I suppose an individual’s consciousness at time t is just the 
brain state of that individual’s temporal part located at t. But does this mean we all 
have to be physicalists in order to make sense of consciousness on a B-Theoretic 
ontology? Regardless of what inferences we draw from it, our consciousness does 
seem to flow fr om one moment to the next, and this seeming is as much a pait of 
reality as is the B-Theorist’s fixture. If spatializing both aspects of reality helps us to 
visualize the human perspective in a B-Theoretic world, then perhaps a more 
heterogeneous logic than Smaif allows is required for the word ‘space’.
On the other hand, suppose we adjust my adaptation of the road analogy, so 
that the I'oad is analogous to my entire space-time woim. So cross sections of the 
road would be analogous to my temporal parts. This is certainly in keeping with 
Lewis’ original analogy, as well as with Smaxt’s strictures concerning the 
spatialization of time. Besides making it a little moi*e cumbersome, and a little less 
dramatic, does this adaptation change the substance of my argument? Now we are 
assuming that my ‘piesent’ temporal part is simultaneous and co-located with Village 
B (at, say mile marker 15), and that I have a later temporal part at mile marker 30 that 
is simultaneous and co-located with Village C. Well, what if my mile marker 15 
temporal part does not want my mile marker 30 temporal pai*t to be simultaneous and 
co-located with Village C? Then there does not seem to be anything Immis can do 
about it, even if  there is a possible world in which Immxo is (am?) not at Village C!
On a space-time diagram, the succession of events that describe the motion of an object define a
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Thus, excising subjective experience from the analogy does not seem to make the 
implications of an existent future any less counter-intuitive. Wliat it does seem to 
show, however, is that absent the experience of passage, the notion of a fated, 
inexorable future that ‘awaits’ us doesn’t even seem to make sense. We will return to 
this point in the conclusion to the chapter.
As for the second objection to my argument from the road analogy, most 
likely the B-Theorist will say that it is precisely my willing and acting that results in 
my passing tlii'ough Village C at mile marker 30 (or the willing and acting of my mile 
marker 15 through mile marker 30 temporal parts). That is to say, as long as the 
causal process involved in my willing and acting results in my passing through 
Village C, then I am no less free than I would be if  the future were non-existent. Pick 
a future event such as Susan’s going to Anstruther at a future time tf. If one can trace 
back the causal chain fi'om that event to Susan’s actions and volitions, then Susan 
goes to Anstmther of her own fi*ee will—regardless of the fact that the event of 
Susan’s going to Anstruther exists eternally. Consider that, assuming the 
impossibility of backwards causation, one camiot trace a causal chain h orn a past 
action, as effect, to a present volition, as cause, and it is obviously this point that 
encourages the B-Theorist to ground the asymmetry of fixity in the unidirectionality 
of causation.
B. A Time Travel Story 
One way of illustrating the B-Theorist’s second objection to my argument from the 
road analogy is by reference to a time tiavel stoiy. Suppose a time traveler from the 
future appears in front of you, hands you an envelope, and claims that the envelope 
contains a description of a day in your life exactly two yeais fr om now. He knows 
because he spends that day with you, and has traveled back to conduct a little
continuous line called the world line of tlie object (Sartori 1996: 139),
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experiment. He urges you, in the spirit of cooperation with the experiment, not to 
open the envelope until the end of the day in question. You comply, and two years 
later, at the end of the day, you read an accurate description of most all that you say 
and do that day. Right down to your vocal expressions of how you feel throughout 
the day, and what you are thinking and deliberating about. Now, you would surely be 
surprised that there is someone who not only forelaiew this, but someone who fore- 
experienced it; that is to say, not only did certain propositions about that event 
antecedently admit of deteiininate tmth values, but the event in question antecedently 
had a concrete existence—at least antecedently to your conscious experience of it. In 
spite o f this sui'prise, however, would the sense of free agency that accompanied your 
thoughts and actions throughout that day now seem diminished? Clearly, claims the 
B-Theorist, it would not. Regardless of the tenseless, eternal existence of the events 
of that day, your volitions led to your actions and to their effects, so those events and 
actions were not fixed or fated prior to their occunence.
Suppose, however, that your tune ti*aveling fr iend wanted to repeat the 
experiment. He hands you another envelope, and says, ‘See you in two years’. But 
this time you are not feeling very cooperative, so you open the envelope and read the 
letter. Now will you feel as though your future is fixed? It seems, in this case, that 
you would. Perhaps you do everything you can to avoid being at the place and in the 
circumstances described in the letter. But as the appointed day draws nearer you 
realize that your very attempts to avoid fulfilling the ‘prophecy’ in the letter are, 
instead, leading to its fulfillment. You have good reason to believe the details of the 
letter are tme, so in what sense are you able to prove them false?
Lewis (1986b) claims that this type of fatalistic ai'gument confuses irrelevant 
facts about the future with relevant facts about the present. Suppose you are able to 
do some time traveling of your own, and you travel back to a time before your birth.
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According to your personal time, your birth is still in the past; but now according to 
external time, your biiih is in the future/"  ^ Are you able to commit acts that contradict 
your knowledge of personally earlier but externally later events? According to Lewis, 
even if you know, based on your personal past, what the external future will be, this is 
a fact about times other than the present moment, and only facts about the present 
moment are relevant to whether you can presently act fr eely. Perhaps your present 
belief ihai you are unable to change history is a fact about the present, but this item of 
belief is compossible with your acting contrary to history. What is not compossible 
with your acting contrary to history is your knowledge of that history—but, again, this 
item of knowledge is not entirely about your present. So facts about the future are not 
facts that are relevant to what you can and cannot do, ‘in any ordinary sense’, as 
Lewis puts it {ibid/. 78). Thus we can have Icnowledge of propositions about the 
future, and—assuming the possibility of time travel—can even have first hand 
experience of concrete events that are now future; and we can have all this without the 
thieat o f fatalism, since facts about the future aie only relevant to what we will do, not 
to what we are able to do.
One possible, and obvious, line of response to the B-Theorist’s objection here 
is to question the validity of her sense of free agency. Is the Lewisian ‘ordinary 
sense’ of being able to do something truly ordinary, or is it a far cry from the common 
sense notion of being free to do something? I do not, however, wish to pursue this 
line of response, since I think it lies too close to the incompatibilist’s objection to the 
compatibilist’s notion of free will. Instead, as a response, I want to offer one final 
argument for the thesis that an existent future is a fixed one, before moving on to my 
concluding remarks.
For a description of these distinctions, see Lewis {op.cit.: 69-70)
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Recall the distinction between logical and ontological fatalism that I outlined 
in the Introduction to the thesis. The reader may have noticed that I have been relying 
on this distinction in my presentation of the time travel examples. Thus, I have been 
keen to stress that the examples not only involve antecedent truth and foreknowledge, 
but also antecedent existence and fore-experience. I stress this because the Lewisian 
response to the fatalistic argument, above, as well as many of the B-Theoretic 
responses to fatalism, seem only to count against logical fatalism. That is to say, they 
only seem to explain away the fatalistic implications that supposedly follow from 
truth, or fr om Icnowledge, about the future. They seem to ignore the point that in 
addition to there being eternal truths, or facts, about the future events in the examples, 
the events themselves have, in some sense, occurred. I say ‘in some sense’ because 
the B-Theorist will object to my use of the past tense ‘occuned’, rather than the 
tenseless ‘occurs’. But even if  you deny objective temporal becoming, you will still 
have to acknowledge that the time traveler in the first example has consciously 
experienced the events described in the letter. And so, for him, those events have 
occuixed ‘before’ he hands you the letter.
So why is this point supposed to count against Lewis’ response to the fatalist? 
He says that knowledge of the future is not a fact (entirely) about the present. Only 
our present beliefs about the future are facts entirely about the present, and these are 
compossible with the future being other than what we believe it to be. What is the 
justification for the claim that facts not entirely about the present are not relevant to 
what we are able to do? One thought might be that such f a c t s could have been 
different; and since our actions par tially determine what those facts are, the latter must 
conform to the former, rather than the converse. The thought is simply that facts
Here I am rendering ‘fact’ simply as a ‘truth’ or a ‘true proposition’, and not as the more inclusive 
‘state-of-affairs that makes a true proposition true’. Again, the motivation for this bifurcation between 
a truth and a tmthmaker will have to wait until Chapter 3.
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about the future cannot condition our ability to act, because such facts 
counterfactually depend upon our actions. So if  it is true that you do not change 
history, or that you do not act contr ary to what is described in the ‘prophetic’ letter, 
then this tnith is a result of your actions, not a determinant of them. The trirth about 
what you will do tomorrow is true because j/ow make it tme. Now, while I 
acknowledge the respectability of this response in the case o f logical fatalism, I 
cannot see how it applies in the case of ontological fatalism—where the truths in 
question ar e about events that have, even if  only for some individuals, already 
occurred.
Perhaps I can better illustrate this point by reference, again, to the road 
analogy. The logical fatalist will argue that the tmth of the proposition, ‘You will 
pass through Village C at mile marker 30’, fixes the corresponding event. The proper 
anti-fatalistic response to this is to say that the truth of the proposition does not fix the 
event, rather, the future occurTence of the event fixes the tmth value of the 
proposition.^  ^ So, if  I don’t pass through Village C at mile marker 30, then it’s not 
that a once tme proposition has been made false, but simply that that proposition had 
always been false. Thus the tmth values of propositions about the future 
counterfactually depend upon the future occurTence of their corTcsponding events.
But here we are speaking of counterfactual dependence of the truth values o f 
propositions, i.e. properties of abstract entities, on concretely existing events. 
According to the road analogy, however, we have not only future tmth, but future 
existence. So, the response to the ontological fatalist cannot rely upon counterfactual 
claims, but must rely upon counier-existence claims: something along the lines of, ‘If 
I don’t pass through Village C, then it doesn’t lie along my route. ’ But what nonsense 
is this? There it is, right there on the map, it does lie upon my route! If a friture event
See Chapter 4.
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J5 f exists, then it is simply a contradiction to suggest that EfS counter-factual non­
existence secures the non-fixity of the future, since Ef does exist. The point is, 
although the truth about the future may counterfactually depend upon my actions, 
what has come into existence cannot be other than what it is, and thus the response to 
the logical fatalist loses its force in the context o f ontological fatalism.
Conclusion
So where do the arguments of Section II leave us? Although I ended that section with 
a final argument against the B-Theorist, it seems one can always anticipate a B- 
Theoretic response. In this case, the B-Theorist is probably going to say that my 
appeal to ‘what has come into existence’ is one that presupposes a dynamic 
conception of time, and so cannot be used to show that a static conception of time 
implies a fixed future. The B-Theorist denies that anything ‘comes into existence’ in 
the sense intended by the A-Theorist—the sum total of existence is not temporally 
relative; and although that sum total is fully determinate and static, it is not necessary, 
and so might have consisted of different entities. From there the dialectic will 
continue much as it has done. Is there any end to this impasse? Perhaps not, but I 
think a diagnosis of the impasse can be found precisely in the B-Theorist’s denial of 
temporal becoming.
Although the majority of both A-Theorists and B-Theorists believe that the 
past is fixed and the future is not, we have seen that the sense in which they intend 
this asymmetry is very different. For the A-Theorist, it is a robust one, according to 
which there is an objective potency about the future, as contrasted with the present 
and the past. This is most often cashed out in terms of a non-existent/non-actual 
future, whereby the ontological status of what was once the fijture changes, or 
becomes something else, in the present. It is this objective temporal becoming of tlie 
future in the present that imparts to the A-Theorist’s notion of temporal asymmetry its
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robustness. Thus objective temporal becoming is constitutive of the A-Theorist’s 
conception of the asymmetry of fixity. Contrast this with the B-Theorist’s notion of 
the asymmetry, and we find a much more limited sense in which the future differs 
fi'om the present and the past. As we saw in Section I.B. with Mellor’s account, it is 
not an ontological difference, but merely a modal difference: all events on the 
timeline are actual, but future events are not temporally necessary in the way that 
present and past events are. For the A-Theorist, however, the modal difference 
between the futui e and Hie past can only obtain if there is an ontological difference—  
for an event to be actual, y is for it to be temporally necessary. This view arises 
directly out of a belief in objective temporal becoming.
Given this distinction between tlie A- and B-Theoretic conceptions of the 
asymmetry of fixity, it should come as no surprise that the two antagonists are unable 
to come to an agreement on whether the B-Theory implies a fixed futuie: they aie 
talking past one another. While this latter point is certainly not surprising, perhaps the 
diagnosis of the disagreement about temporal becoming as the source of the 1
misunderstanding is. For the A-Theorist (according to my generic characterization), 
events become fixed as time objectively passes, i.e. as they come into existence; and 
this is why it is so difficult for her to conceive of existent events that are not fixed.
So in evaluating the B-Theorist’s position, the A-Theorist is smuggling in the A- 
Theoretic notion of temporal becoming, a notion that is simply not intelligible on a 
static, ontologically symmetrical conception of time. As we have seen, this is 
paiticulaiiy clear when the A-Theorist argues that an existent future implies 
ontological fatalism, since that argument seems to depend upon the robust conception 
of fixity for its intelligibility. Do these obseiwations, then, vindicate the B-Theorist?
To remind the reader, my rendering of the generic chai'acterization is embodied in the following two 
tenets: i) the affinnation of the dynamic nature of time, according to which temporal becoming is an 
objective feature of reality, and ii) the denial of the existence of the future.
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To a certain extent, yes. We have seen that the two antagonists are working with 
different conceptions of the asymmetry of fixity, and that this difference is based, on 
the one hand, on an affinnation of temporal becoming, and on the other, a rejection of 
it. So the A-Theorist can only claim that a B-Theoretic ontology implies a fixed 
future in her robust sense of the teim, and this will do little to mffle the B-Theorist’s 
feathers, since she does not acknowledge that sense.
So my conclusions fiom this chapter are twofold. First, I conclude that there 
is an impasse between the A-Theorist and B-Theorist as to whether an existent future 
implies a fixed future, and that this impasse is merely a reflection of the impasse 
between them on temporal becoming. And, second, I conclude that the concept of 
ontological fatalism is most likely a vacuous one; since it is only intelligible in the 
light o f objective temporal becoming, and, on many views, an assertion of temporal 
becoming entails the »oM-existence of the future (thus ruling out ontological fatalism 
by definition).^® Though these conclusions are admittedly modest, I am content with 
them. My guiding intuition throughout this thesis is that the past is fixed and the 
future is not. I have considered whether the B-Theorist can do justice to this intuition, 
and have concluded that she cannot: not because her arguments fail, but because she 
embraces a different conception of the asymmetiy of fixity. For my part, and with 
little in the way of apologetics, I will retain my conception of the asymmeti y, 
gi'ounded as it is in temporal becoming, and will assume the generic characterization 
(at least) of the A-Theory throughout the remainder of this thesis. In the next chapter.
The exceptions, of course, are McCall’s model, according to which becoming consists in tlie 
aimihilation of future possible branches of time; and McTaggart’s initial conception of time, from 
which he deduces its imieality. See the Introduction to the thesis. Section I.D. Both McCall and 
McTaggart acknowledge temporal becoming, but the ontological asymmetry that follows from it is not 
a robust one of existence. It is, rather, simply one of properties. For McCall, it is the actual/non-actual 
asymmetry, where this is determined by a multiplicity of futme branches versus a singular past tiiink. 
According to McTaggart’s conception, it is simply that fiiture events instantiate futurity, and past ones 
(tiivially) don’t. McTaggaits’s conception, it seems to me, provides the weakest A-Theoretic 
asymmetiy. Notice that if the conclusions of this chapter are coirect, it is McTaggart’s conception that 
most tlneatens to generate ontological fatalism; since it postulates an existent future and acknowledges
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we will investigate whether the presentist version of the A-Theory can do what the B- 
Theory could not.
objective temporal becoming. Inasmuch as McCall’s ontological asymmetry is grounded in a 
multiplicity/singularity asymmetry, it seems to be insulated from such a charge.
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CHAPTER 2 
A-THEORY AND ONTOLOGICAL SYMMETRY 
Introduction
Now that we have seen that a B-Theoretic ontology cannot do justice to a robust 
asymmetiy of fixity, we had better discover whether its chief competitor can. As I stated 
in the Intioduction to the thesis, though there are many versions of the A-Theory (as I am 
characterizing it), they all embrace i) the affirmation of the dynamic nature of time, 
according to which temporal becoming is an objective feature of reality, and ii) the denial 
of the existence of the fiitm e. This generic characterization seived oui' purposes in 
Chapter 1, but we shall now have to add to it in order to fix our sights upon the B- 
Theory’s chief competitor: presentism. What does presentism add to i) and ii), above?
As the name of the doctrine suggests, presentism tells us that only the present exists, so 
presentism adds iii) the denial of the existence of the past.
That presentism is the chief competitor to the B-Theoiy is agieed upon by the 
majority of contemporaiy contributors to the debate. The presentists certainly see 
themselves as filling this role, and there is no doubt that most B-Theorists would agi*ee. 
Although there is some discussion of McCall’s and Tooley’s* conceptions of time in the 
literature, the vast majority of it is concerned with the debate between the B-Theory and 
presentism. Presentists such as Craig like to characterize their doctrine as the ‘pure’ fonn 
of the A-Theory, since it denies {contra McTaggaif’s conception) that there is a B-series, 
comprised of events which continually change in their instantiation of A-properties. 
Temporal becoming, according to the presentist, does not consist in future events 
becoming less and less fiitme, then becoming present, then past, and then more and more
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past; rather, temporal becoming simply consists in events coming into existence and 
going out of existence in the present. The question we aie concerned with here is, how 
does this ontology of events in time squaie with oui' guiding intuition about the 
asymmetry of fixity? For, although presentism tells us that the past and futm e are equally 
um-eal, it is also motivated, just as any A-Theory of time is, by the common sense 
intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. As we have seen, it is, in part, this belief 
in a robust asymmetiy of fixity that makes the A-Theoiy distinctive. But are these two 
doctiines—that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity—compatible, or do 
they represent inconsistencies in the presentist’s theory? In this chapter, I will argue that 
there is indeed an inconsistency between the two doctiines, and that the presentist is 
unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fiindamentally a part of her 
theory.
In Section I, I will discuss a recent defense of presentism due to Craig. In the 
coui'se of this defense, Craig attempts to draw out the analogy between modal actualism, 
on the one hand, and presentism, on the other, by formulating a tensed possible worlds 
semantics on the model of the tenseless possible worlds semantics endorsed by the modal 
actualist. I will argue that Craig’s tensed semantics, which I will refer to as ‘actualist 
presentism’ (AP), are not strictly analogous to the tenseless ones, and that this disanalogy 
highlights the tension between the presentist’s doctiines of ontological symmetiy and 
asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I will undertake an investigation on the presentist’s 
behalf in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two docti ines. 
The investigation, based on a suggestion from Craig, will involve considering different 
asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute
* Tooiey adds to i) and ii) the affirmation of the existence of the past (and present). We will discuss
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temporal asymmetry. The successful candidate for this role must not only provide a 
ground for the directional asymmetiies, but, crucially for the A-Theorist, must also 
provide a gi ound for the asymmetry of fixity. In Section III, I will consider whether the 
presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the 
asymmetiy of fixity, and will argue that she cannot. In Section IV, I will conclude that 
the asymmetiy of fixity, which the presentist heartily endorses as an objective featui e of 
reality, cannot be accounted for otheiwise than thi'ough the postulation of an ontological 
asymmetiy. Here, however, I will have to consider an important challenge fi'om the 
presentist. This challenge will require me to work thiough a first approximation of an 
account of past existence that coheres with the A-Theoiy of time. The results of the 
discussion in this section lead to a surprising conclusion: the only events that exist are 
past events. I leave fiirther discussion of these results to the Epilogue.
I. Craig’s AP: The Problem Highlighted 
A. The Modal/Temporal Analogy 
Before beginning Craig’s presentation of AP, it will be instinctive to consider his 
declai’ed motivation for the doctiine. Many philosophers have seen a close parallel 
between the presentism/eternalism debate in the philosophy of time, and the 
actualism/realism debate in the metaphysics of modality. The presentist claims that it is 
only the present that exists, or at least that only the present exists simpliciter—whereas 
the past and future merely exist derivatively and in virtue of the present. Similarly, the 
modal actualist claims that only the actual world exists, other possible worlds simply 
constitute ways the actual world might have been. So on both of these accounts, the 
‘present’ and the ‘actual’ are objective, non-relational terms that pick out sometliing
Tooley’s view in Section II.C.3. of this chapter, as well as in the Epilogue.
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unique. These views are to be conü'asted with those of the temporal etemalist (i.e. B- 
Theorist) and modal realist. For the B-Theorist, tense and temporal becoming are not 
objective features of reality. All times are equally real and exist tenselessly. ‘The 
present’ is merely an indexical teim: the fixing of its reference depends on the context of 
utterance. On many versions of the B-Theory of time, reality consists of a four 
dimensional space-time manifold, whereby objects (or, on some accounts, just events) aie 
spread out in time and ai e comprised of temporal parts (or perhaps stages). This doctrine 
is meant to parallel modal realism in that the latter ti'eats ‘the actual’ as an indexical, and 
holds that all possible worlds are equally real. So for the modal realist, actuality is 
reducible to the range of possibilities; and for the etemalist, present (and all tensed) facts 
are reducible to tenseless ones. Conversely, for the modal actualist, we are to take 
actuality as a primitive, iiTeducible notion; and similarly for the presentist regarding the 
present.
I do not wish to question these alleged paiallels. For one thing, if they aie 
legitimate, it is probably the case that they involve a good deal more complexity tlian I 
have poifrayed. Certainly, there are more fine grained distinctions within both the modal 
realist camp (such as modal continuism and counteipart theory) as well as the etemalist, 
B-Theory camp (such as perdurantism and stage theory), and these distinctions would 
require a more detailed study of how the parallels between the two camps might mn. My 
point in inti'oducing these alleged paiallels in the sketchy manner which I have done, is 
merely to provide the backdrop for Craig’s discussion.
Craig (2001) argues that the paiallels outlined above support the presentist 
dissolution of McTaggart’s Paradox, and cast doubt upon the etemalist’s objections to 
presentism. First, Craig explains how presentism is unaffected by McTaggart’s Paradox.
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He claims that the conception of time which grounds the paradox is one that combines a 
B-Theoretic ontology of events with the A-Theoretic conception of temporal becoming. 
Such a combination is paradoxical because it requires the A-determinations of past, 
present, and future—which aie contradictoiy to one another—all to apply to tenselessly 
existing events. So the image is one of events stning out along the B-series timeline, with 
the spotlight of tlie present lunning over them in the direction of the future. Or, 
alternatively, the B-series of events can be regarded as moving thiough a stationaiy 
present and in the direction of the past. Thus, on either picture, temporal becoming does 
not consist in events becoming real, but rather in future events becoming present, and 
present events becoming past—where the events admit of different degrees of futmity 
and pastness as time passes.
It is easy to see how Craig intends for presentism to avoid this alleged paradox: 
by denying the B-theoretic event ontology, and instead claiming that temporal becoming 
consists in events coming into and going out of existence in the present. So events are 
not all past, present and future—they are all and only present. Tliis is why presentists 
refer to their doctrine as the ‘pui'e’ foim of the A-Theoiy, because they deny that events 
are stiung out in a B-series timeline. Craig concludes, therefore, that McTaggart’s 
Paradox is only a problem for the ‘hybrid A-B-Theory’ (Craig, op.cit.: 32), and that those 
B-theorists who cite the paradox as gi'ounds for rejecting the A-Theory clearly have the 
hybrid, not the ‘pure’ theoiy, in mind.
Of course, if one were only concerned with avoiding McTaggart’s Pai adox, then 
one would have two options in rejecting the hybrid conception: either to embrace the 
‘pure’ A-Theory, or embrace the ‘puie’ B-Theory, according to which past, present, and 
futme are purely relational deteiminations which do not pick out objective features of the
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world. This view, unlike the hybrid theoiy, denies temporal becoming altogether. It is at 
this point that Craig sees the parallels we began with as providing a defence for the 
presentist. This is because, according to Craig, one can foimulate a modal version of 
McTaggart’s Paradox, one which also demands for its solution a decision between the 
modal counteiparts of eternalism and presentism, i.e. realism and actualism; and Craig 
finds it instmctive that most etemalists see the latter as the best response. The modal 
paradox involves the claim that ‘eveiy contingent object or event has to be both actual 
and merely possible’ (ibid.: 41)— given that an event that is actual in w is merely possible 
in w*. But, since an event that is merely possible cannot also be actual, and an event that 
is actual cannot be merely possible, we have a contradiction. Craig claims that if we 
attempt to dissolve the paradox by indexing events to worlds, we fall foul of the same 
type of regress involved in postulating hyper times in order to avoid the temporal 
paiadox. Here, again, we have a similai* choice as in the temporal case; either we can 
claim that all worlds are equally real and that ‘actual’ is merely an indexical teim 
(realism), or we can claim that the only world that exists is the actual one (actualism).
Craig cites Le Poidevin as a B-theorist who embraces the actualist response in 
order to avoid the modal paiadox, but who, in the same breath, denies that the presentist’s 
response to the temporal paradox is tenable. According to Craig, however, the paiallels 
between presentism and actualism ai*e such that the latter is open to the same type of 
objections as those that Le Poidevin brings against the former, and that the responses the 
actualist would give to such objections can also be given by the presentist in defence of 
her doctiine. Similarly, in objecting to eternalism, the presentist can avail herself of the 
same type of arguments as the actualist does in objecting to the realist response in the
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modal case. Craig lists Five Theses that Le Poidevin claims the presentist is committed 
to, and which, in turn, imply an unacceptable ‘temporal solipsism’. They are:
1. The extension of the existential quantifier is restricted to presently existing objects.
2. Relations obtain only between contemporaries, that is, objects existing at the same time.
3. Past and futuie tenses are to be interpreted as sentential operators on core present-tense 
sentences, the present tense not requiring representation by an operator.
4. Instants are logical constructions out of propositions.
5. Past- and fliture-tense statements have only present fact as their truth conditions, that is, what 
makes a certain statement about the past or future hue is the evidence that at present exists. 
iibid. :35)
According to Craig, these theses are those defended by the presentist A.N. Prior, but 
Craig denies that the presentist need be committed to them, and so outlines a version of 
presentism which is meant to avoid the chai ge of temporal solipsism. In light of this 
defence of presentism, which is intended to be analogous to the actualist’s defence 
against the modal realist, Craig claims that it is inconsistent for the actualist not also to 
adopt presentism in the temporal case.
B, Actualist Presentism 
The above outline offers a flavor of Craig’s motivation and sti'ategy. From this point, 
however, I would like to set aside the charges of inconsistency Craig brings against the 
etemalist who is also an actualist, and instead focus on Craig’s actualist presentism (AP). 
It is the latter that highlights the inconsistency I  am charging the presentist with in this 
chapter. Craig begins his presentation of AP by citing Wolterstorff (1979) and Plantinga 
(1974) as sources. He adopts Plantinga’s possible worlds semantics, whereby a possible 
world is conceived as a maximal possible state of affairs. A state of affairs S is maximal 
if  for eveiy state of affairs S', S includes S' or S precludes S' (Craig, op.cit/. 36). Such 
worlds and states of affairs have naturally been thought of as tenseless; but, taking 
Wolterstorff s lead, Craig suggests that we still require tensed states of affairs, in addition 
to the tenseless ones, in order to account for tensed facts. The maximality of such states
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of affairs would be temporally indexed to a stipulated temporal location and duration, as 
opposed to the absolute maximality of tenseless states of affairs. So he defines a tensed 
possible world as a ‘maximal possible state of affairs at some time t of arbitrarily 
stipulated dur ation’ (ibid). All tensed possible worlds that obtain, whether past, present, 
or future ones, are tensed actual worlds. So the world that obtains presently is the tensed 
actual world, and the world that obtains at some time t is the tensed actual world that 
obtains when t is present.
Craig sees a tight analogy between tenseless and tensed possible worlds 
semantics, and tries to show that the analogy fits nicely with a presentist approach to 
tensed possible worlds. For example, in tenseless possible worlds semantics, we say that 
Socrates has in W the property of being snub-nosed if and only if  Socrates would have 
(tenselessly) the property of being snub-nosed were W to be actual. The analogous truth 
conditions in tensed possible worlds semantics for saying that Socrates has the property 
of being snub-nosed in a tensed possible world W, are that Socrates would have (present- 
tense) the property of being snub-nosed were W to be actual. Similarly, just as each 
tenseless possible world exists in each such world, so each tensed possible world exists in 
each such world. The tenseless actual world a  is the only one that obtains, but each 
tenseless possible world W exists in a  and is actual in or at itself, a  is also actual in 
itself, but the difference is that ‘a  is not merely actual in a, but also actual simpliciter', 
and is therefore unique (ibid.). In the same manner, although the tensed actual world v is 
the only one that is actual simpliciter, because it obtains (present-tense); nevertheless, 
each tensed possible world which does not obtain still exists and is actual in itself, and 
those that are not merely possible, but also tensed actual worlds (i.e. Iî^ “), either have 
been or will be actual simpliciter when they obtain in the present.
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As I understand Craig, he wishes to maintain that in the tensed case possible 
worlds may fall into one of thr ee different categories: i) those that are merely possible 
(whether past, present, or future) and so never actually obtain; ii) those that are actual but 
do not (yet/any more) obtain (i.e. future and past tensed actual worlds); and iii) the actual 
world that also obtains (i.e. the present tensed actual world). I also take it that those that 
fall under categories i) and ii), above, are actual in or at themselves, but not actual 
simpliciter. But is this account of tensed possible worlds really analogous to that of 
tenseless possible worlds? Craig’s preferred account of the latter has it that possible 
worlds only fall into two different categories: i) those that are merely possible, though 
actiral in themselves; and ii) the tenseless possible world that is also actual simpliciter. 
The disanalogy seems to lie in the fact that Craig moves from tenseless merely possible 
worlds which are not actual simpliciter, to tensed possible worlds which, though not 
actual simpliciter, have a more robust ontology than do tensed merely possible worlds.
All tenseless possible worlds that are actual in themselves, but not actual simpliciter, are 
merely possible worlds; whereas some tensed possible worlds that are actual in 
themselves but not actual simpliciter (yet/anymore), either will obtain or have obtained, 
and so are not merely possible.
I am not concerned, here, with whether this disanalogy between modal actualism 
and AP is a real problem for Craig’ semantics. What I am concerned with is the tension 
the disanalogy highlights between the presentist’s belief in ontological symmetry and in 
her belief in the asymmetry of fixity. Given the former, Craig must claim that there is no 
ontological distinction between past and future tensed possible worlds that actually have 
obtained/will obtain. How, then, should he char acterize them? If he wishes to maintain a 
strict analogy with tenseless possible worlds semantics, he should claim that such worlds
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are merely possible (since they’re not actual simpliciter). But then he would not be able 
to distinguish between past possible worlds that have obtained, and those that might have 
obtained though did not. In other words, he cannot account for a fixed yet contingent 
past. It is for this reason, I take it, that he introduces the disanalogous class of tensed 
possible worlds which, though actual in themselves (as are all possible worlds), are 
neither actual simpliciter nor merely possible. These ai e the worlds that have obtained 
and will obtain. But now he faces a problem that goes beyond the disanalogy, because in 
positing the existence of futui e tensed possible worlds that are not merely possible, how 
can he account for the wow-fixity of the future? If such worlds exist now and ai e more 
than just mere possibilities, but ai e those possibilities that will become actual in tlie 
present; then in what sense is the futuie non-fixed? Craig’s AP tells us that future tensed 
possible worlds presently have the same degree of actuality as past tensed possible 
worlds, and this mns counter to the A-Theorist’s intuitions about the asymmetiy of 
fixity.^
II. Presentism and the Asymmetry of Fixity
A. A Hierarchical Account 
So how does the presentist intend to reconcile this tension between ontological symmetry 
and the asymmetry of fixity? Unfoitunately, most presentists are rather silent on the 
issue. The literature is occupied more with discussions about language and tense than 
about ontology and modality. Craig is one of the few presentists who has tried to develop 
a thoroughgoing presentist metaphysic, and he acknowledges that the presentist owes an 
account of why—though past and futui e are equally um eal—‘the past is actualized while
 ^I do not wish to exaggerate the force of this argument. There are, no doubt, things that Craig could say in 
his defense. But, of course, I have more tilings to say as well. It is enough for my present purposes if  the 
A-Theorist’s eyebrows are at least raised.
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the futui'c is merely potential’ (Craig 1991: 152)/ Further, he acknowledges that this 
account must go beyond the ‘mere tautology’ that ‘past events are different from futur e 
events because only past events have actually occurred’ (ibid). I will, therefore, take 
Craig’s suggestion as to what fundamentally constitutes temporal asymmetry as the 
starting point of my investigation.
He claims that the ‘asymmetry between past and future lies not in then 
ontological status, but in the fact that in the present there are traces only of the past, and 
this fact is rooted in the impossibility of backwards causation, which is founded, in turn, 
upon the objective reality of temporal becoming’ (Craig 2001: 34nl0). This appears to 
be a hierarchical account of temporal asymmetry: although it is fundamentally constituted 
by objective temporal becoming, causal unidfrectionality and present traces of past (but 
not fixture) events are also a part of the hierarchy and contribute to the asymmetry. Craig 
describes the presentist conception of objective temporal becoming as one of continual 
‘creation/armihilation’, as opposed to a species of change {ibid.: 44). So the passage of 
time is an objective feature of reality, and it is this feature that accormts for the 
unidirectionality of causation, and thus for temporal asymmetry. Objective temporal 
becoming involves the coming into being and the going out of being of present events, 
and there is no ontological difference between that which is prior to the creation (the 
futur e) and that which is subsequent to the annihilation (the past)—they are equally 
um eal. Given this pictur e, then, let us examine the elements of the hierarchy in turn, 
beginning with the least fundamental, and determine to what extent each of them can 
account for the asymmetiy of fixity.
 ^I take Craig’s acknowledgment of the asymmetry of fixity here as a justification for my challenge to the 
presentist.
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B. Traces of the Past
First, we will consider present tr aces of past events. Following the quotation regarding 
temporal asymmetry, above, Craig refers us to a passage from his (1991). In this 
passage, he elaborates more on the role played by tr aces of the past in determining 
temporal asymmetry. His explanation relies upon an A-Theoretic interpretation of the 
Special Theory of Relativity (STR), according to which there is one privileged frame of 
reference (contrary to Einstein’s interpretation), and according to which it is cosmic time 
that provides such a frame. Craig ar gues that on this interpretation of STR, the A- 
Theorist can claim that the future, relative to the fr ame of cosmic time, cannot be 
experienced as real. He says
cosmicaliy past and present events having for two local observers in relatively moving inertial 
frames a space-like separation can be experienced by those observers in different clironological 
order due to the relativity of simultaneity, whereas no cosmicaliy future event can be so 
experienced (Craig, op.cit.'. 152)
Since it is the reception of an object’s reflected light rays which deteimines the relativity 
of simultaneity, Craig claims that these light rays can be thought of as traces, and 
therefore the difference between (cosmic) past and friture is that ‘while there exist traces 
of past events (reflected light rays) there cannot exist any traces of future events, which 
are purely potential’ (ibid.).
We should pause here a moment to ensui e we understand what Craig intends. 
Consider Figures 2.1 and 2.2, below."^  Both figures depict the same thi ee events in the 
course of a simultaneity experiment, but each relative to obseivers in different frames of 
reference. The expeiiment involves a train moving at constant speed V relative to the 
ground. At 1200 two light flashes are sent out fr om an obseiver, M’, stationed on the 
train at its midpoint: one towai ds the fr ont of the ti ain, one towards the rear. Call the
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initiation of these flashes event 1 (Ei), Events 2 and 3 {E2 and Ej), are the aiiival of the 
light rays at the rear and fr ont of the train, respectively. Figui'c 2.1 depicts E2 and E3 
fi'om the perspective of M’ and two other on board obseiwers, F’ and R \  stationed at the 
front and reai' of the train. Figure 2.2 depicts the same events but relative to the reference 
frame of three corresponding ground observers, F, R, and M. In Figure 2.1, £"2 and E3 
occur simultaneously at 1203 ,^ given that the signal was sent fr om the midpoint of the 
train and that the tiain is in a state of rest relative to the obseivers. In Figure 2.2, 
however, given the movement of the train relative to the gr ound obseivers, as well as the 
constancy of the speed of light as postulated by STR, E2 occurs at 1202 and E3 occurs at 
1204. Thus simultaneity is relative.
Now imagine that there are three coiresponding obseivers, F”, R”, and M”, 
monitoring these events from a thii'd frame of reference. For the sake of simplicity, 
assume that these obseivers aie on a train of the same size and configmation, that is 
running on a track parallel to the original tr ain at the same speed, but in the opposite 
dhection (i.e. backwards). Also assume that when Ei occurs, M, M’, and M” are all in a 
line that intersects the tr acks perpendicularly. So now, in the fr ame of reference of the 
second train’s corresponding obseivers, the first tiain is moving at speed 2 V, and so E2 
and E3 occur at 1201 and 1202, respectively. In order to illustr ate the role played by 
cosmic time in Craig’s A-Theoretic interpretation of STR, we can think of the second 
train’s fr ame of reference as representing that of cosmic time. When E2 is cosmicaliy 
present and E3 cosmicaliy future, then both events are still in the future for the ground 
and first train’s obseivers (see Figure 2.3, below). Thus the second train’s obseivers can
These figures, and the examples they depict, are from Sartori (1996: 55-8), though I have adapted them 
for my purposes.
 ^Obviously, these artificial time intervals are merely for illustrative purposes.
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experience the other observers’ futme; but neither they, nor anyone else, can experience 
the futme relative to their own (cosmic) reference frame. And this is so in spite of the 
fact that when E2 and E3 are cosmicaliy past they are experienced in different 
chronological order by the other sets of obseivers. And Craig’s point is, I take it, that the 
experience of cosmicaliy past events as present in other reference frames does not imply 
that those events cosmicaliy exist; but only that their traces exist. So when the first 
train’s obseivers and the giound observers experience E2 and E3, they are experiencing 
the reception of light rays resulting fi om events that no longer exist, not the events 
themselves.
(a)
R’ M’ 
Event 1
t’i=  1200
C Q F’
(b)
R’ TJJ M’ TJJ F’
Event 2 
t’2-1203
Event 3 
t’3= 1203
Fig. 2.1. Simultaneity experiment as seen by train 
observera, (a) Light flashes leave M’ (event 1); (b) light 
flashes arrive at R’ (event 2) and at F' (event 3). Since 
the paths of the two rays are of equal length, their 
arrivals are simultaneous: t’2=t’3
(a)
(b)
(c)
TJJ u
Event 1
ti=
TJJ
R
Event 2 
t2=1202
M
M
TJJ
C>
1200
OJ
TJJ
TJJ
Event 3 
t3= 1204
Fig. 2.2. Simultaneity experiment as seen by ground 
observera, (a) Light flashes leave M (event 1); (b) light 
flash arrives at rear of tiain (event 2); (c) light flash 
airives at fi-ont of train (event 3). Event 2 occurs before 
event 3, Note that in sketch (b), the forward-moving ray 
is still in route.
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Fig. 2.3. COSMIC 
(2“** train)
GROUND TRAIN
Ex 1200 1200 1200
El \ 1201 1202 1203
El 1202 1204 1203
Though I do not wish specifically to question Craig’s revisionist inteipretation 
(which he calls ‘neo-Lorentzian’) of STR, it’s not entirely clear to me that cosmic time 
can do the work that he requires of it (ihid.\ 283-5). While it may be the case that there is 
one single privileged reference frame, to which all others are relative, and that this 
reference frame yields ‘absolute simultaneity and a world-wide edge of becoming’ (ibid,: 
283); nevertheless, the cosmic time which Craig relies on to fill this role is based on the 
unifoim and isotropic expansion of the universe, which is a contingent, empirical 
phenomenon. It is difficult to see, therefore, that cosmic time could yield what are 
presumably metaphysically necessary conclusions about absolute becoming. Consider 
the second train in our example. If it were moving in the same direction as the first tiain, 
and at a speed of 1/2V, then obseivers in the second train would experience E2 and E3 
after the other sets of obseivers, in which case cosmicaliy future events would be real for 
them. There is, of couise, a shaip disanalogy between the movement of a train and the 
expansion of the universe: given that the latter is universal, unifonn, and isotiopic, its 
reference frame is available at all locations in the universe. But it is possible that the 
universe not be an expanding one at all. If this possibility were actual, would there also 
then be no temporal becoming? Of comse, one might have independent metaphysical or 
theistic grounds for embracing a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR. These grounds 
might lead one to a postulation of a ‘metaphysical’ or a ‘God’s’ time as providing the
65
preferred frame of reference; but Craig also wants to argue that empirical data directly 
supports his inteipretation, and this claim seems questionable.
Another concern is with Craig’s use of STR in hying to account for temporal 
asymmehy while maintaining his presentist symmehy of ontology. Certainly, traces of 
future events are not to be found in the present, whereas haces of past events are; but this 
seems to be tme regardless of any considerations derived from STR. Perhaps he thinks 
STR provides a scientifically coherent illustration of how past events, though non­
existent, can leave traces in the present; for he makes the point that ‘the no longer 
existent past event does not act at a temporal distance to immediately produce some later 
effect’ {ibid.: 152). But STR can also provide (and is noimally inteipreted as providing) 
a scientifically coherent illushation of how all events are equally real. So it is odd that 
Craig would appeal to STR in the context of an account of temporal asymmetry.^
Furthermore, one wonders whether the mere observable phenomena of past traces 
could really serve as a ground for the temporal asymmetiy of a fixed past and non-fixed 
future, or whether such phenomena are simply manifestations of the asymmetiy in 
question. The claim that the past is fixed is a claim about the past. But the observation 
that the present contains tr aces of the past is not a claim about the past—or at least not an 
intrinsic claim about the past—it is a claim about the present. Of coui se, the presentist 
will not be embanassed by this, since, from her perspective, it will come as no surprise 
that non-entities such as the past and futm e lack intrinsic properties of any sort. But the 
presentist does want to acknowledge the fixity (i.e. actuality) of the past, as contr asted 
with the non-fixity (i.e. potentiality) of the futm e, and it is imclear that the reduction to
My point here is that, though the appeal might be appropriate in order to provide a plausible reconciliation 
of STR and temporal becoming in the context of A-Theoretic apologetics, it seems less appropriate to rely 
on STR to make a positive point (i.e. do some work) in a discussion of temporal asymmetiy.
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present traces (of the past) can account for an asymmetry that is meant to hold between 
past and future.
Setting this concern aside, however, let us adopt the following, presumably
plausible, definition of intiinsic fixity:
E is intrinsically fixed —dfE is fixed and E is not fixed in virtue of its relation to anytliing 
else
If fixity is an intrinsic feature of the past, then given our definition it clearly cannot be 
reduced to a feature of the present (e.g., traces). But, assuming that a non-existent event 
could only be fixed in viitue of something that does exist, the presentist must deny that 
the past is intrinsically fixed. Simultaneously, however, she must assert that fixity is a 
real, mind-independent property in the world. This follows from her endorsement of 
objective temporal becoming, a notion that implies that the actual/potential distinction 
between past and fixture is equally objective: that which has not yet come into being is 
merely potential (non-fixed), and that which has come into being is actual (fixed). So if  
fixity is a real property, then the presentist must acknowledge that it is a property of 
something real; and if not of the past, then of what? I think there are only two possible 
answers to this last question, neither of which is veiy plausible. The first is that it is a 
property of traces of the past, rather than a property of the past itself; the second is that it 
is a property of the present. Let us consider these possibilities.
With regard to the first, it should be clear that if the past is not real and therefore 
not intrinsically fixed, then neither are traces of the past. Any given trace of a past event 
is only present for an instant, after which time that trace becomes past itself. 
Alternatively, we can think of the trace as having dur ation, in which case it is only 
present while it continues, becoming past upon its completion (and perhaps giving rise to 
a new trace). The point can be made in either case, but it is simpler here to speak of
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instantaneous events and traces. Thus, an event E which occui's at to, and for which there 
is then a tr ace a at may also have a tr ace b at ti, but for the presentist b cannot be the 
same as its immediate predecessor a, since the latter no longer exists. Therefore b is 
either a tr ace of a, or both a and b are different tr aces of the same event E. On either 
reading, a is not intrinsically fixed, since it is only fixed in virtue of è ’s being present at 
ti. Of course, the presentist might try to argue that any series of traces all having the 
same event origin, and differentiated only by the times at which they are present, can be 
thought of as intrinsically fixed and thus as providing the ground for the claim that any 
individual member of the series is fixed. So, a given series of traces a, b ,c, ..., all 
initiated by the same event E, would be thought of as intrinsically fixed, and this 
collective intrinsic fixity would bestow fixity upon the particular past trace a in virtue of 
the latter's membership in the series. I cannot, however, see that this proposal would 
avail the presentist either; for if it is the entire series of traces that is temporally fixed, 
then the theory begins to look very B-Theory-ish—an obviously unacceptable 
consequence for the presentist.
The other possible candidate for intrinsic fixity is simply the present. After all, 
according to the presentist, events (temporally) become fixed in the present. So it is just 
as intuitive to call the present fixed as it is the past (Aristotle (1968) certainly held this 
view, though he spoke of ‘necessity’ rather than ‘fixity’). Furlhermore, the presentist 
maintains that though the past and future do not exist simpliciter, they do exist 
derivatively and in virtue of the present (as in Craig’s past and futur e tensed actual 
worlds which, though existent, do not presently obtain, and therefore do not exist 
simpliciter). So it would seem that the presentist could claim that it is really the present 
that is intrinsically fixed, and that the past is fixed in virtue o/the fixity of the present.
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Upon closer inspection, however, we see that the analogy between derivative existence 
and derivative fixity does not hold; since (for the presentist) time is symmetrical with 
respect to the former but not the latter, and the asymmetry of the latter is what we are 
trying to account for. In other words, if  the past is fixed in viitue of the fixity of the 
present, in virtue of what is the futur e not fixed? This is equivalent to the question with 
which we began, namely, that if all that exists is the present, then what could possibly 
constitute the difference between past and future? We do not seem to be any closer to an 
acceptable answer.
Perhaps, however, this is the wrong way to go about evaluating present tr aces of 
the past as a ground for the asymmetry of fixity. Another thought might be that present 
traces determine the past. On this view, a fixed past is simply a determined one, and all 
that need exist in order to account for the fixity of the past is the bit of reality that does 
the determining, i.e. present traces. Of course, in order to maintain the asymmetry, the 
presentist is going to have to deny that the present state of the universe determines a 
future one, and she is going to have to offer an account of why the determinism is only 
pastwar'ds directed. But perhaps this would not prove too difficult, since it is open to the 
presentist to appeal to agential control as allowing for an indeterminate future—whereas 
there is no pastwards directed agential contr ol. Unfortunately for the presentist, however, 
one can argue against forwards determinism in a way that does not involve an appeal to 
agential control, nor to any phenomenon that exhibits temporal asymmetry. I am 
speaking here of the quantum mechanical argument against determinism, which tells 
against determinism as obtaining in either temporal direction.
According to forwar ds determinism, given the present state of the universe S and 
a future time 4, there is only one possible state of the universe at that is compatible both
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with the laws of nature and S's being the present state. The quantum mechanical 
argument against this view involves noting that one wavefimction (described by S, say) 
can subsequently collapse into one of two different position eigenstates (at % say), in 
which case, there are two states of the world at that are compossible with S. This 
counterexample to forwards determinism can also be adjusted to count against backwards 
determinism. According to the latter, given the present state of the universe S and a past 
time p^, there is only one possible state of the universe at compatible both with the laws 
of nature and S's being the present state. But, again, quantum mechanics theorizes that 
two different wavefunctions, either one of which might be described by the state of the 
universe at tp, can collapse into one and the same position eigenstate described, say, by S. 
So S does not determine which wavefimction obtains at p^. Of course, conclusions about 
determinism from quantum mechanics are contr oversial, but if the presentist is going to 
deny the argument’s application to determinism, and yet maintain that forwards 
determinism is false, then she is going to have to present an even less controversial 
argument for that conclusion; and it is not clear that an appeal to agential contr ol, or any 
other temporally asymmetric notion, is going to provide such an argument.
C. Causation
1. Waterlow’s Account of Causation 
In light of these considerations, we had better rule out the appeal to tr aces, and 
investigate whether the presentist’s appeal to the unidirectionality of causation will prove 
a more satisfactory ground for the asymmetry of fixity. In order to determine whether 
this is so, we must first consider what account of causation the presentist should avail 
herself of. Craig {op.cit.: 152) recommends Waterlow’s (1974) account, in which 
Waterlow uses her conclusions about the nature of forwards causation to argue against
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the possibility of backwards causation. Her account of forwards causation is based upon 
the nature of forwards temporal continuing. She argues that a causal relationship can 
only exist between two events if those events ar e temporally continuous. Specifically, 
the cause must continue up to and during the initial occunence of the effect. A cause 
does not immediately produce a later effect; rather, an occurrence of a cause is 
simultaneous with its effect. One can see how this proposal would appeal to the 
presentist, since we need not think of the earlier cause as existing in order to account for 
its later effects, which are detected in the present. There is, I take it, an instant of time 
when both a particular" effect and its immediate predecessor temporally overlap, and so 
exist presently. This account allows the presentist to claim that the past is not exerting 
any causal power on the present; instead, each successive effect and its immediate cause 
partially overlap, and so events exert their causal powers in the present.
Given that this account of causation and temporal continuing accords well with 
presentism, and given that we want to allow the presentist the best chance of reconciling 
what I claim are her inconsistent doctrines, I will take Craig’s recommendation and adopt 
Waterlow’s account for the time being. Before proceeding, however, it will assist our 
investigation if we consider how Waterlow intends for her account of causation to tell 
against the possibility of backwards causation. Given the dependency of causation upon 
continuing, she argues that if backwards continuing is impossible, so is backwar ds 
causation. In order to r*ule out the former, Waterlow first argues that the continuation of 
events is inherently directional, and then argues that this directionality is necessarily from 
earlier to later (at least for beings such as ourselves). With respect to the first point, she 
claims that mere (directionless) temporal extension cannot yield the continuing required 
for a causal relationship, since some causes temporally extend in either direction from
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their effects (‘as in the case of the heat wave that turns the milk and persists after its 
turning’); and we would not call these relations cases of both forwards and backwards 
causation (Waterlow, op.ciL: 382). Such èi-directional causal relations would merely 
dissolve into non-directional ones. If we are going to speak of causation as having 
direction, then we must also affirm the directionality of temporal continuing. So, in the 
case of foiwai'ds causation, it is not enough that the cause merely extends to the pastward 
side of the effect, but the extension must be one of continuing/rom the cause and up to 
the effect. And, similarly, in the case of backwards causation, it must not only be the 
case that the cause lies to the future side of the effect, but it must also continue to the time 
of the earlier effect from the later cause.
So continuing is directional, but is it necessarily unidirectional (from earlier to 
later)? According to Waterlow, given the stmcture of our temporal knowledge and 
experience, the concept of backwai'ds continuing is, for us, unintelligible. She argues that 
it logically follows from the assertion that an event E is now (foi*wards) continuing ‘that 
for some time before now, E was occuiiing’, whereas such an assertion ‘leaves it open 
whether after now, E will or will not be occuiiing’ {ibid.: 384). So, in order for it to be 
the case that E continue backwards in time, an assertion ofE ’s continuing must imply 
that E will be occuiiing for some time after now, but that it is open whether E has 
occuiTed for any time before now. And, since we take ourselves to have (in principle) 
certainty about the past, but not about the futuie, it would be meaningless for us to make 
an assertion that implied a lack of (in principle) certainty about the past, and the 
possession of certainty about the future. Therefore, given the meaninglessness of 
backwards continuing in time, the meaninglessness of backwards causation follows.
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So Waterlow wants to show, among other things, that the unidirectionality of 
temporal continuing determines the unidirectionality of causation. The question before 
us, however, is whether these unidirectionalities fundamentally constitute and determine 
temporal asymmetiy, as in Craig’s suggested hieraichy. If they do, then they must also 
account for the asymmetiy of fixity. But the problem with taking Waterlow’s 
conclusions about unidhectionality and suggesting that they provide us with a foundation 
for the asymmetry of fixity, is that she m'gnQdfrom the asymmetiy between past and 
future to the unidirectionality of continuing and causation. Her conclusion that 
backwards continuing is unintelligible was based on the idea that the past could, in 
principle, be known with certainty, and that the future could not be so known. And, 
although she refrains from basing this epistemological asymmetiy on any metaphysical 
asymmetry, the latter is implied by an analogy she offers of water spreading fiom north to 
south {ibid). The analogy tells us that an assertion of the water’s (now) spreading made 
at any point implies that water lies to the north of the point but leaves it open whether or 
not water lies to the south. This imagery seems to paint a perfect pictm e of the 
fixity/actuality of the past (water to the north), and the non-fixity/potentiality of the fixture 
(indeterminate to the south). So Waterlow’s conclusions about unidirectionality are not 
available for the presentist to use as a foundation for the asymmetiy of fixity, given that 
Waterlow (rightly, I think) reverses the dependence. This is why, at one point in the 
argument, she acknowledges the presupposition of temporal asymmetiy in arguing for the 
unidirectionality. But the presentist needs to demonstiate that her ontology can 
account—in virtue o f  the unidirectionality of continuing and causation—for this key tenet 
of the A-Theory, and Waterlow’s arguments do not avail the presentist in that respect. I 
take this point as merely an instance of the following more general point: any account of
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temporal continuing and causation that coheres with an A-Theory of time is going to have 
to presuppose the asymmetiy of fixity; in which case, the former cannot ground the latter.
2. Sorabji’s Chcular Time 
Is there some other consideration, which might allow the presentist to claim that temporal 
asymmetiy is founded upon, and so deteimined by, the unidirectionality of temporal 
continuing and causation? In defeme of the presentist, one might wonder whether we 
could even conceive of a world temporally ordered such that time was unidirectional but 
not asymmetric with regard to fixity. In fact, at first glance, if one thinks of temporal 
continuing in the way that Waterlow does, then it would seem that we could not. If 
temporal continuing is not only directional, but necessarily unidirectional (for beings 
such as ouiselves), then it would seem that any unidirectional temporal order would 
require the fixity of events in the direction from which time has continued, and the non­
fixity of events in the direction towards which time will continue. Tliis conceptual 
difficulty, however, can be dissolved by considering an imaginary situation discussed by 
Sorabji (1988).
Sorabji considers what the world would be like if time were closed. By this, he 
does not mean an endlessly repeating linear time, where each repetition consists of an 
identical sequence of events. He rejects this conception as impossible purely on the basis 
of logical considerations: when we apply the principle of the identity of indiscemibles to 
times, there is nothing to distinguish the reoccuning events, nor the times at which they 
reoccui", fi om the initial time series. Thus, the notion of repeating time collapses, since 
no repetition has taken place. Instead, Sorabji proposes a notion of closed time according 
to which it is circular. In circular time, there would be no first and last event, rather the 
sequence of events would ‘appear to foim a seamless, closed circle’ (Sorabji, op.cit.\
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165). Sorabji sees this conception of closed time as avoiding the contradiction inherent 
in the notion of repeating time, since all events in the circular series occur only once (in 
the sense that ‘12 o’clock does not occur" more than once on the clockface’ {ibid)).
Sorabji grants that closed time would require appropriate changes in the laws of physics, 
ones that allowed for, say, a grown tree to shrink or disappear in time for it to grow again; 
but he claims that there is no conceptual obstacle to such a picture.
Now, let’s consider" what would be the ramifications for temporal directionality 
and asymmetry in closed time. As far" as dhectionality is concer"ned, on Waterlow’s 
defiirition of continuing, closed time would also involve (foi*war"ds) unidirectionality.
The planting of a seed leads to the growing of a tr ee which leads to the shading of the 
house; events causally related continue in the same way they do in linear" time. Of 
course, since the sequence of events is chcular, and there is no detectable first and last 
event, one could plant a tr ee tomonow in order to provide shade for the house yesterday. 
But Sorabji does not see this as a legitimate case of backwards causation, and nor should 
we if we are endorsing Waterlow’s view. Although, in a sense, the shading yesterday 
does continue fiom the planting tomorrow, it does so in the for"wards direction, not the 
backwards: the shading at fz continues fiom the planting at U NOT through fg, but through 
ts, k, So, although planting the tree at U is a cause of something that comes before
it in the circular series, the temporal continuing that grounds this causation does not r*un 
towards the earlier than direction. Another way to state this point is with Sorabji’s clock 
analogy: if the ordering of 6^ designates the ‘clockwise’ direction, then the temporal
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continuing in the above example does not lun ^counter clockwise . Theiefoie there is no 
backwards continuing and thus, on Waterlow’s account, no backwards causation.
What about asymmetry? It would seem that the only asymmetries exliibited by 
closed time are those just discussed, i.e. direction of continuing and direction of 
causation. As for fixity, since the sequence is closed and composed of a finite number of 
events, and since all events are equally past, the obvious judgment to make is that closed 
time is symmetrically fixed. Sorabji disagrees with this judgment, but not in a way that 
questions the symmetry; rather, he questions the fixity (or inevitability, as he prefers to 
speak of it) of the symmetrical sets of events. That is to say, he argues that all events are 
non-ûxQd, and so closed time is symmetrically non-fixed. His initial point here is that we 
have as much reason to endorse the symmetry of fixity as we do that of non-fixity.
Though it is trae that in closed time all events are past and the past is fixed, it is also tnie 
to say that all events are future and so not yet fixed. A middle aged man’s birth would be 
just as much part of his future as it would be a part of his past. Sorabji uses other 
arguments which he says tip the balance in favor of a symmetry of non-fixity, and though 
I take issue with his conclusion, the disagreement is immaterial in the context of om* 
present discussion. If, from the perspective of the present, we can view either direction in 
time as being both past and futur e, then clearly there is no asymmetry with regar d to 
fixity/non-frxity. I conclude, therefore, that since we can conceive of time as being 
unidirectional in respect of continuing and causation, while also being symmetrical in 
respect of fixity, the asymmetry of fixity is not gr ormded in the former.
3. Tooley’s Account of Causation
 ^Contrast tliis with Mellor (1998), who {contra Waterlow) thinks that the direction of causation is more 
fundamental than, and so determines, the direction of time (i.e. temporal continuing). Because of tliis, he 
does not tliink that circular time could obtain without backwards causation also obtaining; and so, on his 
account, the impossibility of the latter rules out the possibility of the former.
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Thus far, my arguments against the presentist’s attempt to ground the asymmetry of fixity 
in the unidhectionality of causation have been based upon Waterlow’s account of the 
latter. But perhaps this has restricted the range of solutions the presentist might offer. 
Must the presentist endorse Waterlow’s accoimt of causation, according to which the 
direction of temporal continuing is more fundamental than the direction of causation? Or 
can the presentist claim that ultimately causation is the most fundamental aspect of time, 
and therefore a determinant of the asymmetiy of fixity? We endorsed Waterlow’s 
account on the presentist’s behalf because it allowed for simultaneous causation, and this 
accords well with the presentist ontology. But the presentist may wish to argue that 
causal relations between events can still obtain in the present, even though such relations 
are not determined by temporal continuing in the way suggested by Waterlow. It is one 
question whether the presentist can argue for such a position, it is another whether 
successfully doing so would yield a non-circular account of the asymmetry of fixity. We 
will treat these questions in turn.
With respect to the first question, if the direction of causation is to determine, 
rather than be determined by, the direction of temporal continuing, can the presentist still 
claim that events are simultaneously caused in the present? Wateriow’s claim was that a 
cause must continue up to and during the initial occurrence of its effect in order for a 
genuine causal relation to obtain. She also argued that this claim implies that the 
direction of causation is determined by the direction of continuing. But surely there is 
room here for the presentist to resist this implication, while agr eeing that causal relations 
are continuous in exactly the way described by Waterlow. As long as the presentist 
retains temporal continuing as a necessary condition for causation, she can avail herself 
of Waterlow’s rendering of simultaneous causation; but from this, she need not infer that
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temporal continuing is more fundamental than causation. Just as it is perfectly plausible 
that for any P  and Q, Q's being a necessary condition for P  can result from P ’s 
determining Q\ so, too, it is perfectly plausible that though the direction of temporal 
continuing is detemimed by fire direction of causation, nevertheless, the obtaining of the 
causal relation necessarily requhes temporal continuing between events.
Now, assuming that we have painted an intelligible pictur e here on behalf of the 
presentist, can it provide a non-circular" accoimt of the asymmetry of fixity? If the 
presentist were to wed this causal account of the unidirectionality of temporal continuing 
with a non-reductive, singularist account of causation—according to which causal 
relations are analytically basic—then perhaps she would be within her logical rights to 
claim that the impossibility of backwards causation, and, in tmn, the asymmetiy of fixity, 
simply result fiom this conception of causation. The idea would be to claim that P ’s 
causing F  is just a primitive relation that does not admit of further analysis, and that, as a 
matter of fact, in our world causes always precede their effects. So there is no backwards 
causation, and it is in vh"tue of this fact that the past is fixed. This approach, however, is 
not a very philosophically satisfying one. We have already seen that it is difficult to 
argue for the impossibility of backwards causation without presupposing temporal 
asymmetry. That difficulty is not removed by simply stipulating that it is a br-ute fact 
about causation that causes always precede their effects. Granted, empirical evidence 
strongly suggests that we live in a world where causation is (whether necessai"ily or 
contingently) unidirectional. But to simply define ‘the futur e’ as that half of the time line 
that is subject to causal influence from the present does not provide a ground for the 
asymmetr y, it simply describes an aspect of it. Furlhermore, given our conclusions based 
on the conceptual possibility of ch cular" time, it is far from clear that the unidirectionality
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of causation is a sufficient condition for the non-fixity of the fixture. Nevertheless, the 
suggestion outlined above does point to a more sophisticated approach, one that also 
involves endorsing a singularist account of causation, but one on which the concept of 
causation does call for further analysis.
The approach I have in mind is that taken by Tooley (1997). If conect, it is one 
that would prove false my earlier claim that any account of causation that coheres with 
the A-Theory of time must presuppose the asymmetiy of fixity. Although Tooley does 
acknowledge that one cannot establish the impossibility of backwards causation without 
presupposing a dynamic conception of time, he offers a singularist account of causation 
that purports to show that that relation can only obtain on a dynamic conception of time.® 
So for Tooley, causation is fixndamental to time, and determines both its direction and 
asymmetry. Unlike other singulaiists about causation, however, he does not believe that 
the relation is analytically basic. It requires an analysis, but the analysis need not be a 
reductive one, nor need it presuppose causal laws. He goes on to argue, however, that if  
there are laws involving the causal relation (which he takes it that there are), then those 
laws must satisfy certain postulates. These postulates, in turn, are ones that can only 
obtain in a dynamic world.
So will this approach work for the presentist? According to Tooley, the most 
likely type of dynamic world in which his postulates can obtain is one in which both the 
past and present exist, but the fixture does not. This, however, seems a more contentious 
claim than the claim that his postulates require some type of dynamic world, and since I 
think there is a more fimdamental wony for Tooley’s approach anyway, I will consider it
* As we saw in Chapter 1, Tooley uses ‘dynamic’ as opposed to ‘A-Theory’ in designating his conception 
of time. This is because Ms conception is a hybrid one that involves aspects of botli the A- and B-Theoiy. 
Here, I will adopt Ms temiinology in discussing Ms approach to causation, since the asymmetiy that I am 
claiming is vital to the A-Theoiy is every bit as vital to Ms dynamic conception.
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as a potential solution for the presentist, in spite of its alleged inconsistency with a 
presentist ontology. The more fundamental wony is that Tooley’s postulates, upon 
which his analysis of causation and his account of temporal asymmetry are based, might 
themselves presuppose temporal asymmetry. I believe that they do, and thus that the 
presentist is unable to avail herself of Tooley’s approach in attempting to provide a non­
circular account of the asymmetiy of fixity. In what follows, I will first outline Tooley’s 
postulates and his defense of the claim that they can only obtain in a dynamic world; I 
will then argue that his postulates actually presuppose a dynamic world.
Tooley’s postulates are foimulated in tenus of the probabilities that causes 
transmit to their effects—a foimulation that is supposed to be neutral with respect to 
whether time is static or dynamic. The ‘cmcial content’ of the fom* postulates can be 
expressed by the following two claims:
(PI) The posterior probability of a cause is equal to its prior probability, and does not depend 
upon the prior probability of its effect.
(P2) The posterior probability of an effect depends upon the prior (and posterior) probability 
of its cause. ^
(Tooley, op.cit.: 61,107-8) 
According to Tooley, (PI) and (P2) ‘entail that, if  a type of event with a veiy low prior 
probability turns out to be caused by a type of event with a much higher prior probability, 
then the foimer type of event must be assigned a posterior probability that is at least as 
high as the prior (and also posterior) probability of the type of event that is its cause’ 
{ibid.: 105). So, for example, before an event occurs that involves drops of water, 
randomly scattered throughout the atmosphere, all moving in the same direction towards 
the suiiace of the earth, the probability of such an event seems very small. But after the 
occun ence of this event, when we consider its cause in light of the laws of gravity and 
acceleration, then we must acknowledge that the posterior probability of the event is no
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lower than the initial probability of an event that is causally sufficient to bring about the 
movement of water drops in the same direction. So effects are the recipients of the 
probabilities of their sufficient causes—probabilities which they do not have prior, but 
only posterior, to the obtaining of their causes.
Tooley goes on to argue that this picture cannot obtain in a temporally static 
world. This is because a static world is one in which events do not become actual as of a 
certain time; rather, events are either actual or not—simpliciter. According to Tooley, it 
might initially be thought that in such a world (P2) could still be justified, since there 
seems to be nothing inherently dynamic about the probability of a cause (at least 
partially) determining the probability of its effect. To see this point^ ,^ suppose that E 
occurs at time and E is causally sufficient to subsequently bring about F's occurrence 
at 2^ . Even if E and F  occur in a static world and are therefore actual simpliciter (and so 
eternally actual), this does not bar one fr om endorsing the highly intuitive claim that the 
posterior probability of F  depends upon the prior probability of E. But the problem, 
Tooley argues, is that it does not look as if (PI) can be justified, and this does not bode 
well for (P2).
(PI) is problematic because, given the symmetry of actuality in a static world, the 
non-actuality of an effect guarantees the non-actuality of its sufficient cause, just as much 
as the actuality of a sufficient cause guar antees the actuality of its effect. Thus, contrary 
to (PI), in a static world the posterior probability of a cause does depend upon the prior 
probability of its effect. Tooley’s point is that the time at which one considers what is 
actual is melevant. So, in a static world, the probability of E's being actual at t\ does 
depend upon the probability of F ’s being actual at ti-, and this dependence obtains
 ^My (PI) and (P2) are paraphrases of Tooley’s (C%) and (Q), respectively.
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regardless of the time at which we consider it. Whereas, in a dynamic world, F is not 
actual until it occurs at ti, so the prior probability at, say, k, of its occuirence at h does 
not affect the posterior probability at, say, fg, of £"’s having occurred at ti. And, given oui 
inability to justify (PI) on a static conception of time, Tooley claims that (P2) also cannot 
be justified; since the latter is only justified if we assume that the posterior probability of 
a cause is equal to its prior probability—an assumption that is effectively mled out by our 
inability to justify (PI).
But notice how trivially Tooley’s postulates, by his own lights, imply a dynamic 
conception of time. Doesn’t this suggest that, rather than proving that the world is a 
dynamic one, they must presuppose that it is? Certainly, if  I were a B-Theorist, this is the 
tack I would take in arguing against Tooley. Consider that, inasmuch as (PI) and (P2) 
claim that the relation between posterior and prior probabilities differs for causes and 
effects, there is an asymmetry built into the postulates: posterior probabilities of effects 
depend upon prior (and posterior) probabilities of causes, but posterior probabilities of 
causes do not depend upon the prior probabilities of effects. Perhaps, however, this 
objection is an unfair one, since the proponent of a static theoiy of time does 
acknowledge a limited temporal asymmetiy. So as long as (PI) and (P2) only presuppose 
a limited asymmetry, such as could happily be acknowledged by the proponent of a static 
world, then Tooley’s postulates would remain neutial with respect to different 
conceptions of time.
But a fuither consideration will demonstiate that this response will not spare (PI) 
and (P2) fiom the chai ge that they presuppose a dynamic world. Tooley, in addition to 
characterizing a dynamic world in teims of actuality at a time (as I have done above), is
10Though the point is Tooley’s, the following example is mine.
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also fond of characterizing it as one in which what facts there are depends upon what 
time it is. Here, facts are to be thought of as states of affairs that function as tmthmakers 
for tme propositions. Now, this seems a fair characterization—certainly one that any A- 
Theorist should agree does captui e the natui e of a dynamic world; but, in light of it, 
consider that built into (PI) and (P2) is the idea that the probability of the occurrence of 
an effect differs according to whether we consider it prior or posterior to the occurrence 
of its cause. In other words, the facts about what probabilities there are depend upon 
what time it is. Thus, (PI) and (P2) presuppose a dynamic world according to which 
there is a robust temporal asymmetiy as to what is actual, and therefore they are not 
available for the presentist to use as a ground for the asymmetiy of fixity. And so I stand 
by my claim that any account of causation that coheres with the A-Theory of time must 
presuppose the asymmetiy of fixity.
III. Presentism and the Asymmetry of Fixity—Continued
A. B-Theoretic Accounts 
In Section II we tried, but failed, to vindicate the hieraichy of dependence that Craig has 
suggested giounds the asymmetry of fixity. Given our lack of success in making Craig’s 
suggestion work, perhaps we should consider another class of solutions. Although 
presentists (other than Craig) do not seem to have given much thought to providing an 
account of the asymmetiy of fixity, B-Theorists have been more forthcoming in 
recognizing that then* doctrine of ontological symmetry demands such an account. 
Suggestions that have been offered, to name but a few, include the asymmetiy of 
counterfactual dependence (Lewis 1979), the asymmetiy of entiopy (Horwich 1987: Ch.
It is worth noting here, that Tooley inteiprets the asymmetiy of actuality that he sees following from liis 
postulates, as involving an asymmetiy of ontology. This is why he thinks his account rules out a presentist 
ontology. But since it is the puipose of tliis chapter to demonstrate that an asymmetiy of actuality (or
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4)^ ,^ and, of com'se, the asymmetry of causation (Mellor 1998: Chs. 10-11). Would any 
of these B-Theoretic accounts be of use to the presentist? There is a fundamental reason 
why I think they would not: ultimately, these accounts aie incompatible with the A- 
Theoiy. This incompatibility, however, is not immediately obvious, so I will have to 
elaborate.
Recall OUI' discussion at the end of Chapter 1 regarding the relationship between 
temporal becoming and the A-Theorist’s notion of the asymmetry of fixity. As we saw, 
for the A-Theorist the asymmeti y is a robust one, according to which there is an objective 
openness and potency about the futme, as contrasted with the present (and the past, if you 
are a non-presentist A-Theorist). In whatever way the A-Theorist chooses to characterize 
this asymmetry, it will always involve a change in the ontological status of what was 
once the future, whereby the future becomes something else in the present. Recall that it 
is this objective temporal becoming of the future in the present tliat imparts to the A- 
Theorist’s notion of temporal asymmeti'y its robustness. So it is the combination of 
objective temporal becoming plus the asymmeti'y of fixity that makes the A-Theory 
distinctive. And this is precisely why Craig claims that the asymmeti'y is ultimately 
grounded in objective temporal becoming. Again, contiast this with the B-Theorist’s 
notion of the non-fixity of the future, and it is a much more limited sense in which the 
future differs from the present and the past. It is not an ontological difference, but merely 
a modal difference. For the generic A-Theorist, however, the modal difference between 
the future and the present can only obtain if there is an ontological difference. This view 
arises directly out of a belief in objective temporal becoming, a belief that the B-Theorist
fixity) is grounded upon an asymnietiy of ontology, I have refi ained in the foregoing discussion fi om 
endorsing Tooley’s assumption that it does.
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rejects. So if some aspect of temporal asymmetiy is meant to ground the asymmetry of 
fixity independently of an affirmation of objective temporal becoming, then the 
distinctiveness of the A-Theory is lost. It is for this reason that I believe that A-Theorists 
camiot make use of the B-Theoretic attempts to gi'ound the asymmetry of fixity.
Notice, too, that the foregoing discussion has pointed to a diagnosis of why a 
presentist ontology is incompatible with the asymmetiy of fixity. All A-Theorists, 
presentists included, believe that there is a modal difference between, on the one hand, 
the present and the past, and, on the other, the futuie. They also all believe that there is 
an ontological difference between the present and the future. But, given the presentist’s 
denial o f past existence, she is unable to provide an account of the difference between 
past and future that also accounts for the difference between present and future. The only 
ground the presentist can offer for the latter is an ontological one, but then she must 
withdi aw this ground in tiying to account for the foimer difference. Thus she is unable to 
fully captuie the asymmetiy.
B. A Presentist Rejoinder 
There is one final response the presentist might make to this last objection. She might 
claim that though the past and fiituie are umeal, propositions about past events admit of 
tmth values, while propositions about future events do not. The thought would be that an 
asymmetry in the application of bivalence to propositions about past and future events is 
what gi'ounds the asymmetiy of fixity. This solution would escape the above objection 
by providing the same ground both for the difference between past and fiituie, and for the 
difference between present and futuie (given that propositions about the present are also
Although Homich does not think that time itself has any intrinsic asymmetiy, he does think that our 
experience of asymmetiy results from such ineversible processes as entropy, and that these processes, in 
turn, are explained by big bang cosmology.
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bivalent). Of course, this move would not be open to Craig, since he endorses bivalence 
for all propositions (Craig 2001: 40-1). Furthennore, I am unaware of any presentist who 
would endorse an asymmetry of bivalence in light of their endorsement of an ontological 
symmetry. Nevertheless, I had better explicitly say why the presentist should not endorse 
such a solution.
The suggested solution answers the question, ‘What grounds temporal 
asymmetiy?’, by claiming that it is giounded in an asymmetiy of bivalence: propositions 
about past events are bivalent, propositions about foture events aie not. This answer, 
however, can be interpreted in thiee different ways. EITHER i) the asymmetiy of 
bivalence fundamentally grounds temporal asymmetry independently of temporal 
becoming, OR ii) the asymmetry of bivalence is more fundamental than the asymmetiy of 
fixity, but is itself ultimately grounded in temporal becoming, OR iii) the asymmetiy of 
bivalence just is temporal becoming, that is, temporal becoming consists in non-bivalent 
propositions becoming (mid remaining) bivalent. Unfoitunately for the presentist, none 
of i) thi'ough iii) me satisfactoiy answers to the question. If i) is the coirect interpretation, 
then the objection fiom the previous subsection applies (since, for the A-Theorist, the 
asymmetry cannot be independent of temporal becoming). If ii) is the con ect 
inteipretation, then tliere is a glaring inconsistency in the suggested hierarchy of 
dependence. As we have seen, for the presentist, temporal becoming involves the 
continual creation and annihilation of events, so in order for temporal becoming to 
ground the application of bivalence in a logically consistent manner, only propositions 
about the present could be bivalent. And then, of course, we lose our asymmetiy.
Finally, and for similm' reasons, if iii) is the correct inteipretation then the inconsistency 
becomes an incoherence; since we are now asked to identify a temporally asymmetric
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notion (propositions becoming, and remaining, bivalent), with a temporally symmetric 
one (events becoming, but not remaining, real). Thus an asymmetry of bivalence would 
also fail to provide the presentist with a gi'ound for temporal asymmetiy.
IV. The Existence of the Past
A. The Assertion o f Ontological Asymmetiy 
Though we have been unsuccessful in vindicating the hieraichy of dependence that Craig 
offered us, surely there are some aspects of the hierarchy that we can salvage. None of 
the preceding conclusions have brought into question the dependence of past traces in the 
present on the unidirectionality of causation. Further, we have seen that it is an attractive, 
though not mandated, view for the A-Theorist to hold that the latter is dependent, in turn, 
on the unidirectionality of temporal continuing. Indeed, it is likely that these two 
temporal features are what constitute the unidhectionality of time itself. But, cmcially, 
we have seen that none of these members of the hierarchy determine the asymmetiy of 
fixity, and that it is more likely that the latter is what giounds all of them. What of 
temporal becoming? As we saw, Craig sees all these asymmetries as ultimately grounded 
in temporal becoming. But his conception of becoming, that of the continual creation and 
annihilation of events, is one that is stipulated in order to accord with the presentist’s 
doctrine of non-existent past and future. So this paiticulai- conception of temporal 
becoming is going to be just as unsuccessful in constituting the asymmetry of fixity as the 
other suggestions were.
I take om* failme, here, to reconcile presentism with the intuition that the past is 
fixed and the future not, as a failme of presentism in general. For the A-Theorist, there 
must be some featme of time that can account for a robust asymmetry of fixity, and for 
the other asymmetiies we have discussed, and the presentist cannot provide us with one.
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I would now like to make a suggestion as to what that feature might be. As I have 
indicated, I agree with Craig that the ultimate ground of temporal asymmetry must lie in 
the nature of objective temporal becoming, but surely the presentist’s rendering of this 
concept is not the most intuitive one. The term ‘becoming’ implies only creation, not 
annihilation. A more satisfactory rendering would be that events become real in the 
present and remain real thereafter. This more natural conception of temporal becoming 
then provides us with the immediate ground for the asymmetiy of fixity: the past is 
different fiom the future because the past exists and the futuie does not. So, pace the 
presentist, the difference between past and future is an ontological one, and this 
difference, based as it is on a non-presentist conception of temporal becoming, 
fundamentally constitutes temporal asymmetry.
One can imagine the presentist at this point saying, ‘OK, suppose, for the sake of 
argument, I acknowledge that you’re onto something here with your objection to my 
ontology. Then, can you explain to me how, or in what way, the past exists?’ This is an 
important challenge for me. Would I respond by saying that past events like World War I 
still exist? Or would I claim that though these entities do not exist in the present, they 
exist eternally and are indexed to times that are, for us, now past? Given that I am an A- 
Theorist who wishes to affiim—with the presentist—the dynamic nature of time, neither 
of these answers seems very promising for me. When events cease, they no longer 
exist—unless they exist eternally. And if they exist eternally, then what has become of 
the A-Theorist’s dynamic conception of time? On the other hand, if  past existence does 
not involve eternal existence, then perhaps it simply involves the present existence of 
items that m some way relate to the past. But this is precisely the presentist’s story! So 
now what has become of my distinctive view—one that puiports to navigate between the
exü’emes of presentism and etemalism? It seems that such challenges require me to offer 
an account of past existence that satisfies the following two desiderata: i) the account 
must differ substantially from the presentist’s account, and ii) the account cannot imply a 
B-Theoretic ontology, according to which events exist eternally. It is my purpose in this 
final section to make a first approximation at such an account. I will provide a more 
detailed sketch of the account in the Epilogue.
I will take Robert Adams’ suggestion about the existence of the thisnesses of past 
individuals as the starting point of my account. In his (1979), Adams argues for the 
existence of thisnesses, where a thisness of x is the property of being x or the property of 
being identical to x. In his (1981), however, he argues that there are no thisnesses of non­
actual individuals. Finally, in his (1986), he takes these conclusions as his starting point 
and discusses the relation between thisness and time, arguing that there are no thisnesses 
of individuals that will exist, but that do not exist yet After offering this argument, he 
then considers whether it also implies that the thisnesses of past individuals do not exist, 
and concludes that it does not. In trying to develop an account of past existence that 
satisfies oui* desiderata, I first want to consider Adams’ aiguments in this context, as well 
as some subsequent presentist responses to them due to Kvanvig and Craig.
B. Background Arguments 
Adams’ argument for the thesis that the thisnesses of futuie individuals do not yet exist is 
based upon the following principle, which I shall refer to as the Openness Principle (OP):
(OP) For any beings x and y and time t, if x existed before t or exists timelessly, and y 
exists contingently and comes into existence at t, then it would be metaphysically 
possible for X to have existed even if y had never existed. (Adams 1986: 317)
So, for example, Adams was bom in 1937, but in 1935 it was still open whether he would 
ever be bom. So in 1935 there existed possible continuations of the actual histoiy of the
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world in which he never comes into existence. Thus, even given everything that 
existed—and had existed—up until 1935, the existence of each of those entities is
perfectly compatible with Adams’ never having existed. But, of coui'se, the existence of
■ >
his thisness is not compatible with his never having existed (given the thesis argued for in 
Adams (1981)), so his thisness cannot be among those things that existed in 1935 (or at 
any time before his coming into existence). Adams acknowledges that the force of his 
argument ‘rests on an intuition that the fiitm*e ... is metaphysically open in a way that the 
present and past are not’ (Adams 1986: 318), And, fixrther, that the kind of metaphysical 
openness that (OP) specifies can only obtain in a world in which many events are not 
causally deteimined. He does not ai gue for  the openness of the future or indeterminism; 
he is, rather, content to identify his intended audience as those who share these intuitions.
Adams does, however, consider the following objection to (OP). Take a person, 
e.g., Montgomery Furth, who was bom before Adams: could Furth have existed in 1935 
if Adams did not later come into existence? Intuitively, we want to say that he could 
have existed, but could the person born before Adams was born have existed? The idea 
being that a person bom before Adams, logically speaking, could not have existed if 
Adams were never bom. But of couise, as Adams points out, though Montgomeiy Furth 
has the property of being bom before Adams in the actual world, he does not have this 
property in the possible world in which Adams is never bom; and so while Furth could 
have existed if Adams were never bom, he could not, in that case, have been the person 
that was bom before Adams. What about Furth‘s living (in 1935) before Adams was 
born! Is this an entity that could be said to exist in 1935, and which therefore is 
incompatible with Adams’ never having existed? Even allowing that such an entity is the 
type of thing that admits of existence, Adams suggests that this existent is simply
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reducible to Furth *s living in 1935, ‘chai*acteiized in teiins of a relation that it, in fact, has 
but that it could have lacked’ (ibid.: 317-8). And Furth‘s living in 1935 is certainly 
compatible with Adams’ never having existed. If the offending existent is something 
more than this, then Adams claims that it must express a cross-temporal relationship that 
could not have existed prior to his bhth.
Having given what he acknowledges is a modest defense of (OP) and the thesis it 
supports, Adams goes on to consider, on behalf of the objector, ‘whether the same things 
I am saying about futuie things that do not yet exist should not also be said about past 
things that no longer exist’ (ibid.: 319). He invites us to think of an example of a past 
individual that no longer exists (such as a particular pain), and letting that individual be /, 
he has the objector run the analogous argument to the one against the existence of futuie 
thisnesses:
Surely eveiything Üiat now exists could still have existed—numerically, and not just qualitatively, 
the same—even if the histoiy of the world before now had been veiy different—in particular, even 
if i had never existed. So if the tliisness of i is among the tilings that exist now, it could have 
existed even if i had never existed. Since you deny the latter, you should also deny the fonner. 
(ibid.)
But, of course, this argument violates oui* intuitions regaiding the asymmetry
between past and futuie. It seems far more plausible to claim that no presently existing
entity depends logically or metaphysically on futui*e occurrences, than it does to claim
that no such entity depends logically or metaphysically on past occuirences. For this
reason, Adams rejects the above aigument. He does, however, acknowledge that if the
thisnesses of non-present individuals have the individuals themselves as essential
constituents, then the thisnesses of individuals who have ceased to exist (or, of course,
who have yet to come into existence) must also be non-existent. In this case, we would
have to claim that the thisnesses of past individuals, though non-existent, are nevertheless
available to us. So we would express the asymmeti'y between past and future thisnesses
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as one of availability: the thisnesses of both past and fhtui e individuals do not exist, but 
they are available in the case of past individuals, whereas they are not in the case of 
fntui'e individuals. Adams does not say much more about this possibility, but I take it 
that he believes that thisnesses do not have the individuals themselves as essential 
constituents, and therefore affmns the existence of past thisnesses.
Kvanvig (1989) argues that Adams’ defense of the thesis that the thisnesses of 
future individuals do not yet exist is defective in a way that is analogous to the 
defectiveness of fatalistic arguments. The fatalist argues, according to Kvanvig, that if a 
person S does a certain action A, and if it has always been the case that S would do A, 
then S could not have failed to do A. Kvanvig claims that the correct response to this 
argument is to posit a limited counterfactual power over the past: if  S does not do A, then 
the past is simply different from what it otherwise would have been. In doing A, S 
exercises her power of fi'ee will and makes it the case that a certain fact has always been 
the case; namely, S’s doing A. According to Kvanvig, this is not to be constiued as a 
power to change the past, since it is only a power over what has always been the case. 
Thus the unidirectionality of causation and the fixity of the past are secme. Kvanvig then 
claims that this reply to the fatalist provides an analogous reply to Adams’ argument. 
Although there ai e no thisnesses of non-actual entities, ‘the fact that an entity exists 
brings it about that there always has been a thisness for that entity ... [and so] brings it 
about that the past is different fi'om what it otherwise would have been’ (Kvanvig, op.cit:.
Kvanvig also objects to Adams’ claim that his thesis about the non-existence of 
future thisnesses is motivated by actualism and intuitions concerning the metaphysical 
openness of the futui e (in contiust to the closedness of the past). For, Kvanvig claims, if
92
presentism—the temporal analogue of actualism-—is as plausible as its modal analogue, 
and if Adams is correct about the non-existence of hitme thisnesses, then the analogous 
claim about the non-existence of past thisnesses is equally plausible. In other words, the 
motivation for believing that futur e thisnesses do not exist cannot be the intuition that the 
futur e is open, because if presentism is true, the past participates in the very same 
metaphysical openness. Why should Adams think that presentism is true? Because he 
is a modal actualist, and as we saw Craig argue in Section I, the appeal of presentism is 
supposed to minor the appeal of actualism. But, of course, Adams does not think 
presentism is tine^ '^ , and devotes a section of his paper to saying why he thinks the appeal 
of actualism does not cany over into the temporal case. Rather than discussing that 
aspect of the exchange between Adams and Kvanvig, however, I would like to stick to 
the above two objections and Adams’ responses to them. These two objections, one 
against the non-existence of future Üiisnesses and one against the existence of past 
thisnesses, have the most bearing on the existence of the past, the issue that is of central 
conceni to us at die moment.
In his (1989), Adams replies to Kvanvig’s paper, hi response to the objection 
fr om the anti-fatalistic argument, Adams acknowledges the philosophical respectability 
of Kvanvig’s position in the context of fatalism, but claims that the response does not 
necessarily apply when adapted to address the thesis about the non-existence of future 
thisnesses. The implication, according to Adams, of Kvanvig’s response to the fatalistic 
argument is that ‘things can be true about a time that would not have been true about it if 
(as was possible) things had gone differently at a later time’ (Adams, op.cit.: 300).
Although Kvanvig does actually say this, it does not seem like something tlie presentist should want to 
say. See below, tliis subsection and tlie next, for further discussion of tliis point.
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Adams agrees with this implication, but denies that it is inconsistent with his claim in 
(OP), which was ‘that whatever exists in the history of w up until t must be 
metaphysically compatible with any possible continuation of that history after t (ibid.). 
And, although the objector might claim that the existence, in 1935, oîFurth ’s living 
before Adams was born, is incompatible with Adams’ never being born; we can reduce 
such existents to ones, such as Furth or Furth’s living, ‘that depend on later events for 
some of their properties, but not for their existence'' (ibid., my emphasis). I take it that 
Adams’ thought amounts to the following: though it may be the case that past truths 
counterfactually depend upon future fi'ee actions, this does not imply that actual past 
existents metaphysically depend upon future existents: since it is open whether any 
contingent future entity will exist, but it is not open whether actual past existents did 
exist. So, Adams can embrace Kvanvig’s anti-fatalistic response while resisting the 
analogous application to the existence of firture thisnesses.
As for Kvanvig’s claim that Adams, if committed to the non-existence of firture 
thisnesses, should also be committed to the metaphysical openness of the past; Adams 
responds by pointing out that presentists should not ‘ascribe to the past “the ver*y same 
opeimess” that I am inclined to ascribe to the future’ (ibid.). The metaphysical openness 
of the past consists in ‘the compossibility of the actual present with a plurality of 
alteruative futur es’, but presentism does not imply ‘that the actual present is compossible 
with a plurality of alternative pasts’ (ibid.). I think this is the right response to Kvanvig, 
but it is interesting that he seems to blur the distinction—a distinction that the presentist 
requires—between existence/non-existence, on the one hand, and frxity/non-frxity on the
Not suiprisingly, given his asymmetrical ontology of thisnesses, Adams thinks the past, but not the 
future, exists. He says ‘our quantifier should be understood as ranging, at least, over past as well as present tilings’ (Adams 1986: 322).
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other. I have been arguing that the asymmetiy of fixity is fundamentally constituted by 
an asymmetry of ontology, and that the presentist must deny this while still offering a 
satisfactory account of what constitutes fixity (and that she is unable to do so). Kvanvig, 
however, simply seems to bite the bullet and agree with me that fixity is constituted by 
ontology. At least, that would seem to be the implication of his claim that the past is 
open in the same way the futuie is. And yet, in the passage about counterfactual 
dependence of past upon firture, he affimis the fixity of the past. I have more to say 
about tliis seeming inconsistency and other aspects of the debate thus far, but before 
embarking upon a more in depth commentary, I would like to cover an extension of this 
debate that can be found in Craig (1997b) and Adams (1997).
Craig offers a defense of Kvanvig’s anti-fatalistic response to Adams. Recall that 
Adams sidestepped that response by claiming that all it shows is that past tr uths can 
counterfactually depend upon future events, but not that past entities might somehow 
depend upon future entities for their* very existence. Craig descr*ibes a scenario involving 
time travel which pirr*por*tedly provides a counterexample directly to the latter, and thus to 
(OP) itself. The scenario has us consider a time tr aveler who departs some time after t 
and ariives some time before t  Craig claims that at time t there are two subsets of 
metaphysically possible continuations after t: those that include all actual events prior to t 
in their history, and those that include merely possible, but not actual, events pr*ior to t. It 
is the former sort that Adams exclusively has in mind for his ‘possible continuations’. It 
is die latter sor*t, however, that Craig points to as providing a counterexample to (OP).
So, although the actual continuation fi om t includes the depar*ture of the time traveler, it 
is still possible at t that the time tr aveler not depar t, in which case the history prior to t 
would be other than what it is. Given the time traveler’s anival in the actual history, it is
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episteinically certain that she will depart after t, but it is not metaphysically necessary 
that she do so. Thus, although it ‘is a necessary tmth that the actual fiitiu’c is a 
continuation of the actual past, ... it does not follow that every possible futm*e is a 
continuation of the actual past’ (Craig, op.cit:. 403).
Craig also questions what he calls ‘Adams’s artificial bifiircation between entities 
and facts or truths’ (ibid). He argues that if tense is an objective feature of reality (which 
both he and Adams believe it is), then tensed facts are as much a part of the world’s 
ontology as are other entities. Further, Craig claims that if fiitme contingent propositions 
are bivalent, then the correspondence theory of tmth requires that they coiTespond to 
future-tense states of affairs that obtain presently. According to Craig, this position— 
coupled with Adams’ claim that every possible future is a continuation of the actual 
past—yields fatalism. Thus, in order to avoid fatalism, we must allow that possible 
future continuations include those that contain non-actual past-tense states of affairs.
Craig is not altogether clear at this point, but I assume his concern is that if possible 
continuations after t can only contain the actual histoiy prior to t, and if that histoiy is one 
in which not only facts about the fiitm*e obtained, but also then* coixesponding states of 
affairs, then it is impossible for an agent to have any effect on the previously obtaining 
but yet to be instantiated states of affahs.^  ^ So, concludes Craig, the anti-fatalistic 
argument does provide a valid objection to (OP).
Adams’ direct responses to Craig’s objections are rather brief, though he does 
take the oppoitunity to embark on an interesting commentaiy of Lewis’ (1976) discussion 
of the paradoxes of time travel. The brief and direct responses, however, will suit our
This seems to be a version of the fatalistic argument from temporal necessity, and since I think that that 
argument can be defeated by what I take to be a veiy natural bifurcation between propositions and events 
(or states of affairs), I do not find Craig’s argument here convincing. See Chapter 3, Sections in.E. and IV.
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puiposes here. With respect to Craig’s counterexample involving the time traveler, 
Adams more or less dismisses the possibility of there being alternative fiitures at t that are 
inconsistent with events that have tianspired prior to t. What, he asks, can it mean for 
such alternatives to still be possible at t7 According to tenseless possible worlds 
semantics, there are certainly indefinitely many possible worlds in which the time 
traveler never departs and never amves, but ‘what can it mean to say that such a history 
is still possible at t when the time tiaveler has already aixived?’ (Adams 1997: 409). As 
soon as possibility claims become tensed, Adams can only make sense of them if phrased 
in teims of his definition of ‘possible continuations’.
He also questions Craig’s requirement that future tense propositions with 
detenninate tmth values must coixespond to something that is intrinsically present. We 
noimally think of propositions about the past as having detenninate tmth values, and yet 
we need not believe that such propositions require an intrinsically present ontological 
basis. Propositions about the Battle of Waterloo, for example, have as their ontological 
basis ‘something that was a battle and that does not exist now and is not occumng now’ 
(ibid.: 407-8). So, by pai’ity of reasoning, tme future tense propositions are tme now in 
viitue of ‘coiTespondence with things that will occur in the future, not with things that aie 
occuiring now’ (ibid.: 408). Since Adams does not accept Craig’s ban on cross temporal 
coiTespondence between propositions and entities, he can continue to hold that there 
exists nothing in the present which depends upon fiiture entities for its existence, and 
therefore also hold—without fear of fatalistic implications—that the only possible 
continuations from t are those that contain the actual history prior to t.
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C. Commentary
I take Adams’ thesis about time and thisnesses—call it the Time and Thisness Thesis 
(TTT)—to offer an attractive pictui e of how it is that the past exists while the future does 
not. Unfoitunately for the present discussion, however, Adams does not spell out how 
such a pictuie can satisfy the desiderata that we are pursuing. Of course, Adams is more 
concerned with offering an account of reference that reflects his temporally asymmetiic 
ontology, than he is with defending and explicating that ontology. Nevertheless, if the 
proponent of a dynamic conception of time posits an asymmetiy of ontology, then she 
would do well to offer an account of that ontology that satisfies the proffered desiderata. 
Adams’ failuie to do so leaves him open to Kvanvig’s and Craig’s objections. In what 
follows, I will tiy to clarify the issues in the debate, but will also be hypothetically 
continuing it in a way that is highly speculative; such speculation, however, will provide 
fertile ground for sketching an account of past existence that satisfies oui* desiderata.
I want to start my commentary by going back to Kvanvig’s objections to Adams. 
As we saw, he objected to Adams’ argument for the non-existence of future thisnesses, as 
well as to Adams’ argument for the existence of past thisnesses. We would do well at 
this point to consider Kvanvig’s motivation for his attacks, and the dialectic of his paper 
in light of that motivation. At first sight, given the presentist ontology, one might find it 
odd that a presentist would tiy to attack an argument for the non-existence of fiitui e 
thisnesses. Presentists, however, noimally want to affirm that propositions about the 
future both exist and are bivalent, and one aspect of Adams’ position is that if there are 
no thisnesses of future individuals, then there are also no singular propositions about 
those individuals. So I take it that Kvanvig is keen to affirm the existence of future 
thisnesses, while maintaining that such a claim does not imply that the futuie itself exists;
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or, indeed, that the future is fixed. This is why he appeals to the anti-fatalistic argument 
in attacking Adams’ position.
Analogously, then, he should also want to affirm the existence of past thisnesses. 
So why does he attack Adams’ argument for that veiy conclusion? It cannot be the 
conclusion that he takes issue with, but Adams’ motivation for the argument. Adams 
sees the openness of the futur e and closedness of the past as supervening on the ontology 
of thisnesses. Clearly, Kvanvig does not, and therefore questions Adams’ move from 
open futur e/closed past to the non-existence of future thisnesses /existence of past 
thisnesses. Furthermore, given Kvanvig’s seemingly inconsistent assertion that the past 
is both open and fixed, he must have a different definition of ‘openness’ than does Adams 
(or, indeed, most philosophers). The ‘metaphysical opermess’ of the past and future must 
simply be synonymous with the non-existence of past and future (but, again, not the non­
existence of past and future thisnesses). The asymmetry of fixity, then, must be 
something completely different fiom the asymmetry of opermess, and thus must be 
grormded in something other than ontology. Only on this interpretation can Kvanvig be 
understood as espousing even a remotely internally consistent version of presentism.
So, according to Kvanvig’s presentism, the past and future are non-existent and 
are therefore ‘metaphysically open’. But this opeimess is only one of ontology, not 
modality: the past is fixed and the futur e is non-fixed. Furthermore, the thisnesses of past 
and futur'e individuals exist, even though their existence depends upon the present 
existence of the individuals in question (i.e. depends upon the individuals having existed 
presently (in the past), or going to be existing presently (in the future)). So the present is 
ontologically basic. This interpretation of Kvanvig sheds light on Craig’s defense of him. 
Craig’s objection to OP was that it did not allow possible continuations of the histoiy of
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the world at t to include merely possible but non-actual histories prior to t. Such a 
limitation on the scope of possible continuations, according to Craig, has fatalistic 
implications. Why? Because of the ontological priority of the present: for Craig, all past 
and futur e states of affair's obtain in the present; just as for Kvanvig, the thisnesses of past 
and future individuals exist in the present. These theses not only reflect the presentist’s 
ontology, but also allow for the bivalence of propositions about the past and (more 
controversially) the futur'e.
The problem, however, with inferring fatalism fr'om the conjunction of these 
theses and Adams’ (OP), is that a non-presentist such as Adams would have no reason to 
endorse the theses. Why would one believe that all tensed states of affairs obtain 
presently unless one believed that only the present exists? Similarly, why would one 
believe that there was a symmetr y of ontology with respect to thisnesses of past and 
futm'e individuals, unless one believed that there was a symmetr y of ontology with 
respect to the past and future? Granted, for Kvanvig, the former symmetry is one of 
existence, while the latter is one of non-existence, but this is explained on our* 
interpretation of Kvanvig’s presentism. The point of the question is that if one thought 
there was an asymmetry of ontology with respect to the past and future (as Adams does), 
then it is doubtful that one would embrace a symmetr-y of ontology with respect to the 
thisnesses of past and futur e individuals, regardless of whether that ontology were one of 
existence or non-existence. So in spite of Kvanvig’s and Craig’s objections, Adams is 
under very little pressure to give up either (OP) or the thesis that the thisnesses of future 
individuals do not exist though the thisnesses of past individuals do.
Perhaps we can come to the aid of Kvanvig and Craig here, and suggest an 
objection that has strength independently of any presentist allegiances. In order to do so,
1 0 0
we should first ask what the real disagreement between the parties is—other than that 
Adams thinks the past exists and presentists do not. We should then try to formulate an 
argument on behalf of the presentist that stai'ts from premises shared with Adams. The 
debate from this point will be speculative and hypothetical in nature, but will be no less 
instinctive for that. If (my) Adams can resist the ai gument that we formulate on behalf of 
the presentist, then we will have cleared the first hmdle in vindicating TTT as an account 
of past existence. Though it is not explicit, I think the real disagreement between the two 
parties lies in the interpretation of existence claims about the thisnesses of non-present 
individuals. When Adams says that the thisnesses of past individuals exist and those of 
future individuals do not, I take him to mean that the past is real and exists and the future 
is not. When Kvanvig says that the thisnesses of both past and future individuals exist, I 
take him to mean that these thisnesses exist presently, but not that the past and future 
exist. So, initially, the real worry for Adams’ TTT, in the context of offering an account 
of past existence, is that perhaps the existence of past thisnesses does not necessarily 
imply the existence of past times or events.
Taking Kvanvig as oui' representative presentist, how might he exploit this worry 
without begging the question against TTT? Recall that Adams (1986: 320) acknowledges 
that in order to affirm the existence of past thisnesses, he must deny that the thisnesses of 
individuals have the individuals themselves as essential constituents. Let us call the 
claim that individuals are essential constituents of their thisnesses the Essential 
Constituents Claim (ECC). Adams’ point is that if ECC were ti'ue, then the thisnesses of 
individuals could not exist without the individuals themselves simultaneously existing; 
and he does not want to say that non-present individuals such as the Battle of Waterloo 
still exist, even though he does wish to say that that Battle’s thisness still exists. Now,
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since we are interpreting Kvanvig as affirming the existence of the thisnesses of non­
present individuals, while denying the existence of those individuals themselves, he 
should certainly endorse Adams’ denial of ECC. So, it is open to him to object that if 
ECC is false, then what motivation is there to infer fr om the present existence of past 
thisnesses the existence (present or otherwise) of past times or events?
To see the force of this objection, suppose an instantaneous past event E, having 
thisness E*, occmred at Suppose, further, that it is presently i^. Adams, I take it, 
would claim that though E does not exist at t\ (i.e. presently), its past existence at can 
presently be affirmed on the basis of E*’s existence at fo and at all times after 
(including t\). Kvanvig, I take it, would claim that E'*’s existence at t\ gives us no ground 
for positing the existence of E at any time other than when E is present. So at all times 
after îq, the most we can say about E’s existence is that it obtained when to was present 
but not that it obtains in the past. The question now is, independently of one’s belief 
about the existence of the past, which of these inferences from the agreed present 
existence ofE* is more plausible? In light of Adams’ denial of ECC, Kvanvig could 
argue that it is more plausible to infer the non-existence (simpliciter) of E rather than the 
(qualified) past existence of E. This is because they both agree on the following three 
premises: i) E does not currently exist at i^, ii) E* does exist at ti, and iii) E is not an 
essential constituent ofE*; so what furfher premise would Adams offer for E's past 
existence?
Though this line of objection is open to Kvanvig, I do not think it would prove 
successful, for there is a further premise Adams could make use of (though he does not 
explicitly use it in this way). It is a premise we have already seen in his response to 
Craig, and it initially comes in the context of his objection to the presentist ontology. He
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daims that the ontological basis of ‘the fact that an important battle was fought at 
Waterloo on June 18,1815 ... is, or includes, something that was a battle and that does 
not exist now and is not occmiing now’ {ibid.: 322). Adams grants that this claim rests 
on intuitions, but they are not intuitions specifically about whether or not the past exists, 
so this is not a question begging response; they ai e intuitions about what must be part of 
the world’s ontology in order for a fact or state of affahs to obtain—and also, I take it, in 
order for the thisness of a fact or state of affairs to exist. The Battle of Waterloo does not 
exist presently, but its thisness does, and therefore it would appear that ECC is false. But, 
unless you are a presentist, the present non-existence of an entity does not mle out the 
existence of that entity at some time other than the present; and, Adams would say, if you 
agree with the presentist that it does, then you owe some account of how a fact about a 
past event or the thisness of that event can exist without anytliing in the world (present or 
otherwise) to ground it.
To be fair to Kvanvig, he does offer such an account. He claims that present 
truths about a past event are explained by an event type—where this is conceived of as a 
universal or a property—of which the past event was a token, and ‘which now has the 
property of having been instanced in the past... ;fiirther, this event type is not now and 
never was an actual [event]’ (Kvanvig 1989: 297, his emphasis). But this is a strange 
claim, as a token of a type is normally conceived of as a specific instance of a general 
concept, and there is nothing general about, for example, the Battle of Waterloo type. 
Furthermore, this solution does not fiilfill the requirement for an ontological ground, it 
just inserts an additional level. We now want to know, what is the ontological basis for 
the event type, other than something that was a battle? So if one shares the intuition that
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such entities as facts and thisnesses require an ontological basis, then one is still going to 
be dissatisfied with the presentist’s account.
Does the requirement for an ontological basis conflict with Adams’ denial of 
ECC? I think not, because it seems that E can be the ontological basis ofÆ"* without 
being an essential constituent of it. To judge definitively whether this is the case would 
require an analysis of the notion of essential constituent (as well as ontological ground), 
something which Adams does not provide and which I will not attempt here. Intuitively, 
however, it is plausible to maintain that essential constituency is a relation governed by 
the following conditional: if x is an essential constituent ofy, then if y exists now, x must 
exist now.^ ® But, prima facie, is there any such simultaneous existence requirement for 
%’s being the ontological basis of y? Wiry would one hold that in order for % to be the 
ontological basis of y, both x and y must exist simultaneously? Suppose that God exists 
and is timeless, and is the sustainer of all things; then here we have a logically coherent 
example of an ontological basis that is cleaiiy not simultaneous with all that it is the basis 
of. So, while the presentist might try to argue that the requirement for an ontological 
basis conflicts with Adams’ denial of ECC, I am hard pressed to see that such an 
argument would go beyond a bmte appeal to a presentist ontology.
D. Desiderata Satisfied?
So Adams’ account has smvived its initial clash with the presentist. But what of our 
desiderata? To remind the reader, the two desiderata we would like our account of past 
existence to satisfy are i) the account must differ substantially fiom the presentist’s 
account, and ii) the account cannot imply a B-Theoretic ontology, according to which
It is interesting to note here that because the relation is not necessarily syinmetiical, the converse does 
not hold. That is, y  need not exist now in order for x to exist now. For example, perhaps roundness is an 
essential constituent of a wheel, so a wheel cannot exist now without roundness existing now; but, of
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events exist eternally. As to i), it seems there is a real disagreement between Adams and 
the presentist, since they differ as to the ontological implications of existence claims 
about the thisnesses of past individuals. Thus it looks as if we have satisfied our first 
desideratum. But can we satisfy the second? How can Adams’ TTT avoid the charge 
that it implies the eternal existence of past events? Kvanvig thinks the only obstacle to 
endorsing his view, namely, the view that what explains present truths about the Battle of 
Waterloo is ‘not (now) something that... was (then) a battle,’ is the wearing of 
‘eternalist-colored glasses’ {ibid.: 294, 297). I will now suggest a way that Adams might 
respond to this charge.
My interpretation of Adams had it that the past exists and provides the ontological 
basis for the present existence of the thisnesses of past individuals. Obviously, as we 
saw, the former existence claim is not to be constmed as present existence. Nor, 
however, can it be constmed as eternal existence indexed to a past time. Such a picture 
would allow that the Battle of Waterloo eternally exists at a past time, and this does 
involve the viewing of the Battle of Waterloo thiough ‘eternalist-colored glasses.’ But 
we are not compelled to take such a view. Prior to the existence of an individual %, there 
exists no conesponding thisness of %. From the first moment of %’s existence, throughout 
the entire period of %’s existence, and for (presumably) as long as time lasts, %’s thisness 
exists. I suggest that the thisness’s simultaneous existence with the individual that serves 
as its ontological basis, and its simultaneous existence with entities at all times after the 
individual’s demise, is precisely the cross temporal bridge that Adams requires to 
maintain that the past exists even though past events no longer exist. So there is not a
course, roundness can exist now without a wheel existing now. For tliis reason, we may agree with Adams 
that E  is not an essential constituent of E*, while still claiming that E* is an essential constituent of E.
On his own behalf, Adams responds to this charge by claiming that he is not conscious of being an 
etemalist, but that it would ‘be hard to prove conclusively’ that he is not (Adams 1989: 301).
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battle eternally located at the spatiotemporal region picked out by ‘Waterloo on June 18, 
1815’. But there was a battle that occurred there, and even though that battle no longer 
exists (presently), it is part of the world’s ontology and is manifested as such in the 
existence of its thisness fiom 1815 until the present. Thus we do have an account of how 
the past exists, and one that does not require us to view the past through ‘eternalist- 
colored glasses’.
Though I think this account has some merit, there is a potential worry, hr trying 
to provide an accormt that avoids the B-Theoretic implications of an existent past, have 
we not failed, after all, to satisfy our first desideratum? Recall that the presentist has a 
story to tell that makes her nihilism about the past more palatable. Present existence is 
just existence simpliciter, so past events do not exist simpliciter, but they did exist when 
they were present, and it is only in this derivative sense that the past exists. So it is open 
to presentists to make a similar appeal—in accormting for a sense in which the past 
exists—to the present existence of the thisnesses of past individuals.*  ^ I suppose the 
thought would be that the presently existing thisness of a past event is derivative from the 
(non-existent) event itself, and hence vindicates a presentist ontology without reducing 
past events to ‘false stories’.*^  Perhaps, then, it is merely a matter of semantics that what 
I am calling ‘existence’ the presentist is calling ‘derivative existence’, and that when I 
say the thisnesses in question exist ‘at all times after the individual’s demise’, the 
presentist says ‘existed when those times were present’. If this is right, then it appears 
that in trying to avoid the B-Theoretic implications of an existent past, I have failed to 
provide a real alternative to the presentist’s account.
Of course, the presentist tells the same story about future events, wliich, I imagine, is why Kvanvig also 
wished to affirm the existence of the thisnesses of firture individuals.
This is Lewis’ characterization of past and future events on a presentist ontology (Lewis 1986: 205).
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I want to end this chapter with a suggestion as to how one might successfiilly 
navigate between these two extremes, and so avoid this line of objection. The presentist 
stipulates that present existence is existence simpliciter, while the B-Theorist claims that 
all events exist simpliciter. The presentist stipulation is supposed to be highly intuitive, 
since we experience the present directly, and nothing could be more real than the objects 
of direct experience. But the specious present is notoriously vague and indeterminate. 
How do we define the present moment, and so designate present events? It seems the 
only way to do so is by ostension, but no sooner do we utter, is the present 
moment”, than the token of that utterance becomes false. By definition, present events 
are indeteiminate, since there can be no complete description of any event while it is yet 
present. Consider, fuither, that if the past is real, and the futme is not, then so called 
present events have temporal parts that lack a concrete reality; since they have not yet 
fully occmi'ed. But this idea, that there concretely exist events with an incomplete 
reality, hardly seems coherent.
Do we think that reality admits of such indeterminacy, or is reality constituted by 
determinate events? If the latter, then I suggest we stipulate that past existence is 
existence simpliciter. Events are determinate and complete entities that have been fully 
actualized, and thus the only events that exist simpliciter are past events. Since I take it 
that what exists, must be determinate, and since so called ‘present’ events are not 
determinate, I don’t believe that they exist.^ ** This is not to claim (as the presentist does 
about the past) that the present is um eal. The present does not designate a temporal 
region at all, rather, it is the ever shifting boundary between what is real (the past) and 
what is umeal (the future). On this picture, there is no such thing as a ‘present’ event.
I giant that some work is required here in order to accommodate instantaneous events. See the Epilogue.
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This account not only provides a substantially different ontological picture than 
the presentist’s, but it also allows us to retain, with some adjustments, aspects of oui* 
earlier account in satisfying the second desideratum: though all events exist simpliciter, 
all events aie past, and have come into existence, and are therefore not eternal. Past 
events exist, and that existence is manifested in the existence of their thisnesses at all 
times subsequent to their having been fully actualized. Now, there aie two qualifications 
I need to make regarding this proposal. The first is that, though the use of the verb 
‘exists’ here must be a tenseless one, this does not imply that events tenselessly occur, 
since the verb applies only inasmuch as the events have come into existence. So past 
events exist t e n s e l e s s l y a  point in time. *^ Secondly, in claiming that past events 
exist simpliciter, I am claiming that they are the only entities that are, without 
qualification, worthy of the teim ‘event’ (given then complete reality). The thought is 
that the fundamental mode of temporal existence is captuied nothy ‘is’ or ‘is becoming’, 
but by ‘has become’ or ‘has occmi'ed’. Given, then, that (past) events exist both 
tenselessly and temporally, their thisnesses seem the right sort of thing to manifest that 
existence, since they have also come into existence temporally (i.e. from a point in time), 
and then continue to exist, presumably, for as long as time lasts. Thus we can think of 
these thisnesses as the logical traces of the events that have given rise to them.^  ^ Though 
this ‘pastist’ approach to time is certainly unusual, it is one that provides precisely what 
we require. It allows us to embrace a robust asymmeti'y of fixity, fiimly grounded in an 
asymmeti'y of ontology, and it allows us to do so without any etemalistic implications. 
We will take a look at this pastist approach to time in greater detail in the Epilogue.
Another way to state this claim is that past events exist tenselessly at a point in time, but with the 
qualification that they did not always do so.
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Conclusion
And so we come to the end of Part I. In this part of the thesis, we have seen that in order 
to account for the intuition that guides us thi'oughout, we must endorse an A-Theory of 
time according to which only past events exist. In Part II, we will look at another 
commonly cited threat to the guiding intuition, namely, determinate truth about the 
futme. Since the timeless and universal application of the laws of logic also has a 
significant amount of intuitive appeal, we will endeavor to affirm such an application 
without compromising a robust asymmetiy of fixity.
Again, more work is required here. Obviously, in order for this revised account to remain consistent, I 
must replace the earlier claim that the thisnesses of past events exist presently, with some other claim; and 
it is not clear what that claim should be. See the Epilogue,
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PART II
TIME, FIXITY, AND TRUTH
CHAPTER 3
ANTECEDENT TRUTH, TEMPORAL NECESSITY AND LOGICAL FATALISM
Introduction
In Part I, we saw that in order to retain our intuition that there is a robust asymmetry of 
fixity between past and firture events, we had to endorse a conception of time grounded in 
i) objective temporal becoming and ii) an asymmetiy of ontology according to which the 
past exists {simpliciter) and the future does not. We also saw that, inasmuch as neither 
the B-Theory nor a presentist A-Theory are grounded in both i) and ii), they are a threat 
to the intuition. Aie there any other thieats to the intuition? In the Introduction to the 
thesis, I argued that fatalism might prove a threat to the asymmetry of fixity, but that this 
depends upon the categoiy of fatalism, as well as the specification of fixity, under 
consideration. I also argued, however, that if logical fatalism obtains, then it would 
threaten the non-fixity of the future regardless of how we specify the ground of fixity. 
Thus, though we have concluded that the asymmetiy of fixity is grounded in an 
asymmetiy of ontology; nevertheless, if the laws of logic yield fatalism by fixing events 
involving human agents, then it is likely that they also fix all events. Given this potential 
tln eat to the asymmeti'y of fixity, then, we had better see whether we can retain both the 
guiding intuition as well as classical logic. Accordingly, in this chapter and the next, we 
will be evaluating two different types of argument for logical fatalism.
Let me begin the discussion in this chapter by making a distinction between my 
use of two different teims. By the ‘logical determinateness’ of a proposition (or class of 
propositions), I refer to the application of the law of identity, law of non-contiadiction, 
and law of excluded middle (where the latter is inteipreted as implying the principle of 
bivalence) to the proposition(s) in question. I will refer to the doctrine according to
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which ail propositions are timelessly and universally logically detenninate as Universal 
Logical Determinateness (ULD). This doctrine is meant to exclude recourse to neutral, 
indefinite, and indeteiminate tiuth values.* It also naturally goes hand in hand with the 
view that tmth simpliciter is the fundamental notion of tmth, rather than tmth at a time.
If propositions have their tmth values simpliciter, then even tmths about a time are not, 
properly speaking, tme at that time (or any other)—they are eternally true (i.e. tme 
irrespective of one’s temporal perspective). In any event, tliroughout this chapter and the 
next, I will be assuming that the proponent of ULD does indeed embrace tmth 
simpliciter, and that she therefore affiims the immutability of tmth.
By ‘logical fatalism’, I intend the doctrine that the tmth of ULD implies that 
future events are fixed in the same way that we intuitively take past events to be. So the 
proponent of ULD claims merely that there is a logical symmetiy between past and 
futm'e, whereas the logical fatalist claims that if there is, indeed, such a logical symmetry, 
then it follows that there must also be a symmetiy of fixity, according to which both the 
past and the future are fixed. I also should note that thioughout the discussion in this part 
of the thesis, I will be assuming the generic form of the A-Theory (if not my pastist 
version). This begs no questions against the logical fatalist, since, arguably, the 
traditional context in which the fatalist/anti-fatalist debate took place was one in which 
temporal becoming and the non-existence of the futm'e were assumed.^
Although the case for logical fatalism has been made by employing many 
different arguments, they generally fall under two types: those fiom antecedent tmth
' I wish to exclude these potential solutions to the problem of logical fatalism, not because I have an 
argument to show that they are unsuccessful, but because some of them are, in part, motivated by the 
fatalist’s arguments; if those arguments are invalid, however, then such moves are not well motivated (at 
least not in the temporal case).
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value (Type I, hereafter), and those from temporal necessity (i.e. the necessity of the past) 
(Type II, hereafter).  ^ Among contemporary philosophers, it is generally thought that the 
Type I argument is easily refuted, and that the Type II argument poses the real thieat to 
the non-fixity of the future."* We shall see for ourselves whether the conventional 
wisdom regarding these argument types is sound. In this chapter, I will first offer an 
explication of the two argument types (Section I), then provide an analysis of the concept 
of temporal necessity, drawing upon both historical and contemporary accounts (Sections 
II and III), and then offer my own analysis of the concept (Section IV), before concluding 
with some recommendations for the anti-fatalist.
I. The Ai'guments for Logical Fatalism 
The Type I argument has its origins in Aiistotle^, who employed it not to demonstrate the 
tmth of logical fatalism (which he took to be absur dly false) but—according to the 
standard inteipretation—to demonstrate ihs falsity of ULD. On this interpretation, 
Aristotle accepts the inference from ULD to logical fatalism, and therefore denies the 
former with respect to futur e contingent propositions. The argument is normally 
interpreted by its detractors as involving a very obvious and notorious modal fallacy. 
According to this interpretation, a somewhat simplified version of the argument would 
run as follows (lettingp  = ‘Susan will go to Anstruther at fŸ:
 ^Perhaps with the exception of Aquinas. See Section II. A., below. As to the coherence of the view that 
future events are non-existent even though propositions about them are logically detenninate, see the 
Epilogue.
 ^I should note that in Diekemper (2004), I transpose the referents of ‘Type F and ‘Type IF.
For example, Craig (1988a; 135-6), Plantinga (1986; 237), Sorabji (1980: 91), and Zagzebski (1991: 12), 
specifically reject Type I as less plausible than Type II; and Craig (1986), Freddoso (1983), and Plantinga 
(1986) expend considerable and not entirely successful efforts in refliting Type II. See tliis chapter, Section 
III.
 ^See Aristotle (1968).
 ^Here, and in the Type II argument below, I attribute tensed propositions that are tme at a time to the 
logical fatalist. I take it that the logical fatalist can make use of such propositions without betraying his 
allegiance to truth simpliciter. Thoughp  does change in tmth value over time (it becomes either false or 
meaningless after t), according to ULD, its con esponding tenseless proposition does not. Of course, not all
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(1) pv'^ p  (Law of Excluded Middle)
(2) 0(p=)p) (Law of Identity)
(3) p-z>Up (From(2))
(4) □(~pr>~p) (Law of Identity)
(5) '''PzdU'^ p  (From(4))
(6 ) /.O pvO '^ (From (1), (3), and (5))
So, the antecedent tmth of a proposition about the fiiture implies the necessity of 
that proposition, and therefore also the necessity of the coiTesponding event. The reader, 
of course, will readily catch the obvious scope fallacy in the moves from (2) to (3) and
(4) to (5); for, although the conditionals in (2) and (4) are necessary, this necessity does 
not attach to the consequents of those conditionals, as the fatalist wants to infer in (3) and
(5). It is the difference between the claim tliat ‘Necessarily, if  it is tme (now) to say that 
Susan will go to Anstmther, then Susan will, indeed, go to Anstmther’; and ‘If it is tme 
(now) to say that Susan will go to Anstmther, then necessarily Susan will go to 
Anstmther’. The former proposition involves a wide scope necessity and is ti’ivially tme, 
the latter involves a narrow scope necessity and does not follow fiom the former. So, if  
this is the move that the fatalist is really making, then the Type I argument is successfully 
refuted. For the moment, then, let us shelve Type I and see what force can be found in 
the (apparently) more prickly Type II argument.
In order to understand—and see the force o f—the Type II argument, one must 
first have a basic understanding of the notion of temporal necessity. We will pur sue a 
more in depth understanding in Sections H-IV, but for now the following brief 
description will serve to get us started. The notion can, once again, be traced back to 
Aristotle, who claimed that tme propositions about the past admit of necessity, in that
tensed propositions can be translated into tenseless ones without loss of meaning, but all of the ones I will
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what is true of the past must henceforth remain true. So this is a temporally relativised 
notion of necessity, and it is constitutive of it that any proposition (or event) that admits 
of it did not always do so. Now, how does the fatalist make use of temporal necessity in 
his Type II argument? He does so in the following manner, lettingp  = ‘At it was the 
case that at A Susan will go to Anstrutlier’ and letting q -  ‘At ^3 Susan will go to 
Anstruther’ (where p  and q are both uttered at tf):
(7) jp v-p  (Law of Excluded Middle)
(8 ) U(p 3  q) (Logical consequence, given our example propositions)
(9) D(~p =) -g ) (Logical consequence, given oui' example propositions)
' (10) V □''-p (From (7) and the necessity of the past)
(11) .'.Og'vO-g (From (8 ), (9), and (10))
This argument, unlike our Type I example, is not only valid, but it is also sound— 
i f  one accepts the necessity of the past. Given that p  is a proposition about the past, its 
tmth entails its (temporal) necessity, and its falsity entails its (temporal) impossibility. 
This is die justification for (10), The conclusion in (11) is not the product o f a scope 
fallacy, but validly follows because the necessity of a conditional and the necessity of its 
antecedent jointly entail the necessity of the conditional’s consequent. So whether Susan 
goes to Anstmther at h or not, the tr uth of the matter is already necessitated, and thus she 
is fated to act one way or the other,
‘Hold on one minute!’, the objector will cry. ‘You’re claiming that the necessity 
of the conditional in (8 ), i.e. the necessity o f logical consequence, modally licenses the 
fatalist to infer the necessity of q from that of p. But the necessity ofp  is temporal 
necessity, so how can an absolute type of necessity like logical consequence succeed in
be attributing to the fatalist can.
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transfening the relative type of necessity of which p  admits to ql And just what type of 
necessity is it that q inherits in the transfer: absolute, temporal, or some hybrid?’
These are, of comse, valid concerns. Some philosophers argue that q inherits the 
exact same type of necessity as that of p. Others argue that such a position completely 
violates the intuitive and conceptual undeipinning of the notion of temporal necessity 
(given that pastness is meant to be constitutive of it). We will consider the range of 
views on these questions in Sections II and III. Regardless, though, of what subscripts 
are attached to the different necessity operators in the Type II argument, it seems to me 
that the transfer of necessity principle  ^upon which the fatalist relies cannot just be 
dismissed out of hand. Wliat the Type II argument attempts to demonstiate is that, 
despite our intuitions, the necessity of the past, given ULD, is the sort of thing that can 
also apply to the future. So simply denying this without an argument is not a very 
satisfactory objection. Furthemiore, irrespective of what type of necessity ends up 
attaching to q, the argument is wonying enough if q turns out to be necessaiy in any way. 
At any rate, for present purposes, I assume that the problem with the Type II argument 
does not solely lie in its reliance upon an admittedly unorthodox transfer of necessity 
principle.
II. Temporal Necessity: A Historical Perspective 
So, according to the majority of contemporary philosophers, Type I fails and Type II 
tlu'eatens. How, then, do such philosophers propose to deal with the thieat? Before 
answering that question, it will be instmctive to look at a couple of historical accounts of 
temporal necessity. The two I have in mind are that of Aquinas and Ockham. Of com*se, 
these philosophers were concerned with theological, not logical, fatalism; whereas logical
 ^I boiTow this terni from Zagzebski (1991; 7).
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fatalism infers fatalism from truth about the future, theological fatalism infers fatalism 
from God’s omniscient knowledge of the future. We will see in Section III that, in the 
context of the Type II argument, given the additional issue of God’s omniscience, 
theological fatalism does not just reduce to logical fatalism. Nevertheless, for most of the 
discussion in Sections II and III, we can tieat the two different versions of fatalism as 
being of a piece.
A, Aquinas on Temporal Necessity 
Aquinas’ attempts to reconcile the contingency of (some) future events with God’s 
eternal knowledge of those events can be found in several of his works: Commentufy on 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. The Disputed Questions on Truth, Summa Theologica, and 
Summa Contra Gentiles. These accounts are nicely amalgamated for an overall picture of 
Aquinas’ position in Ch. 4 of Craig (1988b). I use Craig as my source for the ensuing 
discussion.
Craig begins his exposition of Aquinas’ account by describing two different types 
of knowledge of non-existents which Aquinas attributes to God: knowledge of vision 
{scientia visionis) and knowledge of simple understanding {scientia simplicis 
intelligentiae). The foimer pertains to knowledge of things which, though they do not 
actually exist now, either once were, or will be, existent. The latter knowledge is 
speculative in nature and is of pure possibles—those things that might have been, or 
might be, but which never actually are. Knowledge of vision is so called because it is an 
apt metaphor for captming Aquinas’ view that God exists outside of the temporal series, 
which he ‘sees’ laid out before him in its entirety. Because God is outside this series, all 
positions along it are present to him. Aquinas uses the analogy of a circle to illustrate this 
point: the circumference of the circle is the temporal series, whereas the center point is
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God. There is no relation of ‘simultaneity’ between any two points along the 
circumference, but the center point bears the same relation to all points along the 
circumference. This is not to suggest, however, that for God all events occur 
simultaneously; rather, he sees both the events as well as the temporal relations that hold 
between them. Aquinas claims that in the same way that a man upon a lofty watch tower 
can, in one glance, see the whole parade of travelers along the road below, so, too, can 
the succession of time be present to God without his successively experiencing it. As 
Craig explains, ‘Each tiaveler coiTesponds to an event in time, and while a person 
standing on the road sees them passing by successively, the man in the watchtower sees 
all of them in a single moment’ (Craig, op.cit.: 106-7). Not surprisingly, then, it is God’s 
knowledge of vision that produces his knowledge of fiiture contingents. In the remainder 
of this subsection, I will discuss three of the objections—and the respective replies— 
Aquinas considers to such knowledge, and then go on to make some remarks about his 
use of temporal necessity in this context.
First, Aquinas considers the objection that, as Aristotle has shown that future 
contingent singular propositions do not admit of a definite tiuth value, God camiot have 
Icnowledge of such propositions; for only tme propositions can be known. Aquinas 
responds by acknowledging that future contingents are not deteimined while they remain 
fiitui e, but claims that God’s knowledge of such propositions is based upon their 
becoming determinately tme in the present. As Craig points out, this claim raises the 
difficulty of interpreting what Aquinas intends by ‘determinate’ tmth. Craig argues, on 
the basis of a passage concerning the con espondence theory of tmth in The Disputed 
Questions on Truths that Aquinas, in denying the determinate tmth of future contingent 
propositions, cannot mean that such propositions lack antecedent tmth value. This is
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because Craig inteiprets Aquinas’ correspondence theoiy of ùuth as not requiring the 
cuiTent existence of the state of affairs to which such propositions refer. So, ‘The 
Antichi'ist will be born’ is true now, even though the Anticlirist has not yet been bom.
For Aquinas, the tmth of such propositions lies not in the existence of the relevant events; 
rather, it lies in the knower, whose intellect possesses the tmth and is in confomiity to the 
thing known—even while the latter is non-existent. Given this theoiy of tmth, Craig 
reasons, Aquinas’ admission that futuie contingents are not deteiminately tiue must 
mean, as Aquinas explicitly states elsewhere, that we cannot know with certainty the 
tmth value of such propositions. Thus, for Aquinas, determinate tmth is an epistemic 
notion, not a logical one. Not wishing to become bogged down in exegetical disputes, I 
will take it that this is, indeed, Aquinas’ intention.
So, then, Craig’s inteipretation renders Aquinas’ reply to the first objection in the 
following manner: Aiistotle’s argument only shows that future contingent propositions 
are not certainly knowable as either tme or false, not that they lack antecedent tmth 
value. How, then, is God able to know them? In fact, if he were in time, he could not 
know them with certainty. But, as God’s experience is outside the temporal series, the 
events to which future contingent propositions refer are always present to God (indeed, 
all events are always present to God), and so He knows them in viitue of their being 
present to Him. Craig quotes Aquinas as saying, ‘Neither our [knowledge] nor God’s 
knowledge can be about future contingents. This would be even more tme if He knew 
them as future. He loiows them, however, as present to Himself and future to others’ 
{ibid.: 110). So it would seem that the propositions that God knows through his 
Icnowledge of vision must be tenseless ones, and thus, from God’s perspective, tmth is 
timeless. However, as Craig points out, in the Summa Theologica Aquinas explicitly
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States that tensed propositions cannot, without loss, be translated into tenseless ones 
whose tmth values are timeless. Rather, God knows which propositions are tme at one 
time and false at another. We must, therefore, take Aquinas’ position as holding that, 
while not all propositions can be rendered into tenseless ones, certainly God’s knowledge 
of vision is exclusively comprised of such propositions. So the propositions that are the 
objects of God’s knowledge of vision are timelessly tme, but are about propositions 
whose tmth value is temporally indexed. For example, let P  be the proposition ‘Some 
proposition p  is tiue at ti and false at although P  is tenseless and is known to be 
timelessly tiue by God, p ’s tiuth value vaiies over time. Thus the contingency of future 
events is maintained because the timeless tmth of propositions about those events is only 
known as such by God, and this does not eliminate their contingency. We will see why, 
below.
Another objection Aquinas considers tides to show how the possibility of God’s 
knowledge being falsified follows from his foreknowledge of contingents. The objector 
claims that if God knows a future contingent event such as Socrates’ sitting down, then, 
since the event is, by hypothesis, a contingent one, Socrates may choose not to sit down; 
in which case God’s foreknowledge was mistaken. Given the impossibility of God’s 
being mistaken, then, he cannot know future contingents, because if he did know them 
they would be necessary. In replying to this objection, Aquinas makes use of the 
necessity of the consequence (nécessitas consequentiae) / necessity of the consequent 
(nécessitas consequentis) distinction—a distinction that we saw the objector to the Type I 
argument rely upon in Section I. The necessity of the consequence means that the modal 
operator governs the entire conditional, whereas the necessity of the consequent means 
that only the consequent of the conditional falls within the scope of the modal operator.
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Aquinas’ claim is that the conditional, Tf God knows that Socrates will sit down, then 
Socrates must necessarily do so’, is true but haiinless if the necessity is interpreted as 
necessity of the consequence. Whereas, it is just false if inteipreted as necessity of the 
consequent. Thus, it is necessarily the case (and trivially tiue) that if God, in his eternal 
timelessness, sees Socrates sitting down at a certain point in the temporal series, then he 
is indeed doing so. But it is not the case that if God sees Socrates sitting down, then 
Socrates’ sitting down is a necessary event. Socrates may do as he chooses, but if he is 
seen to be sitting down, then of couise he is sitting down!
Aquinas also offers an additional reply to this objection, drawing upon Aristotle’s 
axiom that ‘Whatever is, necessarily is, when it is’. The axiom reflects Aiistotle’s notion 
of temporal necessity. Temporal necessity is to be distinguished from causal or logical 
necessity in that it does not imply that things could not have occurred otheiwise. Rather, 
it is meant to capture the fixity of all present and past events: necessity is imparted to 
such events only after (or while) they have occuiTed (or are occuning). Aquinas makes 
use of this notion by claiming that Socrates’ sitting down is, in a sense, necessaiy. This is 
because all events are present to God, so it is impossible for Socrates not to be sitting 
down when God sees him doing so at a certain point in the temporal series. But, in the 
same way that my seeing youi' sitting down necessitates that you are sitting down without 
implying that your sitting down was (causally or logically) necessitated, so, too, the 
necessity of the objects of God’s knowledge of vision is not one that removes their 
contingency.
One final objection that Aquinas considers draws upon the notion that for any true 
conditional, if the antecedent is necessaiy then so must the consequent be. So, given the 
tiuth of the conditional, ‘If God knew that this is going to happen, then it will happen’,
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and the necessity of God’s having known what is going to happen (i.e., the necessity of 
the antecedent), the event in question cannot be contingent. Thus God has no knowledge 
of futm*e contingents. The objector goes on to attribute a twofold necessity to the 
antecedent of the conditional: it is necessary in that God’s knowledge is eternal, and 
whatever is eternal is necessary; and in that it is a past tense proposition, and so if tme, 
then (temporally) necessarily so. Cleaiiy, this objection relies upon Type II style 
reasoning. In response to the objection, Aquinas acknowledges the tmth of the premises, 
and argues against those who would defeat the objection by rejecting the premises, but he 
then goes on to reject the conclusion that God does not know future contingents.
First, he accepts that the necessity of the antecedent of a tme conditional implies 
the necessity of the consequent. He also accepts that the antecedent in the given tiue 
conditional is indeed necessary, and thus that the consequent is necessary. As Craig 
points out, though, the necessity of the consequent only follows from the necessity of the 
antecedent if the tme conditional is one of strict implication, whereby the entire 
conditional is necessary. Of course, Aquinas would certainly accept that the given 
conditional is necessaiy, but it is a logical necessity. Whereas the necessity of the 
antecedent is a temporal necessity—whether God’s knowledge is viewed as eternally 
present or temporally past. Craig claims that this is a suspicious move for the objector to 
make, as well as for Aquinas to accept. Craig’s wony here is akin to the objection I 
discussed briefly at the end of Section I, as to what transfer of necessity principle the 
Type II fatalist relies upon. Aquinas’ objector offers an argument that puiports to 
demonstrate the necessity of its conclusion from two premises, each of which admits of a 
different type of necessity. Not only, according to Craig, is the validity of such a move 
questionable, but it also leaves us in doubt as to what type of necessity the conclusion
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admits of. Surely it cannot be temporal, as the consequent refers to a future event, but if 
it is logical, then what has the temporal necessity of the antecedent contributed to the 
argument?
Aquinas, for his part, allows the transfer of necessity, and allows that the 
necessity of the consequent is indeed temporal, and I think he is right to do so for the 
reasons I offered at the end of Section I. So, instead of attacking the objector’s premises, 
Aquinas relies upon his response to the previous objection, and argues that temporal 
necessity has the uniquely atti’active modal quality of not removing contingency. How 
can he justify the ascription of temporal necessity to a proposition about a future event? 
He does so, not suiprisingly, by claiming that the event is not future to God, but 
timelessly present. Given that all of oui' experience is bound within the temporal series, 
we tend to think of a time lag existing between God’s foreknowledge of a future event 
and the event’s occunence. But God’s knowledge of things within the temporal series 
lies, itself, outwith that series. So, according to Aquinas, God’s knowledge of events is 
experientially concurrent with those events. There is no question of future events having 
to (or failing to) confomi to his present or past knowledge, anymore than there is a 
concern about my (perceptual) knowledge of your present actions either detenuining 
those actions or being mistaken about them. In the case of present experience, 
laiowledge of events is necessarily conjoined with the existence of those events, but fi'om 
this we do not suppose that such events lack contingency. With respect to God’s 
laiowledge of vision, all propositions are to be rendered tenseless, so there is no such 
thing as God’s past foreknowledge of a future contingent. Rather, if God knows a 
proposition about a contingent event in the temporal series, then for him, that event is.
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Even if Aquinas’ use of temporal necessity is effective in establishing the 
compatibility of divine foreknowledge and futui*e contingency (I’m not sure that it is), 
what work can his account do for us in the context of logical fatalism? His account relies 
very heavily on God’s atemporal obseiwation of temporal events, as well as on a relative 
notion of existence, according to which non-present events are non-existent for us^  even 
though they exist for God. Does this picture have to obtain in order for fatalism to be 
false? What if God is in time? The point is, one would have thought that there were 
more general and widely accepted premises fiom which the refutation of fatalism 
follows. Furthermore, I have a wony about Aquinas’ failuie to distinguish between the 
modality of a proposition and the modality of an event. Of course, this failure is not 
peculiar to Aquinas, and can be traced back to Aiistotle. Nevertheless, I suspect that 
discussing God’s laiowledge of events interchangeably with his knowledge of tiuth 
values of propositions bolsters the fatalist’s position. Wliy not offer an account that 
maintains a distinction between prepositional tmth value and the fixity of events, such 
that an appeal to the nature of God is not required? Otheiwise, we are forced into 
allowing such claims as that past propositions are temporally necessary, although they 
may refer to logically contingent events. This modally confused claim simply plays into 
the fatalist’s hand, who will say that it is nonsense to attribute both a necessity and a 
contingency to a proposition, and so argue that a necessary proposition of any sort can 
only coiTCSpond to a necessary event. Fuitheimore, it seems to me that when we equate 
the fixity of events, which results from temporal becoming, with the temporal necessity 
of their corresponding propositions, we encour age the notion that the tmth value of those 
propositions is what fixes their events. We will see more on these points in Sections III 
and IV of this chapter, as well as in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say for the moment, that we
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may wish to defeat the fatalist without an appeal to the timelessness of God, or to the 
relativity of existence; and that the distinction between properties of a proposition (such 
as modality and tiuth value), on the one hand, and properties of events (such as fixity), on 
the other, may provide us with the means for doing so.
B. Ockham on Temporal Necessity 
We now move on to Ockham’s use of temporal necessity. In this sub-section, adopting 
the same fomiat as in the previous one, I will present Ockham’s defense of God’s 
knowledge of future contingents by focusing on two of the objections he considers to 
such knowledge. As with Aquinas, I will then go on to make some comments about 
Ockliam’s use of temporal necessity. Once again, I rely on Craig (ibid.), but also 
occasionally consult Adams and Ki'etzraann’s (1969) translation of the original material. 
Craig’s primary souices are Ockham’s Tractatiis de praedestinatione et de praescientia 
dei respecta futurorum contingentium, Ordinatio, Peri hermeneias, and Summa logicae.
Before making oui' way through the objections, it will be useful to consider 
Ockham’s conceptions of ‘determinateness’ and ‘contingency’. With regard to the 
former, Ockham sometimes refers to fiitm'e contingents as having ‘determinate’ truth 
value (as when he states the objections he is considering), and other times omits this 
modifier of truth value (as when he replies to the objections); which leads Craig to 
conclude that, for Ockham, there is no distinction between ‘determinately true’ and 
‘true’. As we will see, Ockham believes that future contingent propositions have a 
present truth value, and so, if Craig is right, he must believe that such propositions are 
determinately true or false. What is the basis for this belief? Craig explains that the 
answer is closely related to Ockliam’s theoi-y of truth and his emphasis on the 
metaphysical priority of the present.
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According to Ockham, in order for a present tense proposition to be tme, its 
subject and predicate tenus must be able to ‘supposit’, or stand in, for the realities which 
they represent, and they must do so in the right way. Craig offers the following example: 
‘“Some A is B” is tme iff there exists something for which both “A” and “B” supposit; 
“No A is B” is tme iff nothing exists for which both “A” and “B” supposit’ (Craig, 
op.cit.’. 148). Now this seems straightforward enough, but Ockham will have a problem 
asserting the tmth of non-present tense propositions, because, for him, such propositions 
do not refer to real entities. Or, at least, their reality is ontologically secondary and 
derivative to that of present entities. In either case, they are not eligible for supposition. 
Ockham’s way around this is to require the tmth of a present tense proposition as a 
condition for the tmth of every non-present tense proposition, where the subject and 
predicate terms of the former concern tlie same realities which these terms stand in for in 
the latter. Furthermore, the present tense proposition in virtue of which the futur e tense 
proposition is tme, must use demonstrative pronouns in the predication of its subject 
terms. So, it is in virtue of the eventual tmth of the present tense proposition, ‘This 
[referring to the sea battle envisioned in the conesponding future tense proposition] sea 
battle is now occuning in St. Andrews Bay’, that the hiture tense proposition, ‘A sea 
battle will occur in St. Andrews Bay’, is presently true. Thus a proposition at any given 
time is true because of the fact that at that time, the corresponding present tense 
proposition (which may be identical to the given proposition) either has been, is, or will 
be true.
This explains why Ockham thinks that futur e contingent propositions have a truth 
value, but why would he also seemingly acknowledge the determinateness of this truth 
value? Craig claims that, inasmuch as Ockham attributes truth and falsity to fritme
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contingents (where these are naturally inteipreted as events or states of affairs) for him 
there is no distinction between these and future contingent propositions (ibid.). And 
since he holds that future events aie deteiminate, futm*e contingent propositions are 
determinately tme or false because their conesponding events will determinately be, or 
determinately not be, actually present. Now, of course, in characterizing future events as 
determinate, Ocldiam is not claiming that they are causally determined or necessary; 
rather, he seems to be making a tenseless attribution of actuality to such events. So the 
deteiininateness is umelated to time. If an event obtains (tenseless) in the actual world, 
then it is deteiminate. Thus, as Craig puts it, ‘future contingent propositions aie tme or 
false according as they coiTespond with states that obtain in the actual world’ {ibid,\ 149).
Ockliam’s use of ‘determinate’ must be contrasted with his use of ‘contingent’. 
For though deteiminateness can be predicated of events and propositions iiTespective of 
temporal considerations, contingency cannot. Events are deteiminate because they obtain 
in the actual world; but since they are actualized successively, those events—and their 
conesponding propositions—are contingent until the former are temporally ‘posited in 
reality’ (ibid.). For this reason, it is important to specify the definite temporal position of 
any actual event in determining its modal status. So if it is presently tp, and the event 
described by the (tenseless) proposition, ‘A sea battle occurs in St. Andiews Bay’ obtains 
at some futuie time tf, then that proposition is deteiminately tme at tp, but is only 
contingent until tf, at which time it becomes necessary.^ Obviously, then, this necessity is 
of the temporally relative kind. For Ockham, there is no contradiction in claiming that 
the above proposition is determinate but contingent at tp. The deteiminateness of the
Nothing hinges upon the tenselessness of the given proposition—other than ease of explanation. One 
could offer an equally coherent, albeit more complicated, account of this ‘temporal’ contingency using 
present- and fixture-tense versions of the proposition.
127
tmth value of the proposition is predicated upon the occun ence of the event it describes, 
and prior to tf, it remains possible that that event not occur, even though it will occur. 
After tf, however, this possibility is removed, and the proposition becomes necessaiy. 
Thus, Ockliam’s position is that prior to (/the given proposition is possibly true and 
possibly false {and determinately tme or determinately false), but that at (/and afterward 
the proposition is necessarily tme or necessarily false. Ockham does not actually refer to 
this necessity as ‘temporal’, rather he calls it necessity per accidens, or ‘accidental’ 
necessity.
It is important, yet again, to distinguish Ockham’s accidental necessity—which, 
for the sake of consistency, I will henceforth refer to as ‘temporal’^ —from logical or 
causal necessity. Obviously a temporally relative necessity cannot be a logical (i.e. 
absolute) necessity; and, as Craig points out, for Ockham, causally necessaiy 
propositions are still temporally contingent until their conesponding events obtain (given 
the possibility of a free agent inteivening in the natural causal chain). Furthermore, it is 
not only future tense propositions that are temporally contingent, but also those non­
future tense propositions which, nevertheless, concern futuie entities and events.
Ockliam offers the following example: ‘Peter is predestined’ is a present tense 
proposition, but given that it concerns a futiue event, it should be analyzed as ‘Péter will 
be saved’; in which case it is clearly temporally contingent. So, if God saves Peter at (/,
 ^Ockham, and contemporaiy ‘Ockhamists’, also seem to prefer ‘contingency’ rather than ‘possibility’ (as I 
referred to the modal characterization of non-fixity in Part I the thesis), when discussing temporal modality. 
In this respect, I will adopt the Ockhamistic usage for the remainder of this section.
For Ockham, causally detennined events are those that have natural causes, and cannot ‘be impeded 
except by a free cause’ (Ordinatio 1.38.M, Adams and Kretzmann (trans.), op.cit.: 89).
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then the above proposition does not become necessary until that time, and remains 
necessary for all times after tf}^
With this background infomiation behind us, we will proceed to the objections to 
God’s knowledge of fiiture contingents. Ocldiam considers thiee sets of objections, each 
set differing according to the status of the knowledge in question: whether determinate, 
certain and infallible, or necessary (actually, this last set comprises arguments for the 
necessity of God’s knowledge, and as such counts against the contingency of future tense 
propositions). For the sake of space, and given my interest in Ockham’s use of temporal 
necessity, I will focus on two of the most illuminating objections with respect to that 
notion.
First, we will take the second objection to God’s deteiminate knowledge of future 
contingents. The objector argues, in the Aiistotelian tradition, that if future contingents 
did possess deteiminate truth or falsity, then necessarily the objects of God’s deteiminate 
knowledge would come to pass. Thus, deliberation and taking trouble would be 
pointless. In his response to this objection, Ockham takes the Aiistotelian position as 
actually involving two separate arguments for fatalism: one from the antecedent truth 
value of future contingent propositions, and the other fi om the necessity of past tense 
statements concerning yet future contingents (my Type I and Type II, respectively). With 
regard to the first argument, Ockham claims that God’s knowledge of which one of a pair 
of contradictory future contingents will be tme and which will be false, does not result in 
the necessity of the proposition, ‘God knows this part of the contradiction will be tme’. 
He argues that although ‘God knows this part will be tme’ is tme, it is nonetheless 
contingent, for it is still possible that it ‘will never have been tme’. This possibility
According to Adams and Kretzmann (op.cit,: 16-20), Ockham ‘denies that Peter’s predestination is
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allows that there is ‘a capacity for its opposite without any succession’ (Craig quoting 
from Ockham, ibid.: 161).
Clearly, then, Ockliam here is refening to temporal necessity/contingency. The 
tmth of ‘God Imows this part will be tme’ is based on the tenseless obtaining of the part 
of the conti'adiction God knows to be tme. But as this obtaining is actualized 
successively, and as the actual time of the obtaining has not yet succeeded, it is still 
possible that ‘God loiows this part will be false’ is and always was tme—even though 
that possibility is not realized. This ‘capacity’ for the opposite will remain as long as the 
given event has not been successively posited in reality. Once it has, however, then the 
determinately tme proposition, ‘God knows this part is tme’, becomes necessary. That is 
to say, the capacity for the opposite to be tme is removed, and the opposite now becomes 
impossible. It is important to note that Ockham is not suggesting that a proposition has 
the capacity for its tmth value to change, or that both of two contradictories can be tme; 
rather, the possibility for the falsity of a deteiminately tme proposition merely requires 
that were the possibility realized, then it would always have been the case that the 
proposition was determinately false.
What does the preceding discussion tell us about God’s Imowledge of the 
antecedent tmth value of future tense propositions? Given the contingency of such 
propositions, Ockham concludes that God’s knowledge of them must also be contingent; 
and so although God loiows ‘Tliis part of the contradiction will be true’, up until the 
conesponding event is posited in reality it is possible tliat he will always have known 
‘This part of the contradiction will be false’. This obseiwation leads to the second part of 
the Aiistotelian objection (i.e. the Type II argument for fatalism), because God’s
necessitated by something really inhering in God in the past.’
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forelmowledge is not only a fact about the present, but also one about the past (whatever 
he knows, he has always known). So God’s presently foreknowing a future tense 
proposition p  implies the tmth of the past tense proposition, ‘God foreknew p \  And if 
this proposition is tme, goes the argument, then given its tense, it must also be temporally 
necessary. In which case,/? cannot possibly be false, and fatalism is supposed to follow.
In light of the discussion of temporal contingency/necessity, above, one should be 
able to anticipate Ockliam’s reply to this objection. He claims that ‘God foreknew/?’ is 
not temporally necessary. This proposition depends on the tmth of the proposition, ‘God 
foreknows /?’; but the latter is only ostensibly present tense, because its tmth depends on 
the tmth of p, which is about a yet unrealized future event. Prior to the positing of that 
event in reality, both p  and not-/? are possible, even thoughp  is deteiminately tme. So the 
tmth of the coiTesponding past tense formulation of the proposition is not gi ounds for 
judging it to be temporally necessary. Thus, God’s having forelaiownp  is deteimined by 
the tenseless obtaining of the event whichp  is about, but since that obtaining is realized 
successively, bothp  and God’s knowledge of/? is contingent until the event is posited in 
reality. Until that time, God’s having always foreknown not-/? remains a possibility. In 
sum, then, neither the antecedent tmth of future contingent propositions, nor God’s past 
forelmowledge of yet future contingents, necessitate the occuirence of the events those 
propositions are about, and therefore fatalism does not follow.
The second objection and reply I will discuss is actually the first argument 
Ockham considers for God’s necessary knowledge of future contingents, which therefore 
counts as an objection to the contingency of future tense propositions and their 
coiTesponding events. The aigument claims that, as the necessity that one must attribute 
to God is nothing other than immutability, so whatever is in him immutably is also in him
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necessarily. So, God knows a future event immutably, and therefore also necessarily. 
Ockliam replies by first distinguishing two different ways in which God’s knowledge 
might be said to be necessaiy. First, the claim may refer to the way in which future 
contingents aie known by God. In this sense, Ockham would affimi the necessity of 
God’s knowledge, because he believes that ‘the divine essence itself is one single 
necessary and immutable cognition of all things... necessary and contingent’ (Adams and 
Ki*etzmann, op.cit.: 67). Alternatively, one might refer to the content of God’s 
knowledge as necessary, in which case the modal operator attaches to the actual set of 
propositions known by God. As we have seen, Ockham denies this type of necessity for 
God’s knowledge, because God knows fiiture tense propositions only contingently. So, 
with regard to the objection, Ocldiam argues that since there is necessity in God, one can 
indeed validly infer that there is immutability, but fiom this immutability one cannot infer 
temporal necessity. For, inasmuch as future contingents are deteiminate, they are also 
immutable. But, as we have seen, Ockham tells a stoiy that allows him to affiim this 
inmiutability without admitting temporal necessity. Their immutability is conditioned by 
their (tenseless) obtaining, whereas their contingency is conditioned by the antecedent 
possibility of then not obtaining. If this possibility is realized, then it is not the case that 
the object of God’s Icnowledge has changed from p  to not-/?, but that his knowledge was 
eternally and immutably of not-/?.
To conclude, then, Ockham offers an account of God’s knowledge of future 
contingents that relies upon a presentist ontology and a distinctive type of necessity, that 
of temporal necessity. It is useful, I think, to contrast this solution with that of Aquinas. 
Recall that Aquinas, too, relied upon temporal necessity to refute objections to God’s 
foreknowledge of future contingents, but that he did so by claiming that the necessity of
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God’s knowledge is merely temporal—because God is outside of time and all the objects 
of his laiowledge of vision are present to him and are experienced without succession— 
and such a necessity does not causally or logically necessitate the truth of what it 
governs. Such a solution requires us to abstract fiom the temporal series, which would 
seem to be constitutive of our experience of time, in order to render the antecedent tmth 
value of future contingent propositions fatalistically impotent. One might think, 
however, that the absurdity of fatalism would allow for a refutation of it which did not 
involve an appeal to the existence of God, or to a perspective of time (i.e. from outside 
looking in) so phenomenologically foreign.
Ockham, on the other hand, offers a solution that coheres with our experience of 
events—in that we experience them presently and successively—and so, if  successful, 
allows not only for God’s foreknowledge of fiiture contingents, but also for the 
antecedent tmth value of future contingents: that is, it potentially allows both for a 
refutation of theological fatalism as well as of fatalism simpliciter, where the latter is 
taken as a problem that is as relevant to the atheist and agnostic as it is to the theist. But 
now notice that if Ockham’s presentist solution is successful, it is difficult to see what 
work the notion of temporal necessity is doing for him. Aquinas needed that notion 
because he felt compelled to acknowledge the necessity of God’s knowledge, but in the 
same breath be able to claim that such necessity still allows for futuie contingents. 
Ockham, however, flatly denies the necessity of God’s knowledge, except in the sense 
that it is necessary that God know futui'e contingents; but not that the objects of his 
knowledge are necessary. So if he has the framework for aftimiing both the contingency 
and the determinate tmth value of future tense propositions, which is all the argument 
requires, then why feel obliged to affinm the necessity of present and past tense
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propositions, when it was that affirmation that led Aiistotle to wony about fatalism in the 
first place? Is it to account for the fixity of past events? Here, again, we see the 
confusion involved in tr anslating the fixity of events into the temporal necessity of 
propositions. In treating events and propositions as ontologically on a par, and in 
conflating two distinct notions, that of fixity and that of necessity, Aristotle, Aquinas, and 
Ockham all contribute to a confusion that only works in the fatalist’s favor. Over the 
course of the next two sections I will elucidate on, and provide a justification for, this 
claim.
III. Temporal Necessity: A Contemporary Perspective
A. Hard Facts/Soft Facts 
We now turn to some contemporary accounts of temporal necessity. By way of 
introduction to the contemporary discussion, let us recall Ockham’s distinction between 
propositions that are properly present or past tense, and those that are only present or past 
tense in their wording, but which really are about future entities. It was this latter 
category of propositions that allowed Ockham to claim that propositions about God’s past 
foreknowledge of future events are not temporally necessary. Given that those entities—  
which the terms in such propositions supposit for—have not yet been successively 
realized (i.e. not actualized in the temporal series), these propositions are not, strictly 
speaking, about the past. Recall, as well, that the whole point of this distinction was to 
refute the fatalist’s argument which claims that the necessity of past propositions infects 
the future propositions entailed by them, thus rendering their corresponding events 
necessaiy and not within our power. It is this distinction between propositions and events 
that are strictly past, and those that are not, that has dominated the contemporary 
discussion of temporal necessity. Ockham’s account of the distinction is somewhat
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vague, and contemporary philosophers have taken it upon themselves to systematize an 
account that might withstand the barrage of counterexamples often hurled at each new 
proposal. The teiminology adopted by many to express this distinction has been that of 
‘hard facts’ vs. ‘soft facts’; the former refers to facts that are strictly about the past, the 
latter to facts that are seemingly about the past, but whose status as a fact depends upon 
future contingencies. So, propositions about hard facts aie meant to be temporally 
necessary, and those about soft facts are, as yet, temporally contingent. That is the basic 
idea, although things get much more complex.
It is interesting to note that the preponderance of the contemporary literature on 
theological (as well as logical) fatalism is concerned with providing a watertight analysis 
of temporal necessity, and that, as I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this 
preponderance indicates a general acceptance of the idea that the Type II argument poses 
the most dangerous thi eat to the non-fixity future. By the time we get to the end of this 
chapter, I hope to have shown that this idea is incoiTect. With regard to the necessity of 
the past, Craig (1986) offers a fairly comprehensive suiwey of the various positions on the 
hard fact/soft fact distinction and its relation to temporal necessity, and then goes on to 
make his own proposal. I will first discuss a few of these positions, and will then move 
on to a discussion of Craig’s proposal. Craig attributes the original distinction between 
hard and soft facts to Pike, whose use of the tenus occui s in the context of a debate on 
theological fatalism between him and Saunders. Saunders, in defense of freedom, had 
claimed that we have the power to act so that God’s foreknowledge would have been 
different. To make his point, he uses the example of his ability to act so that Caesar died 
2009 years before the writing of his aiticle. Caesar’s dying 2009 years before Saunders’
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article, though in the past, depends in pait upon Saunders’ fiiture actions (prior to the 
writing of the article). Pike responds by acknowledging that there are some facts about 
the past (soft ones) that are not ‘fully accomplished’ or ‘over-and-done-with’, and 
Saunders’ example is one these; but he claims that God’s past belief about futui'e events 
is not one of these, and is instead a hard fact (Craig quoting Pike, op.cit.'. 66).
B. Freddoso on Temporal Necessity 
That is the origin of the contemporary debate on temporal necessity. The two accounts I 
want to take a closer look at are Freddoso’s and Plantinga’s. Freddoso (1983) offers a 
veiy complex and sophisticated analysis of temporal necessity which relies upon possible 
worlds semantics. I will not however, go thiough an exposition of the analysis; it will 
suffice for our puiposes to restrict the discussion to the following definition in which the 
analysis culminates:
1. p is  temporally necessaiy at (w, t) iff (a) p  is logically contingent and (b) p  is true at t and at 
eveiy moment after t in eveiy world w* such that w* shares the same histoiy with w at / 
(Freddoso, op.cit., p.276)
2. w shares the same liistoiy with w* at t iff (a) w and w* have identical series of (,<( and (b) for 
any submoment tz and time („<(, k obtains at (w, („) iff k obtains at (w*, („) (Craig, op.cit.: 75)
3. A submoment /c for any (w, t) is the set of immediate propositions true at (w, t) (ibid.)
4. An immediate propositionp  must be (a) an atomic, non-quantified, present-tense proposition 
and (b) temporally indifferent (ibid.)
5. A temporally indifferent proposition p  is such that either (a) p  is not logically contingent or 
(b) it is possible thatp, as well as its negation, be true at a first, a last, and an intermediate 
moment of time (Freddoso, op.cit.: 272)
Freddoso claims that the superiority of his account over others lies in its 
recognition of Ocldiam’s doctrine of the metaphysical ‘primacy of the pure present’ 
(ibid.: 258). For two worlds to share tlie same histoiy prior to (, they must share all the 
same submoments in the same order, where these submoments comprise tme and purely 
present tense propositions. By this, Freddoso means that the submoment of a world w at 
any given time t determines what is tiue at t in w, and does so in a way that does not
Saunders, J., ‘Of God and Freedom’, Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 219-25 and Pike, N,, ‘Of God and
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depend upon what has been or will be tme at any other times in w. So ‘Caesar died in 
Rome’ is now temporally necessary because ‘Caesar is dying in Rome’ is a member of a 
past submoment which obtains at some point prior to the present in any world that shares 
the same history as our world prior to the present. ‘Katie will wash her car the day after 
tomoiTow’, however, is not immediate, and is therefore not the member of any 
submoment. So even if this proposition is tme in our world at a time (say, the day after 
its utterance) prior to Katie’s washing of her cai*, there are other worlds sharing our 
identical histoiy up to that time in which it is not tiue at that time. It is, therefore, 
temporally contingent until she washes the car, at which time its present tense version 
becomes the member of a submoment shared by other worlds with identical histories up 
to that time, and thus becomes temporally necessaiy. In this way, Freddoso hopes to 
show that the past truth of a yet future contingent proposition does not necessitate the 
corresponding event, because such past truths do not, on his account, qualify as 
temporally necessary.
Craig criticizes Freddoso’s account on the grounds that his criterion for the 
temporal indifference of a logically contingent proposition is too strict. 5(b), above, 
requires that the present tmth value of a temporally indifferent, logically contingent 
proposition remain unaffected by the question of whether there are any past moments, as 
well as by the question of whether there any future moments, in tire given world. This 
criterion is meant to captme Ockham’s pure present. But Craig claims that if we assume 
the logical possibility of time travel, then it might be the case that a temporally indifferent 
proposition—according to Freddoso’s criterion—might turn out to be temporally 
contingent. Say, for example, that the tmth, at (/, of ‘Socrates drinks hemlock’ depends
Freedom: A Rejoinder’, Philosophical Review 75 (1966): 370.
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upon the tmth, at of T don’t go back in time and prevent Socrates from diinking 
hemlock’. Here, the tmth of the first proposition is counterfactually dependent upon the 
tmth, at a later time, of the second proposition; in which case, the foiiner would seem to 
be temporally contingent (i.e. expressing a soft fact). But since there is a possible world 
w* which shares all the same submoments with ours up thiough tj, and where Socrates 
drinks the hemlock at tj, but where tj is the last moment of time in w*, so ‘Socrates 
drinks hemlock’ at tj meets Freddoso’s criterion of temporal indifference, and 
accordingly becomes temporally necessary at ti. In oui' world, however, it is within my 
power to render ‘Socrates drinks hemlock’ false, so how can it be temporally necessary?
As Craig points out, Freddoso actually presupposes the incompatibility of his 
account with the possibility of time travel and other cases of an agent’s power over the 
past. For if we allow the possibility of such cases, then it would seem that very few 
propositions about the past will tui'n out temporally necessary. Freddoso, however, 
claims that such cases are ‘flights of fancy’ and depend upon ‘outlandish’ metaphysical 
assumptions (ibid.: 260). While Craig shares Freddoso’s scepticism about the 
metaphysical possibility of time ti'avel—and also extends this doubt to backwards 
causation and a retrocausal account of precognition—he claims that the logical 
possibility of time travel, at least, cannot be so easily luled out. Craig’s motivation for 
this claim is the logical parallel he sees between divine foreknowledge and time travel^ ,^ 
and his point is that if Freddoso’s account is not compatible with the logical possibility of 
the latter, then it also cannot allow for the fomier. The distinction between the logical 
possibility of time travel and that of backward causation may seem an idle one, but it is 
one that Craig is keen to make. He claims that the fbimer possibility, as in the case of
Craig (1988a) explicitly argues for tills parallel.
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divine foreknowledge, is constituted by the possibility of the counterfactual dependence 
of earlier events upon later ones, and that this is a weaker kind of dependence than that 
constituted by direct backwards causation. We will see, later, how this distinction plays a 
role in the fonnulation of Craig’s own account of temporal necessity, but it will be 
beneficial first to consider his appraisal of Plantinga’s account, as that account also 
makes use of the notion of counterfactual dependence.
C. Plantinga on Temporal Necessity 
Plantinga (1986) takes the debate in a different direction by divorcing the hard fact/soft 
fact distinction fi'om the concept of temporal necessity. He claims that we cannot define 
temporal necessity in tenns of what is strictly about the past, because we lack a 
sufficiently clear concept of strict pastness. Intuitively, perhaps, we want to say that a 
proposition that is strictly about the past is one that does not entail a proposition that is 
about the future. But this is not veiy helpful, because almost any past tense proposition 
entails a futui'e one. ‘Abraham existed in 1995 EC’, for example, entails that Abraham 
will not begin to exist (i.e. exist for the first time) in AD 2005 (Plantinga, op.cit,: 251-2). 
According to Plantinga, then, we should search in a different area to discover what is 
definitive of temporal necessity. His suggestion is that it be defined in tenns of an 
event’s lying within, or not lying within, one’s power. His initial proposal is that a 
proposition p  is temporally necessary at t iff p  is tiue at t and it is not possible both that p  
is tme at t and that there exists an agent S and action A such that (i) S has the power at t or 
later to perfoim A and (ii) if S were to perfoiin at ( or later, then p  would have been 
false (ibid.: 253). So a proposition is temporally necessary iff it is tme and its tmth is not 
counterfactually dependent upon an agent’s subsequent actions. This constmal yields 
intuitive results as to the temporal contingency of many soft facts, such as the one
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expressed by the proposition, ‘God believed eighty years ago that Paul would mow his 
lawn in 2010’.^ '^  It is within Paul’s power to perforai a future action (viz. that of avoiding 
mowing his lawn in 2010) which, if he does perforai it, would make the above 
proposition to have (always) been false. So the proposition is temporally contingent and 
Paul is fiee to act as he chooses (even though he does, indeed, mow his lawn).
The results, however, become less intuitive when we discover that many, if not 
most, hard facts also come out as temporally contingent. Craig offers the following 
example: suppose that if Pilate had been just, then he would not have cmcified Jesus. 
Suppose, furthermore, that God’s sole puipose in causing Christ’s conception and birth 
was for him to die a redemptive death. From these suppositions, Craig infers that it 
would have been tme to say that if Pilate had been just, Chiist would not have been 
born.^  ^ But here we have an earlier event, Christ’s birth, being counterfactually 
dependent upon an agent’s subsequent actions. So a hard fact like Christ’s birth is, prior 
to his death, temporally contingent. Plantinga, for his part, also considers several 
counterexamples of his own, and concludes that his initial formulation has the 
consequence that very few facts about the past are temporally necessaiy. He says, 
‘Indeed, it is not easy to think of any contingent facts about the past that are 
.. .[temporally] .. .necessary in that sense’ (ibid.: 257, Plantinga’s emphasis). And so he 
considers how he might remedy this weakness. He first considers whether the correct 
indicator of temporal contingency might not actually be the possibility of backward 
causation, rather than the presence of counterfactual dependency of past upon future. I 
take it that Plantinga has something like the following in mind: in the scenario above.
I boiTow this example from Plantinga (ibid.: 253), but I have updated the year.
Of course, Christ might have died a redemptive death at the hands of some other agent if not Pilate’s. 
Whomever that agent might have been, however, if he or she would have had it in her power to order
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although Chiist’s birth may be counterfactually dependent upon Pilate’s actions, Pilate’s 
being just does not cause Chiist to not be born. My future actions, however, could cause 
God’s past foreknowledge to have been other than what it was. But Plantinga shelves 
this proposal because it involves ‘a number of profound peiplexities—about agent 
causation, the analysis of causation, whether backward causation is possible, the relation 
between causation and counterfactuals’, and instead offers what he calls a ‘related 
suggestion’ {ibid:. 258).
The new suggestion is simply an adjustment to the original definition, one that 
adds the requirement that the relevant counterfactual dependence of the truth of a past 
fact upon a future agent’s actions must be a (logically) necessary dependence in order for 
the past fact to be temporally contingent. This adjustment allows that though it is 
possibly tme that if Pilate had been just, then Chiist would not have been bom, it is not 
necessarily tme; and thus Christ’s past birth is temporally necessaiy. The adjustment 
does not, however, render propositions about God’s past foreknowledge temporally 
necessary. Take the proposition expressed by ‘God foreknew Pilate’s injustice’. This is 
a true proposition which, prior to Pilate’s having condenmed Christ, Pilate had within his 
power to make necessarily false; since, if Pilate had behaved justly, then, given God’s 
essential omniscience, ‘God foreknew Pilate’s injustice’ could not possibly ever have 
been tme. Accordingly, God’s foreknowledge is not temporally necessary.
As Craig explains, Plantinga’s aim here is to remove from consideration—when 
determining the temporal modality of a proposition about the past—the merely possible 
counterfactual dependency of the past upon the futm e. Backtracking counterfactuals that 
are not (logically) necessarily tiue cannot be an indicator of temporal contingency,
Christ’s death, then he or she might not have done so out of a sense of justice; in which case, we still have a
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because such an indicator would not do justice to the intuitive idea of the necessity of the 
past. Once one allows merely possibly tme backtracking counterfactuals to indicate 
temporal contingency, then one must allow that there are an infinite number of them that 
could possibly be true; in which case the past is not nearly as necessary as the proponents 
of temporal necessity seem to think it is. In restiicting the class of backtracking 
counterfactuals that indicate temporal contingency to necessary ones, then, Plantinga sees 
himself as vindicating our intuitions about the necessity of the past without rendering 
facts such as God’s past foreknowledge as hard.
Craig, however, criticizes Plantinga’s adjustment to his original proposal for 
being ad hoc. He claims that if the original proposal ‘did not capture oui' intuitive 
understanding of temporal necessity, [the second one]... does less so’ (Craig, op. cit.: 80). 
I tend to agree. Why should the addition of the entailment requirement (5”s perfoi'mance 
of vf at  ^or later entails the falsity ofp) reflect anything more significant than Plantinga’s 
desire to avoid the counterexamples to his original proposal? As Craig says, if the latter 
was too weak a definition of temporal necessity (rendering a hard fact like the past birth 
of Jesus temporally contingent), the adjusted definition is too strong. For the entailment 
adjustment forces us to judge that past propositions, whose truth values really do 
counterfactually depend upon an agent’s futur e actions—though only contingently— 
cannot be temporally contingent. But if they are temporally necessary, then how can it 
still be the case that they might have been false? Recall that this amounts to the same 
objection that Craig alleged against Freddoso. If we are to allow that tme backtracking 
counterfactuals are indicators of temporal contingency at all, then it would appear' that we 
must also allow that at least some of the merely contingent ones are indicators of
counterexample to Plantinga’s initial formulation.
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temporal contingency. But which ones? It seems that Plantinga’s proposal brings us no 
closer to a definition of temporal necessity. Craig, for his part, thinlcs that Plantinga’s 
discussion does offer us a glimpse of the right way fbiivard—one that can be found in 
Plantinga’s ‘profound peiplexities’. And so Craig goes on to provide an analysis of 
temporal necessity which draws upon both Freddoso’s and Plantinga’s discussion. We 
will now turn to this analysis.
D. Craig on Temporal Necessity 
Craig begins his own analysis of temporal necessity by reconsidering Freddoso’s 
presupposition of the impossibility of time travel. Previously Craig had claimed that such 
a presupposition was not wan anted. Now, he goes on to say that Freddoso’s definition 
does not even require such a presupposition, as long as we allow that the tmth values of 
some temporally necessaiy propositions depend upon the tmth of fiituie directed 
propositions. That is to say, on Freddoso’s account ‘Socrates di*ank hemlock’ is 
temporally necessary; but given the possibility of time ti avel, the tmth of this proposition 
depends upon the tmth of certain propositions about a future time traveler’s actions. This 
does not undeiTnine Freddoso’s definition as much as it undermines our intuitions about 
the necessity of the past. Indeed, prior to providing his definition, Freddoso insists that 
any account of temporal necessity must respect the intuition that no agent has it within 
his power to make a temporally necessary proposition false. Now Craig, in reaction to 
the lack of success in formulating a water tight definition of the philosophical notion of 
temporal necessity that coheres with our intuitions about the necessity of the past, 
suggests that the philosophical notion be divorced from our intuitions. Accordingly, he 
proposes that we amend Freddoso’s account of temporal indifference so that is 
temporally indifferent iff p  is tme and p  would be ti-ue even if the past and future were
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anniliilated’ {ibid:. 82). We then claim that a fact is soft iff it corresponds to a past or 
present event which is counterfactually dependent upon some future event, where the 
dependency is the one way dependency of a consequence upon a condition. A hard fact 
is one that is not so dependent. Although this proposal is similar to Plantinga’s in its use 
of counterfactual dependence, notice that it does not rely upon reference to agents and 
what lies within their power. Craig does not see such considerations as being constitutive 
of temporal necessity.
What, then, of our intuitions? Craig acknowledges that his definitions of hard and 
soft facts are such that hardness and softness ‘are not dispositional properties of facts, but 
simply characterize things de facto' {ibid.: 84). It might be the case that many facts that 
we intuitively take to be hard are, in actuality, soft. Given the possibility of divine 
forelcnowledge and backtracking counterfactuals, only God knows which facts ftom the 
past are or are not counterfactually dependent upon ftituie facts. Nor is it necessaiy that 
soft facts are only ones about God’s foreknowledge, for, as we have seen, it is possible 
(though highly unlikely) that Jesus’ birth was a soft fact prior to his crucifixion. In light 
of this epistemic impoverishment with respect to the counterfactual relations between 
past and ftiture, Craig admits that our intuitions regarding the necessity of the past cannot 
come from awareness of such relations. But all this tells us is that our intuitions about 
the necessity of the past have nothing to do with the hard/soft distinction. In accounting 
for our strong intuitions about the necessity of the past, then, he claims that they are 
generated by the almost universal belief in the impossibility of backward causation—a 
belief that is justified by the ‘dynamic nature of time and becoming’ {ibid.: 89).^  ^ So 
Craig does make use of Plantinga’s ‘profound peiplexities’, but he does so not, as
Here we see Craig’s hierarchy, which I attempted to refute in Chapter 2, rearing its head again.
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Plantinga had suggested, in order to define temporal necessity; rather, heflrst defines 
temporal necessity in teims of backtiacking counterfactual dependence, and then uses 
Plantinga’s distinction between this dependence and backward causation to explain why 
his definition is not as counter-intuitive as it seems. We can allow that God’s past 
foreknowledge has for its objects soft facts, without offending our intuitive sensibilities 
about the necessity of the past in the process; this is because facts are soft in virtue of 
their coimterfactual dependence upon futui*e facts, and such a dependence does not 
thi eaten the causal impeiwiousness of the past, and therefore neither does it thi eaten our 
intuitions about the past.
Although the thi ee accounts of temporal necessity we have just examined barely 
scratch the surface of the many contemporary accounts that have been put foiward, they 
are fairly representative of the general types of accounts available. Freddoso’s can be 
seen as representative of those which first offer an account of what is strictly in the past, 
and then define temporal necessity in teims of this feature. Plantinga’s, on the other 
hand, is representative of those accounts which bypass the inteimediary of strict pastness, 
and instead define temporal necessity directly in terms of the power of human agents. 
And Craig’s, as we have just seen, is a sort of hybrid of both types. In what remains of 
this section, I will discuss Zagzebski’s assessment of these thi'ee different approaches, as 
well as her own analysis of temporal necessity.
E. Zagzebs/d on Temporal Necessity 
Zagzebsld (1991) offers a critique of the types of approaches I have just outlined above. 
She discusses Freddoso’s and Plantinga’s accounts specifically, and though she does not 
respond directly to Craig’s account, one can infer her likely comments on it fiom what 
she does say (she does reference Craig’s paper in a footnote). With regard to Freddoso’s
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account—and those of which it is representative—Zagzebski criticizes them for the 
methodology they employ. She claims that they seek to fonnulate a definition of 
temporal necessity that meets the following two criteria: i) it is consistent with the 
intuitively clear cases of hard and soft facts, and thus impeivious to counterexamples, and 
(ii) it has as the consequence tliat God’s past beliefs (such as those about the future 
actions of humans) come out as soft facts (Zagzebski, op.cit.: 74). She notes that these 
criteria seem to be universally accepted as sufficient for a definition of temporal 
necessity, and so the debate as to the success of the definition usually centers on whether 
it can withstand counterexamples. Her criticism of this method is that it encourages the 
formulation of ad hoc and nominal definitions, which do not reflect a real distinction in 
the nature of things.
Zagzebski, alternatively, chooses to abandon the use of counterexamples in 
attacking these types of definitions, claiming that imperviousness to counterexamples 
cannot compensate for their lack of explanatoiy value. Her point is that though there may 
be an elaborate recursive definition that is capable of satisfying both criteria (i) and (ii), 
such satisfaction cannot constitute a real definition unless it also illuminates the strong 
intuition of the necessity of the past which underlies it. That intuition tells us that events 
which lie in the past, to include those involving beliefs about the future, are necessary 
and fixed in viilue of their pastness. If a definition is formulated with the puipose of 
denying this intuition in the case of God’s beliefs, then such a negative solution to the 
foreknowledge dilemma must be capable of telling us something about the asymmetry of 
time winch is independent of the foreknowledge issue; it must give us independent 
reasons for accepting the definition. If it does not, then according to Zagzebski, it is ad 
hoc. In other words, the definition must first be able to show generally what types of past
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propositions are necessary, and then demonstrate the possibility that propositions about 
God’s past foreknowledge are not of this type. Given that what we are after is a 
metaphysical account of temporal necessity, and how it is that that account invalidates the 
(theo)logical fatalist’s argument from the necessity of the past, Zagzebski’s requirements 
seem quite reasonable to me.
As for Plantinga’s proposal, and others that attempt to define temporal necessity 
in teims of the power of agents, Zagzebski criticizes them for the lack of work 
counterfactual dependence really does for them. In the first place, she remarks that 
Plantinga’s definition would also cover logically and causally necessary facts, since we 
have no power over them either. And this despite the fact that Plantinga himself, in 
initially characterizing temporal necessity, claims that it must be distinguished from these 
other foims of necessity. Even if he were to amend the definition, however, so as to 
preclude the logically and causally necessary, Zagzebski still claims that such a proposal, 
inasmuch as it is supposed to provide a definition of temporal necessity, would be 
unsuccessful. This is because it would remain a negative definition that only tells what 
facts cannot be if they are to be temporally necessary (they cannot be counterfactually 
dependent upon future actions that lie within an agent’s power), it does not tell us what it 
is about these facts that both makes them such that they are not within our power, and 
also distinguishes them from causally and logically necessaiy facts.
Zagzebski, though, still wants to give Plantinga’s proposal a chance to at least say 
something helpftil about temporal necessity, even if failing to define it; for she recognizes 
that many contemporary ‘Ockliamists’ would acknowledge that his account is satisfied by 
temporally necessary propositions. Her conclusion, however, is that not only do 
proposals such as Plantinga’s fail to offer a proper definition of temporal necessity, they
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also fail to say anything infonnative about the concept at all. Zagzebski offers two 
reasons for this conclusion. First, in allowing the tmth of some backtracking 
counterfactuals, she claims that Plantinga and others do not give due consideration to the 
intuition that motivates the fatalistic argument from the necessity of the past. This lack of 
consideration would be fine if they offered an accoimt of why the intuition that gi'ounds 
their proposal is superior to the one tliat the fatalist relies upon. But recall that the 
Ockliamist shares the fatalist’s intuition about the necessity of the past, and simply wants 
to claim that God’s past beliefs about future events are not strictly past. And Zagzebski’s 
point is that the counterfactual dependence of the past upon the future is not compatible 
with the intuition that both the fatalist and the Ockhamist are meant to shaie.
Even Plantinga’s sti'engthened proposal—with the entailment amendment— 
allows that it is possible for what we intuitively take to be hard facts still to be 
counterfactually dependent upon the future actions of agents. Such dependence, because 
it is not necessary, still allows that these types of facts are temporally necessary. But if it 
is possibly within my power to act so that a past hard fact would always have been false, 
how can that fact be temporally necessaiy in a way that coheres with my intuition about 
the necessity of the past? This objection is obviously similar to the one that Craig brings 
against Plantinga, according to which Plantinga’s amended definition is too sti'ong. The 
difference, however, is that Zagzebski clearly does not agree with Craig that our 
intuitions about the past can be separated from the philosophical notion of temporal 
necessity, since the fatalist’s argument, and the Ockhamist’s response, gamer their 
plausibility precisely from the grounding of the philosophical notion in oui' intuitions. 
This point leads to Zagzebski’s second objection.
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Craig embraces Plantinga’s distinction between counterfactual dependence of the 
past upon the futuie, on the one hand, and backward causation, on the other. As we saw, 
he claims this distinction can account for our intuitions about the past (in that these 
intuitions reflect a disbelief in backward causation), and that it can also account for om* 
use of the philosophical notion of temporal necessity (in that that use is governed by 
counterfactual dependence of the past upon the future); and so there is no conflict 
between the two. Zagzebski, however, claims that this distinction that Plantinga, Craig, 
and others make use of does not really do the work they want it to. Many philosophers 
who endorse Plantinga’s type of proposal, she says, make a great deal of fuss over 
whether backtracking counterfactuals entail backward causation. For her own part, 
Zagzebski is puzzled by this issue, since the whole point of Ockhamism is to show that 
God’s past beliefs about future human actions are not strictly in the past; in which case, 
the counterfactuals in question aie not strictly backtiacking, nor is the causation involved, 
if  it is indeed entailed by the counterfactuals, stiictly backward causation. If, on the other 
hand, God’s past beliefs are really in the past, then it matters very little whether the one 
entails the other, since our intuitions would seem to require that a strictly past event be 
immune both to causation and to counterfactual dependence. This point leads Zagzebski 
to conclude that ‘it is difficult to see how we can accept the claim that it is possible that 
we have counterfactual power over the past without a clarification of what is stiictly in 
the past’ {ibid:. 82). But since that clarification is presented by Plantinga in terms of 
counterfactual power, and is fbimulated specifically to address the foreknowledge 
dilemma, it fails to explain how it is that we can have counterfactual power over God’s 
past beliefs.
149
So where does this leave us? We have seen that temporal necessity and the 
hardness of the past are very difficult concepts to pin down. Perhaps we need to back up 
and take a look again at the origin of the concept in oui' intuitions. When we agree with 
the fatalist that the past is necessary, what motivates us? Zagzebski ai'gues that it is our 
belief in the asymmeti’y of time that grounds our intuitions about the necessity of the past; 
where the asymmetry involved is both an ontological as well as a modal one. We think 
of the past as being real, whereas the future is not. Similarly, we find traces of the past in 
the present, but the present contains no traces of the future. The modal asymmetry, of 
course, goes hand in hand with the ontological, because given that the past is real and is 
not temporally located with the present, there is nothing we can do about it. It is fixed, 
whereas the futur e, according to oui' intuitions and experience, is not. This is all quite 
straightfoiward, but Zagzebski’s point in stating the obvious is to highlight that many of 
the philosophical discussions about temporal necessity have lost sight of the concept’s 
origins. She claims that if the intuitions that ground the concept are sound, then there 
should be no temptation to heed the fatalist’s argument from the necessity of the past.
This is because the pre-analytical defining characteristic of the concept is such that if a 
proposition is temporally necessary, then it was not always so. This is what distinguishes 
it from other types of necessity (such as causal or logical)—a proposition instantiates it 
accidentally. If a philosophical analysis of the concept omits this characteristic, then the 
concept becomes vacuous. So it is impossible for temporal necessity to yield fatalistic 
implications, because the non-fixity of the fiiture is built into it (i.e. necessarily, the futui'e 
cannot instantiate the necessity of the past). If, however, the intuitions that Zagzebski 
identifies are not sound, then, by the same reasoning, the concept of temporal necessity is 
incoherent. But such an incoherence is of no use to the fatalist, according to Zagzebski,
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because any argument based upon an incoherent concept must fail. So regardless of the 
coherence of the concept of temporal necessity, the fatalist’s argument (whether of the 
logical or theological type) must fail.
What should we make of tliis conclusion? There is certainly something 
persuasive about Zagzebski’s reasoning, but it is not entirely satisfying. She thinks that 
any argument for the fixity of the future, based on a conception of temporal necessity 
according to which both past and future events instantiate such a necessity, just begs the 
question against the non-fixity of the future. But, as I indicated in Section I, tliis is not 
going to definitively reflate the Type II logical fatalist, since he is simply going to return 
the charge of begging the question. Foitunately, however, Zagzebski does not leave it at 
that. Although she claims that if the concept of temporal necessity is coherent, any 
fatalistic ai gument from the necessity of the past must fail, she is keen to provide a more 
infonnative diagnosis of that failure. In particular, she argues that theological fatalism 
cannot simply be reduced to logical fatalism, and is therefore a more serious problem 
than the latter (even though ultimately doomed to failure as well). I would like to discuss 
this argument because, in the coui se of it, she makes some interesting and helpful 
conclusions about the distinction between propositions and events with regard to the 
concept of temporal necessity.
So, for the sake of philosophical diagnosis, Zagzebski assumes the coherence of 
temporal necessity, and assumes the validity of the fatalist’s argument, thus concluding 
that one of the fatalist’s premises must be false. And with regard to logical fatalism, she 
argues that it is much clearer which premise fails and why it does so. The logical fatalist 
requires that the past truth of a proposition is now temporally necessary, so that ‘there is 
nothing we can do now about the fact that it was tme in the past’ {ibid:. 25). Ockhamists
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deny this premise in the case of a special class of propositions; and, as we have seen, 
attempts to define this class have not met with great success. Zagzebski, on the other 
hand, chooses to deny the premise on the grounds that the truth of propositions ‘is not the 
soit of thing to which accidental necessity applies’ (she also attributes this option to 
Sorabji) (ibid.). Instead, both the intuitive as well as the philosophical basis of temporal 
necessity require that it only be instantiated by events. I think this is the right move to 
make, both for the reasons that Zagzebski offers, as well as for some of my own. My 
reasons, however, lead to the more diastic conclusion that temporal necessity is a 
misnomer, and that it is not any type of necessity whatsoever. I will present my reasons 
in Section IV; first, however, we will discuss Zagzebski’s reasons.
She claims that her conclusion is supported both by our intuitions about the modal 
and ontological asymmetries of time, as well as by the philosophical development of the 
concept of temporal necessity. With regard to our intuitions, both the reality and the 
fixity of the past are intuitions about past events, not propositions. With regard to the 
philosophical concept of temporal necessity, as developed by Ockliam and other 
medieval philosophers, Zagzebski claims that it relies heavily on Aiistotle’s act/potency 
distinction. Only past events have been actualized, in vii*tue of their having occurred; 
futuie (contingent) events, have not yet occurred and therefore exist in mere potency. 
There is no analogous application of these distinctions to propositions. Propositions, 
unless given a very counter intuitive ontological status, are not real/um*eal, fixed/non­
fixed, or actual/potential—at least not in the way that is intended when discussing the 
common sense asymmetry between past and future. Given this, it must be constitutive of 
the concept of temporal necessity that only events (or states of affairs) can properly be 
said to admit of it. So, she argues, the intuitive and philosophical grounding of temporal
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necessity does not support the fatalist’s application of the concept in the Type II 
argument. If this is right, then propositions about the past, such as ‘At  ^it was the case 
that at tz Susan will go to Anstmther’, are not temporally necessaiy, and therefore neither 
is the entailed fiiture tense proposition.
Of course, Ockham thought temporal necessity applied to propositions about the 
past, but Zagzebski argues that such an application is not consistent with the 
philosophical concept that he himself helped establish. She has no objection to the 
isomorphic treatment of propositions and events in other contexts, but claims that the 
sense of ‘events’ or ‘states of affairs’ which we intend in the context of temporal 
necessity is nanower than the one that is isomoiphic with propositions. So, propositions 
like the one above in the Type II argument do not refer to events or states of affairs of the 
sort that motivate our intuitions about the necessity of the past. The state of affairs that 
corresponds to this proposition is its being the case at tj that Susan will go to Anstruther 
at ts. But, in what sense can its being the case at t} that Susan will go to Anstruther at ts 
be said to be an ontologically real, fixed, and temporally actualised state of affairs? Its 
being the case that Susan will go to Anstruther at ts does not occur or become actual at t\, 
and thus this is not the type of state of affairs to which any intuitively consistent notion of 
temporal necessity applies.
This insight about the relation between propositions and events in the context of 
temporal necessity allows Zagzebski to conclude that theological fatalism is a different 
and more difficult problem than logical fatalism. The latter requires that the past tmth of 
propositions wliich entail future propositions be temporally necessary. In light of the 
argument above, Zagzebski can deny this and so defeat the logical fatalist. The 
theological fatalist, however, claims that it is God’s past beliefs (in conjunction with his
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essential omniscience), that necessitate future events; and propositions about the past 
beliefs of agents do correspond to ontologically real, modally fixed, and temporally 
actualized events or states of affairs. Therefore, if such events are temporally necessary, 
then the opponent of theological fatalism must show that the Mure events entailed by 
them are immune to the necessity of the past. In the course of her book, Zagzebski does 
attempt to show this, but I will not discuss those arguments here. I want, now, to redirect 
our focus exclusively to logical fatalism, and to offer my own analysis of the role 
temporal necessity plays in the Type II logical fatalist argument.
IV. Temporal Necessity: A New Analysis 
Although I agree with Zagzebski as far as her conclusions go, I think more can be said 
about temporal necessity. I want to take a closer look at the concept, using the 
distinction between necessity de dicto and necessity de re as a medium for analysis.
There are two ideas I would like my discussion to motivate: The first is that the logical 
fatalist is not a likely candidate to have ever relied upon temporal necessity in arguing for 
his doctrine. In connection with this idea, I should note that I am unaware of any sincere 
fatalist who does make use of the concept—as we have seen, it is most often used by anti­
fatalists to argue against ULD. And the second is that its modal oddities make it an 
inappropriate and dubious tool for use in constmcting a fatalistic argument (regardless of 
whether one sincerely embraces the doctrine or not).
We begin with a brief review of the de dicto/de re distinction. Necessity de dicto 
is the necessity of a proposition—the type of necessity that Zagzebski concluded was not 
appropriate to the ti aditional concept of temporal necessity. Necessity de re, on the other 
hand, is the necessity of an object—specifically, the necessity of an object’s
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exemplification of a given property. The following examples will help to refresh the 
reader’s memory of this distinction:
(1) ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is necessarily tme.
(2) The number three is necessarily prime.
(1) is a rig dicto attribution of necessity. It involves the claim that the ti uth of the given 
proposition is one of necessity. (2) is a de re attribution, which is a claim about the 
object refeiTcd to by the expression ‘the number thi'ee’—specifically, a claim about that 
object’s exemplification of the property of being prime. In every possible world in which 
that object exists, it is prime. Thus a de re attiibution of necessity is a claim about an 
object, namely, the claim that some property is essential to it; whereas a de dicto 
attribution of necessity is a claim about the modal status of a proposition’s tmth value.
Now, then, how might our notion of temporal necessity apply de dictol 
According to Zagzebski, it cannot do so. Intuitively, temporal necessity is a notion about 
the fixity of past events, not about the fixity of propositions about the past. Furthermore, 
for the logical fatalist the law of excluded middle applies tunelessly to all propositions, 
regardless of tlieir subject matter, and ti*uth is tmth simpliciter. So if the logical fatalist is 
unwilling to temporally relativise ti'uth, it is unlikely that he would be willing to 
temporally relativise the modal status of tmth—in which case we should be wary of 
attributing the Type II argument to the sincere fatalist. Nevertheless, for the sake of the 
analysis, let us consider how we might foi'mulate an attribution of temporal necessity de 
dicto. Consider the following claim (I assume tluoughout that the embedded proposition 
in (3) is tme):
(3) ‘Susan goes to Ansti'uther at f  is temporally necessarily ti'ue.
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To make it clear that it is the necessity of the past that is intended, we can modify (3) in 
the following manner:
(3*) ‘Susan goes to Anstmther at f  is (temporally) necessarily ti'ue at 
^+n.‘^
Now apply a similar formulation to oui' example proposition from the Type II argument, 
and we have the following:
(4) ‘At ti it was the case that at tz Susan will go to Anstmther’ is 
(temporally) necessarily tme at ti.
Following Zagzebski, we concluded that (4) was false because temporal necessity is a 
concept originating in our intuitions about past events and states of affairs, not past 
propositions; and (4)’s conesponding state of affairs is not the sort to which those 
intuitions apply. What about (3*), though? If, indeed, Susan does go to Anstmther at t, 
then that event is temporally necessai'y after t, and therefore (3*) would seem to be a 
valid application of temporal necessity de dicto. So perhaps, after all, temporal necessity 
does apply to certain propositions. But notice the proceduie we have had to use in order 
to determine the tmth of (3*) and the falsity of (4). We have had first to detei'mine 
whether the given proposition’s conesponding event is temporally necessary, and only 
then could we detei'mine whether the given proposition itself is temporally necessary.
We will revisit this point in a moment.
Now consider the de re application of temporal necessity. Given that necessity de 
re is the necessity of an object’s exemplification of a property, we should thinlc of the
One might think that the translation from (3) to (3*) would allow us to drop the ‘temporally’ modifier 
from the claim altogether. But even though the temporal relativity of the necessity in (3*) is made explicit 
by indexing the claim to an open ended time frame, it remains important to distinguish the time indexed 
necessity from, say, logical or metaphysical necessity.
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event in question in any attribution of temporal necessity de re as an object.
Accordingly, we can convert (3) into its conesponding de re claim:
(5) Susan’s going to Anstmther at t is temporally necessary.
Again, since temporal necessity is simply the necessity of the past, we can make the 
temporal relativity of (5) explicit:
(5*) Susan’s going to Anstmther at Ms a (temporally) necessary 
event at Nn.
But this is still not quite what we are looking for, since we are ti'ying to show what it is 
for an event to be (temporally) necessary, and (5*) is not informative on that point. We 
need to detei'mine what property a temporally necessaiy event, as the object of a de re 
claim, might exemplify essentially. It would seem the most likely candidate would be 
that of fixity. If conceiving of the past as necessai'y is motivated by the fact that past 
events have occurred, and the occuii'ence of an event is a matter of that event becoming 
fixed, then all events that are temporally necessary must share the property of fixity. So a 
temporally necessary event is one that exemplifies the property of fixity necessarily. We 
can now modify (5*) to get what we’re after:
(5**) Susan’s going to Anstmther at Ms a (temporally) necessarily 
fixed event at t+n.
So apparently (5**) best captures what it means for the given event to be temporally 
necessary. It is a de re modal claim about an event’s exemplification of the property of 
fixity.
As we saw above, the procedure for detei'mining whether a proposition 
legitimately admits of temporal necessity involves first determining whether it applies to 
the proposition’s con esponding event. So, what our analysis of the de dicto/de re
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application of temporal necessity shows is that temporal necessity de dicto only seems to 
apply—if it applies at all—derivatively, and in virtue o/its de re application. Now 
compare this with (1), our original de dicto example. Does an evaluation of that claim 
require the same procedure? Of course not. (1) is tme in virtue of the analyticity of the 
proposition ‘All bachelors are unmaiiied’, not in viitue of any de re claims about the 
constituents of that proposition. As a matter of fact, there are many de dicto claims that 
do not have the same tmth value as their conesponding de re claims; whereas in the case 
of temporal necessity de dicto, a given claim must have the same tmth value as its 
conesponding de re claim. Indeed, the latter determines the fomier.
These obseivations call into question the modal legitimacy of temporal necessity. 
Its temporal relativity makes it an unlikely tool for any proponent of tmth simpliciter, and 
the fact that it functions in ways very different from our standard modal notions, casts 
doubt on the plausibility of its use in the Type II argument. At least, one wonders 
whether a modal notion that functions so differently in its de dicto/de re applications, 
might not also function differently in its logic. If it does, then we have reason to question 
the modal inference relied upon in Type II.
Conclusion
If Zagzebski’s conclusions are coivect, the Type II argument for logical fatalism fails. 
Why, then, the need to cast further doubt on Type II with my extended analysis of 
temporal necessity? The reason is that questioning the modal legitimacy of the concept 
can help us to better understand the logical fatalist’s real motivation. This understanding, 
in turn, will allow us to identify the real threat to the non-fixity of the future. In order to 
bring out these points, I would briefly like to take up the role of fatalist’s advocate with
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respect to the argument, and then conclude by suggesting a shift in the anti-
fatalist’s ai'gumentative strategy.
On my analysis of temporal necessity de re, we saw that an event, such as Susan’s 
going to Anstruther at t, is (temporally) necessarily fixed at t-t-n. But notice, then, that an 
attribution of temporal necessity de re actually requires the attribution of two properties. 
There is the first order property, fixity; and there is the second order, modal property, 
temporal necessity. The latter involves the modal claim that the fixity of the event is 
essential to it (the event exemplifies this property necessarily). Thus, in order to cash out 
the de re claim of temporal necessity, we needed to include the additional claim of fixity. 
The distinction between these two properties gives the fatalist room to claim that he is 
innocent of the modal fallacy attiibuted to him in his Type I argument. For, he can deny 
that he ever intended to attribute necessity to future events based on the present tmth of 
their corresponding propositions, and claim that he was merely attiibutingyix/(y to them 
on that basis; in which case the scope fallacy objection does not go thiough.
Now, I must admit that I am quite baffled by what it might mean for an event to 
be (temporally) necessarily fixed. Perhaps fixity is like existence, in that any object that 
has it, does so essentially. So perhaps there are no (temporally) contingently fixed 
events. The analysis is not, however, meant to show the way temporal necessity actually 
works; it is meant to show how it might work if the notion were actually viable. The 
analysis has demonstiated that temporal necessity is a veiy odd modal notion, and that it 
is gratuitous in light of the requirement to include fixity in all its attiibutions. These 
results suggest that the notion is not a viable one, and that our intuitions about the 
peiinanence of the past are best captui ed simply by the MOM-modal notion of fixity. At 
least, they suggest that if the peiinanence of the past does involve modality, it is a
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modality that cannot be captured by the box operator of modal logic. So the lesson to be 
taken from the analysis is not so much that temporal necessity and fixity come apart, but 
that temporal necessity is a misnomer and should be discarded altogether.
Finally, these obsei*vations give us reason to think that the logical fatalist, in 
claiming that future events are fixed and inexorable, is not making a claim that can be 
expressed and evaluated with modal logic. For the participants in the fatalist/anti-fatalist 
debate, it matters very little whether the actual future is only (broadly logically) 
contingently fixed (i.e., whether the future is not fixed—or is fixed differently—in other 
possible worlds), or whether it is necessarily fixed. Either way, both parties to the debate 
would agree that fatalism follows. The logical fatalist is making a claim about the nature 
of tmth: regardless of its modality, tmth is peimanent. Wliat is tme (today) about 
tomorrow cannot be false tomorrow, even if that tmth is a contingent one. So it is not 
that the tmth about tomorrow could not have been other than what it is, but simply that it 
is not other than what it is, and therefore is not within our power to affect. And it is this 
fact that seems to thi eaten the non-fixity of the ftiture.
So we have come, via an in depth suiwey of the concept of temporal necessity, full 
circle from the offhanded dismissal of the Type I argument in Section I. Wliat my 
extended analysis of temporal necessity has shown is that the real tlu eat of fatalism 
comes from what might seem the unlikely direction of antecedent tmth value, and that 
this is where the counter offensive should be focused. In the next chapter, we will launch 
such a counter offensive.
160
CHAPTER 4
ANTECEDENT TRUTH AND LOGICAL FATALISM (REVISITED)
Introduction
In Chapter 3 we saw that the Type II argument fails on the basis of the modal illegitimacy 
of temporal necessity. The analysis of temporal necessity also gave us reason to thinlc 
that the real threat of logical fatalism comes from the Type I argument. My puipose in 
this chapter will be to remove, or at least significantly reduce, the thieat Type I poses to 
the asymmetiy of fixity. I will not achieve this, however, simply by dismissing Type I on 
the basis of a perceived scope fallacy; rather, thiough a systematic analysis of two 
different versions of the argument, I hope to discover and discredit the metaphysical 
doctiine that informs the argument. I begin in Section I with an assessment of Taylor’s 
assertion of fatalism. Then in Section III discuss Dummett’s presentation and refutation 
of fatalism, which occur in the larger context of his attempt to demonstrate the logical 
possibility of a non-fixed past. Finally, in Section III, I go on to assess whether he does, 
indeed, establish this possibility.
I. Taylor’s Aigument: The Naval Battle 
In his article ‘Fatalism’, Taylor (1968) offers an argument which is meant to show that 
time is symmetiically fixed: just as it is not within our power to alter past events, so, too, 
are we unable to avoid future ones (both past and future events are fixed). His strategy is 
first to present an argument whose conclusion affirms the uncontioversial view that the 
past is fixed, and then to present the exact analogue of that argument with respect to the 
future. The idea is that if we accept the former we cannot help but assent to the latter 
(without rejecting certain assumptions).
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Taylor’s argument can be inteipreted as an attempt to deduce fatalism from ULD. 
ULD tells us that the tmth value of a proposition is timeless—if it is tme, it is eternally 
tme. Taylor, of course, is not alone in his belief that ULD implies fatalism; for, 
according to several interpretations of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle also 
believed the implication, and therefore chose to abandon (or modify, depending on the 
interpretation) the law of excluded middle with regard to future contingent propositions. 
Taylor, however, assumes that the law of excluded middle must apply to all propositions, 
and that it must do so in the same manner. Furthermore, he assumes that time, in itself, 
has no metaphysical efficacy. It does not have the power to change the way things are—  
the mere passage of time can neither impart tmth values to propositions which previously 
were without them, nor can it impart determinateness to the truth values of propositions 
which were previously indeterminate. Taylor goes on to make the stronger claim that any 
characterization of past and fiitur e events that claims that the former are fixed and the 
latter not, must concede a similar power to time. In other words, for time to be 
asymmetrical, it must have the power to change events fr om being within our power to 
being not within our power. If, in tmth, there is no temporal efficacy, then time is 
symmetrical.
Granting, for the moment, Taylor’s weaker assumptions, what of the cogency of 
his argument for fatalism? He attempts to draw out the connection he sees between the 
properties of logical determinateness and fixity, by showing that when one assumes that 
the futme, unlike the past, is within one’s power, then logical contradiction arises. The 
argument for a fixed future involves a scenario in which Taylor is a naval commander.^
" I omit the analogous argument for a closed past. It is intended to be uncontioversial, and Taylor’s 
argument for fatalism does not depend upon it. However, given the strategy of his dialectic, I should point 
out that although the objections I offer to his fatalistic argument would also count against Iris analogous
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We assume that his giving an order for a naval battle to occur tomoiTow is a sufficient 
condition for the battle’s occuirence. We also assume that his not giving the order is a 
sufficient condition for the battle’s not taking place. Letting O = ‘He issues the order for 
the naval battle’ and letting Q = ‘The naval battle occuis tomoiTow’, my fonnal 
reconstmction of Taylor’s ar gument nms as follows:
(1) O ZD Q (Assumption)
(2) =) ~Q (Assmnption)
(3) 6 3  0 (From(2))
(4) Q 3  {-O  is not within his power) (From (3))
(5) - 6  3 -^ 0  (From (1))
(6) ~ 6  3  ip  is not within his power) (From (5))
(7) 6  V ~ 6  (Law of Excluded Middle (LEM))
(8) (O is not within his power) v (~ 0  is not within his power) (From (4), (6),
(7)) (Taylor, op.cit:. 225)
So either it is not within his power to issue the order, or it is not within his power 
to refr ain fiom issuing the order, and both of these disjuncts, of cour se, contradict our' 
common sense belief that one is capable of detei'mining one’s own course of action. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, the standard objection to this type of argument is to claim that the 
inferences from (3) to (4) and fiom (5) to (6) involve a scope fallacy. For, though it may 
be the case (given his assumptions) that (3) and (5) represent necessary implications, one 
cannot validly infer fi om such a necessity that the consequents of those implications ar e 
also necessary (we must distinguish between the necessity of the consequences, in (3) and
argument for a closed past; nevertheless, those objections do not pose a threat to the fixity of past events. 
See my n. 3, below.
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(5), and the necessity of their consequents). And, according to this objection, this is 
exactly what Taylor is doing in steps (4) and (6), by claiming that the negation of the 
consequents of (3) and (5), respectively, are not within his power. More formally, this 
objection interprets (3) through (6) in the following manner:
( 3 3 0 ( 6 3  0 )
(43 6  =>00 (From (33)
(53 o (~ 6= >~ 0)
(6 3 -6  ^ 0 - 0  (From (53).
And, clearly, the inferences from (3') to (43 and from (53 to (63 are invalid.
In Chapter 3 we saw that there are some forceful considerations which call into 
question the validity of this objection. Here, I will add a couple more. In bringing this 
objection against the fatalist, we must assume either that his logical pedigree is of the 
very lowest, or that he is deliberately coimnitting a fallacy that he hopes to pass off as a 
valid move. Neither of these assumptions seems very likely to me. Given the impressive 
list of philosophers who have offered this type of argument in some form or another 
(going back to Aristotle), and given that some have been so convinced by it so as to be 
motivated to invent new logics to accommodate its conclusion, I think perhaps a bit more 
charitable treatment of the argument is in order. Secondly, the scope fallacy objection is 
certainly not very metaphysically infonnative. Recall that we are attempting to discover 
the metaphysical picture that informs the fatalist’s move from ULD to fatalism. If such a 
move is fallacious, then we want to know why the fatalist does not see it as such.
Accordingly, let’s take a look again at the suspect inferences from (3) to (4) and 
(5) to (6). Those inferences seem to require a suppressed bridge premise for their 
validity; for they are only valid if something like the following statement is true:
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(3.5) A proposition’s admitting of a tmth value detennines that the event to which 
that proposition refers is not within one’s power.
Or perhaps:
(3.5') A proposition’s admitting of a tmth value fixes its conesponding event. 
Now, there are some opponents of fatalism, particularly those who feel motivated to 
postulate a third or indetenninate tmth value, who might think that the appropriate 
version of (3.5) is perfectly straightfoiward and uncontioversial. But even if it is tme, 
and it is the case that tmth value and fixity are constantly conjoined, they are at least 
logically distinct. If, perchance, (3.5) cannot be established, or can be refuted, and we 
accordingly remove (4) and (6) and stiip Taylor’s argument of the ‘within his power’ 
operators, then it becomes tiivial and quite innocuous:
(1) O z)Q  (Assumption)
(2) ~ 0  3  ~ 6  (Assumption)
(3)6:)OQ%'om(2»
(5) ~ 6  3 - 0  (From (1))
(7) 6  V- 6  (LEM)
(9) . .O v-0(F rom (3), (5), (7))
Given assumptions (1) and (2), this argument simply states that if there is a naval
battle tomorrow then he issues (or has issued) the order, if there isn’t then he doesn’t (or
hasn’t), either there is a naval battle tomorrow or there isn’t, therefore either he issues (or
has issued) the order or he doesn’t (or hasn’t). The question is, what do any of these
inferences have to do with what is or is not within one’s power? Of course, it is the case
that propositions about the past are both logically determinate and refer to events which
are not within one’s power. But why should these two logically distinct domains not be
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divorced with regard to futui'e contingent propositions and the events to which they refer? 
Or if they are not distinct, then is their overlap so obvious that no argument is required to 
establish it? It seems that Taylor simply helps himself to the assumption that because 
there is a fact of the matter, one cannot do otherwise. But surely it is open to us to object 
that if one chooses to do otheiwise, then the fact is not what it is if one does not choose to 
do otheiwise.
I think we can attribute this overhasty assumption on the part of Taylor to the 
muddling effect of the notion of temporal necessity. As we have seen, in addition to its 
questionable modal legitimacy, temporal necessity is easily conflated with logical 
deteiminateness. The process of conflating the two (see Fig. 4.1, below) involves first 
noting that the past is temporally necessary in two respects: propositions about the past 
are temporally necessai'y, and past events ai e. The former are temporally necessary in 
vii’tue of their logical deteiminateness (they admit of a deteiminate ti'uth value, and ti uth 
value cannot change), and the latter in vii*tue of their fixity (past events are inexorable). 
We then infer that these two notions cannot be merely coincidental, but wherever we find 
logical determinateness we must also find fixity. Therefore, we are tempted into oui' 
dilemma, and conclude that the only way to affiim the now-fixity of fiitme events, is by 
denying logical deteiminateness for futui'e contingent propositions.
Fig..A.L PAST
Temporally Necessary
Propositions Events
/  \
Logically Determinate Fixed
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But it is not at all clear that logical detenninateness and fixity must go hand in 
hand, for the former is a propeity of propositions, while the latter is a property of events. 
This is why the scope fallacy objection falls short of the mark and actually plays into the 
fatalist’s hands. It requires us to equate the necessity operator with fixity, and then deny 
that fixity follows fiom the necessity of the implications in (3) and (5). But the necessity 
of those implications is not one of fixity, but one of logical consequence; so how can we 
make such a denial when the two necessity operators involved in stating the objection 
actually represent different types of necessity (logical consequence vs. fixity)? Once 
again, it is better to keep the notions of necessity and fixity separate, rather than risk 
encouiaging the slide from ULD to fatalism. Of comse, it is open to Taylor to object that 
I am simply begging the question against the symmetiy of time, by claiming that the 
relationship between a proposition’s logical determinateness and the fixity of the event to 
which it refers varies according to whether the proposition concerns past or future events. 
And this is surely how Taylor would object, given his assumption about the efficacy of 
time. My answer to that objection is to reiterate the challenge to the fatalist to show why 
it must be the case that logical detenninateness and fixity always overlap. Another 
answer involves retuming the charge of circularity against Taylor, by pointing out that his 
argument assumes fatalism in order to demonstrate it.
This second answer hinges upon maintaining a distinction between tlnee different 
relations: implication, condition, and evidence, as those relations ai e conti asted by 
Wertheimer (1968). Wertheimer provides an account of the relation of conditionship, 
one which he takes to refute Taylor’s argument. His claim is that the tmth conditions of 
material implication are not equivalent to those of ‘necessary condition’ and ‘sufficient 
condition’. We must distinguish between conditionhood on the one hand, and
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implication on the other. Thus, 'p's being a sufficient condition of q' is not equivalent to 
'pz:> q \  nor is ‘^’s being a necessaiy condition of p' equivalent to either of the former 
two or to '-q  =) ~p\ In English we use the term ‘condition’ to delineate a relation 
between two distinct propositions or states of affairs, in the same way that we use tenns 
like ‘before’ and ‘after’. Forp to be a condition of q (whether a necessary or sufficient 
one), it must be the case that q is in some way posterior to and dependent upon p, and 
that p is in some way prior to and nondependent on q. The expression, ‘in some way’, is 
to be worked out according to the type of condition involved, such as causal, logical or 
legal. For most conditional relations, it will usually involve the idea that for p to be a 
condition of q, q must result from or be a consequence ofp.
In English, we also discriminate between condition relations and evidential 
relations, where p may be evidence for q without it being the case that p is  a condition of 
q. Wertheimer (op.cit.: 359-60) offers the following example to highlight this distinction, 
where P ~ ' x  being bigger than y and y  being bigger than z’ and Q - ' x  being bigger than 
z’: ^  is a necessaiy condition of P, because P is  a consequence of Q; therefore (-Q  Z) -P) 
is tme. But, although (P d  Q) is tme, its truth does not imply that P is  a sufficient 
condition of Q, because Q does not result ftom P (the size of y is inelevant to x's being 
bigger than z). Rather, in this context, P  is sufficient evidence for and therefore does 
not stand in a conditional relationship with g , but an evidential one. Thus, generally, one 
cannot detennine whether p is  a condition of q on the grounds that the two are related by 
implication, but only on contextual giounds. Having deteimined that p  is indeed a 
condition of q, then one can detennine whetherp is a sufficient condition of ^  (p =) g), or 
a necessaiy one (~p Z) -#), or both ((p z> ^) & (~p z> ~^)), on truth functional grounds. 
Note that, in the latter case,p’s being a necessary and sufficient condition of q does not
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impart conditionship to q, because q is merely a consequence of p. Thus, on 
Wertheimer’s analysis of conditions, the biconditional does not, strictly speaking, 
represent a conditional relationship at all?
So how does Wertheimer intend this analysis of conditions to count against 
Taylor’s argument? Refemng to my representation of Taylor’s argument, above, 
implication allows Taylor to go from (1) to (5) and from (2) to (3); but (1) and (2) 
represent conditional relationships, in Weiflieimer’s sense (i.e. one way 
conditional/consequential dependence), and so the tiuth of (5) and (3) cannot also imply a 
conditional relation. Instead, those steps represent an evidential relation. More 
explicitly, Taylor wants to infer that O is not within his power from the falsity of Q, on 
the basis of the assumption that if O is tiue, then Q will follow. But while the ti'uth of O 
may be a sufficient condition for Q's tmth, the falsity of Q is not a condition for the 
falsity of O; it is, rather, evidence for the falsity of O. Moreover, it is evidence which 
does not, in the slightest, impugn the autonomy of the naval commander’s will. Of 
course, one of the assumptions which Taylor asserts fr'om the outset of his aiticle is that if  
and only if p is a sufficient condition for g, then  ^is a necessary condition forp (Taylor, 
op. cit. \ 223). But there are numerous counter-examples to this assumption which show 
that it is not necessarily tme, and that its tmth depends upon the type of condition 
involved. For example, being at least 21 years old is a necessary condition for being a 
voter, whereas being a voter is not a sufficient condition for being at least 21 (because 
one’s age does not result fiom, is not conditioned by, one’s voting status) (Weitheimer,
 ^Of course, it may be the case that Wertheimer’s analysis only captures some types of conditional 
relationsliips, but not all of them. It might be argued, for example, that a pre-condition, though prior to, 
does not result in, that which it pre-conditions. This is only a serious objection if one attempts to apply the 
analysis to all conditional relationships irrespective of the context. If, based on the context of a statement, 
one discerns a one way conditional dependency between two relata, then it seems to me that Wertheimer’s 
analysis is a useful tool for capturing that dependency.
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op.cit: 358). Thus, in assuming that there is a two way conditional dependency between 
Q and O (which is what his assumption about necessary and sufficient conditions 
amounts to), Taylor is, once again, assuming that tnith value conditions what is within 
one’s power—and this begs the question against the non-fixity of the fiitui e.^
II. Dummett’s Ar gument: The Air Raid 
Dummett (1968), in his article ‘Bringing About the Past’, also exploits a perceived 
analogy between the argument for fatalism and the argument for a fixed past, but does so 
with the contrary pmpose of demonstrating the possibility that time is symmetrically non- 
fixed. He diagnoses the fallacy of the fatalist ar gument, and then claims that precisely the 
same objection can be made to the analogous argument for a fixed past. Thus his strategy 
is the exact reverse of Taylor’s. In this section I will assess Dummett’s presentation and 
diagnosis of the fatalist argument, bringing in considerations gleaned fiom our discussion 
of Taylor’s argument. I will then go on in Section III to examine Dummett’s analogous 
treatment of the past.
Dummett’s argument is offered in the context of a common debate that took place 
in London during World War II, as to whether there was any point in taking precautions 
for survival during an air raid. His fatalist argues in the following maimer:
1. ‘Either you are going to be killed in this raid or you are not. ’ (LEM)
2. ‘If you are going to be killed, then you will be killed even if you take 
precautions.’ (Material Implication?)
 ^If the reader is familiar with Taylor’s analogous argument for a closed past, then it should be clear that 
these objections would not allow him to assume, as he explicitly does, that Iris reading a certain newspaper 
article can be a necessary condition for a previous naval battle. The reading of the article cannot condition 
the battle in any way, but can only serve as evidence for the battle. It is the occurrence of the battle that 
conditions which aiticle he reads, and this is why it is not witliin Iris power to read both that the battle 
occuned and that it did not occur.
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3. Tf you are not going to be killed, then you will not be killed even if you 
neglect precautions.’ (Material Implication?)
4. ‘Hence, if  you are going to be killed in the raid, any precautions you take will 
be ineffective.’ (From 2.)
5. ‘Hence, if you are not going to be killed in the raid, any precautions you take 
will have been superfluous.’ (From 3.) (Dummett, op.cit.: 261)
At this point, I am assuming that Dummett interprets 2. and 3. as tautologies with 
the ‘if.. .then’ interpreted, as material implication (for why else would we believe them?).
I will have more to say on this later; but, for the moment, let’s begin with 4. and 5. 
Initially, Dummett claims that the consequents in both 4. and 5. are what constitute the 
fatalistic thesis, that is to say, they deny that precautions ar e capable of being effective in 
preventing your' death. Given the tr'utli of 2., according to Dummett, the fatalistic 
conclusion in 4. follows indisputably: if you are going to die even if you take precautions, 
then if you are going to die, precautions caimot cause you to live. The inference from 3. 
to 5., however, is more dubious, in that it says since avoiding precautions does not lead to 
your" death, the taking of precautions caimot be a causal factor in your not dying. As 
Dummett rightly points out, we want to object that ‘it may be just the precautions that I 
am going to take which save me from being killed’ (ibid.: 262). His diagnosis of where 
the fatalist’s reasoning goes wrong involves allowing 2. and 3., but claiming that the 
sense of ‘i f  which makes these premises true also leads to a fallacy in the inference from
3. to 5.. According to Dummett, the latter inference can only be valid if the consequent 
of 3. (1*, below) is incompatible with 2*, below:
1 * ‘(Even) if you do not take precautions, you will not be killed.’
2* ‘If you do not take precautions, you will be killed.’ (ibid.)
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But, Dummett claims, given the sense of ‘i f  that makes 3. true, 1* is perfectly 
compatible with 2*. Given this compatibility, we cannot validly infer from l ’^  (as the 
fatalist tries to do in step 5.) that the taking of precautions is causally superfluous to your 
not being killed. Dummett’s reasoning behind this claim is that such a conclusion 
involves the denial of the conjunction of 2* and 3*, below:
3* ‘If you take precautions, then you will not be killed.’ (ibid.)
For if precautions were effective in preventing your' death, then it would both be the case 
that if you avoid them you will die, and if you take them you will live. But if 2* and 3* 
are compatible with I* (we have just seen that 2* is, and it should be obvious that 3* is), 
then the truth of 1* cannot be grounds for denying the conjimction of 2* and 3*. 
Therefore the inference from 3. to 5. is invalid, and thus it may be the case that your 
precautions contribute to your' living.
Does Dummett’s objection to the fatalist work? Before answering that question, 
let’s fonnalize the argument and see if we can make more sense of it. Letting p = ‘You 
will be killed in the raid’ and g = ‘You take precautions against being killed’, we have the 
following:
1. pv'-p(LEM )
2. p z> (g =) p) (Material Implication)
3. ~p Z) (~q Z) ~p) (Material Implication)
4. ,\p  z) -( -q  z>p) V -{q  Z) ~p) (From 2.)
5. -p  z) - ( -q  z) p) V -(q  Z) ~p) (From 3.) ;
and
1* -qzD-p
2* ~qrz)p
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3* ç z> ~p.
So the sense of ‘i f  in 2. and 3. that Dummett is allowing and which, in turn, allows him 
to refute the fatalist, is indeed the material sense of the conditional. Dummett admits as 
much when he says that both 2. and 3. ‘are of the form, “If p, then if q then p’” (ibid.: 
261). Furthermore, Dummett stipulates that the conjunction of 2* and 3* (viz. z p )
& (g Z) ~p)) are what constitute the claim that the taking of precautions is effective in 
preventing your' death, so the consequent in 4. and 5. is the negation of that conjunction 
(this is a slight revision of his earlier characterization of the fatalist’s conclusion). 
Allowing, for the moment, Dummett’s interpretation of 2. and 3. in terms of material 
implication, what of his claim that the fatalist’s inference from 3. to 5. is invalid? 
Applying the truth conditions of material implication, what we find is that when we let q 
be true and p false, then 3. is true and 5. is false, in which case the inference is, indeed, 
invalid."^  I take it that this is why Dummett claims that ‘it follows from the truth of [1 * 
and 2 * ] . . .  together that their common antecedent is false; that is, that I am in fact going 
to take precautions’ (ibid.: 262). This statement also verifies that it is the material sense 
of ‘i f  that he has in mind, for it is only on such a reading of ‘i f  that 1 ^  and 2* could both 
be true (given that they have contr adictory conclusions, 2’*‘ can only be true in virtue of 
both its antecedent and its consequent being false). So Dummett, in allowing the fatalist 
to make use of material implication truth conditions, is able to use the same truth 
conditions in refuting him.
Thus it would seem that Dummett has successfirlly detected the fatalist’s fallacy, 
by showing that the latter caimot validly infer his desired conclusion merely from the 
tr-rvial truths of 2. and 3.. One might think, however, that Dummett’s analysis, though
173
successful, does not really hit upon what it is about fatalism that we find so counter­
intuitive, It seems, after all, that what we object to in the fatalist’s argument are steps 2. 
and 3.—or at least to the sense in which he intends those steps—but Dummett, in order 
to defeat the fatalist, supposedly allows that veiy sense (the material sense) and then uses 
it against him. The question is, however, does the sense of ‘(even) i f  in the English 
language versions of 2. and 3. admit of interpretation by material implication? The 
fatalist requires it to do so in order for 2. and 3. to be tautological, and so indisputable. 
Dummett requires it in order to subsequently refute the fatalist. But it seems to me that 
the material sense of ‘i f ,  and the sense of ‘i f  implied by ‘even i f ,  are not equivalent 
coimectives. According to normal English usage, the sense of ‘even i f  in 1 * means that 
no matter what you do, you will not be killed. Thus, in order for the entire conditional to 
be true—regardless of what truth value the antecedent has—the consequent must be true. 
This means that if both the antecedent and consequent are false, the conditional is false; 
but the formal version of 1* (representing material implication) would still be true in such 
a scenario. Therefore the formal versions of 2. and 3. are not equivalent to their English 
language counterparts. In which case, though the formal versions are tautological and 
indisputable, the English language versions are not. This gives us scope to argue that 2. 
and 3. are inadmissible steps in the fatalist’s argument, because it is not true to say that 
regar’dless of what actions you take, you are still either going to be killed or not killed. 
You are, indeed, either going to be killed or not killed, but there ar e causal factors—some 
of which include your actions—that determine which of these outcomes represents the 
truth of the matter.
 ^Notice that, upon Dummett’s revised interpretation of the fatalist’s conclusion, the inference from 2. to 4. 
is also invalid—contrary to Dummett’s earlier claim.
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Dummett’s reasoning for allowing 2. and 3. is that doing so is preferable to trying 
to ‘make out that there is a sense of “if  ’ on which. . .  [ l ’^  and 2^] . . .  are indeed 
incompatible, but on which . . .  [3. ] . . .  is unjustified, because it is notoriously difficult to 
elucidate such a sense of “i f  ” {ibid:, 263). But if it is the case that the use of ‘even i f  in
2. and 3. renders these propositions non-tautological, then and 2* may very well be 
incompatible; for the former is based on the truth conditions of ‘even i f  (because it is 
taken from 3.), while the latter is based on the truth conditions of material implication 
(because it is meant to represent how being killed is a consequence of not taking 
precautions), and we have just seen how these two sets of truth conditions are not 
equivalent. In fahuess to Dummett, however, although 1* and 2* may admit of different 
truth conditions, it is difficult to demonstrate that such a difference necessitates a lack of 
compatibility between the two statements; and I assume it is this difficulty to which 
Dummett refers in the quotation above. Regardless, the equivocation between ‘even i f  
and ‘i f  is, at the very least, suspicious, and also points to another objection to his 
presentation and refutation of the fatalist’s argument, one that once agahi draws upon the 
distinction between implication and conditionhood.
In the case of Dummett’s fatalist, though, we carmot use the exact analogue of our 
objection to Taylor. This is because we are dealing with two different varieties of 
fatalism. Taylor’s fatalism is the traditional variety, according to which, though our' 
actions affect the fiitur e (the naval commander’s order is a sufficient condition for the 
occurr ence of the battle), they are not exercised with autonomy (he was fated to make the 
order). Whereas Dummett’s fatalism represents a version of the Lazy Argument, 
whereby it is denied that our actions have effects. So, it is not fated that you should 
either take precautions or not do so, but it is fated that you will either be killed or not be
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killed, so yoiu' freely willed actions are inefficacious. This disanalogy bars us from 
merely objecting to Dummett that yom* decision to take precautions is not conditioned by 
whether or not you are killed, because that is immaterial to his variety of fatalism. What 
we can say, however, is that just as we must distinguish between implication and ‘even 
i f ,  so, too, must we distinguish between implication and conditionhood. Thus, a 
demonstration of the incompatibility of 1* and 2* need not solely rely upon the point 
that their English language versions indicate two different relations, but can also make 
reference to Dummetf s representation of both of them as material implications, a 
representation which is then used to demonstrate their compatibility! Thus, in the same 
way that Taylor uses implication to indiscriminately shift between conditional and 
evidential relations; Dummett, in refuting the fatalist, uses implication to indiscriminately 
shift between conditional and ‘even i f  relations.^
These observations bring us back to challenging 2. and 3. directly, on the grounds 
that they already grant the fatalist more than he deserves. For, in the absence of this 
challenge, the fatalist can simply respond to Dummetf s objection with a shift in his 
fatalistic position, one that is more in line with Taylor’s version of the doctrine (which is 
surely the more plausible of the two). He can allow that the application of the law of 
excluded middle to future contingent propositions does not imply that om* actions do not 
affect the events to which such propositions refer, but claim that that application does 
imply that the decision to take such actions is not one that is fr eely made. So he can 
replace the claim that eternal truths render our actions pointless, with the claim that 
eternal truths determine our decisions to act. Although such a claim conflicts with 2. and
 ^Buller (1995), has offered a different rejection of 2. and 3., but one which may well reflect the 
equivocation between ‘even i f  and ‘if .  He argues that the implications in 2. and 3. are invalid because of 
a shift in the modal context between the antecedents and the consequents. He claims that the former are
176
3., it nevertheless is informed by the same conception of time as those claims—a 
conception according to which fiitme events are fixed by their present, or eternal, tmth 
values. And it is not until we challenge the fatalist to show why such a conception is 
necessary, and to offer alternative conceptions, that we can fully refute the doctrine of 
fatalism.
III. Dummett’s Argument (cont): The Dancing Chief 
Dummett’s next step is to describe a fictional situation which purports to show that the 
past might be affected by present actions, and claims that the argument we naturally want 
to use to deny this possibility is the exact analogue of the fatalist’s fallacious argument.
In this section, I will try to show that Dummett’s analogous treatment of the two 
arguments is only valid on the assumption that ULD implies a symmetrical conception of 
time; and therefore that his presentation and refutation of the ar gument for a fixed past 
begs the question against the asymmetry of time.
The contrived scenario Dummett relates to us involves a tribal chief who dances 
so that his young tribesman might himt bravely on their ceremonial initiation hunt (we 
assume that there are empirical gr ounds for asserting a real causal relationship between 
the chiefs dancing and the young men’s bravery). The young men are away for six days 
on their hunt, but they will have ceased hunting by the fourth day. Although the chief is 
aware of this, he continues to dance thr oughout the entire six day period (that is, until the 
tribal observers return with news of the young men’s performance); so that the last two 
days of dancing—if it is not possible to affect the past—are superfluous to the bravery of 
the young men. So Dummett now reconstructs the fatalist’s argument, but this time
meant to be tme in the actual world, wliile the tmth of the latter is evaluated in the context of possible 
worlds—in some of wliich the consequents false.
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directs it against the chiefs belief in the non-fixity of the past. Thus we have the 
following:
1) Either the young tribesman were cowardly or they were brave, (LEM)
2) If they were cowardly, then they were cowardly even if you dance (on the 
fifth and sixth day). (Material Implication)
3) If they were brave, then they were brave even if you do not dance (on the fifth 
and sixth day). (Material Implication)
4) Hence, if  they were cowardly, any dancing you do (on the fifth and sixth day) 
will be ineffective. (From 2))
5) Hence, if they were brave, any dancing you do (on the fifth and sixth day) will 
have been superfluous. (From 3)) {ibid.: 265)
And, of cour se, this is the exact analogue of the fatalist’s argument; and Dummett’s claim 
is that if we accept his refiitation of that argument and so conclude that the future is open, 
then we must also accept the analogous refutation of this argument and conclude that the 
past is open. As we saw, it was my contention that both Dummetf s presentation—and 
his refutation—of fatalism rest on an equivocation; and that, regardless of the 
equivocation, the refiitation is ultimately unsuccessfiil because it allows the fatalist room 
to shift his position without abandoning the spirit of his doctrine. It should, therefore, 
come as no surprise that I also reject his presentation and refutation of the argument for a 
fixed past. Before advancing to that discussion, however, we should first treat 
Dummetf s illustr ation of how it could possibly even make sense to speak of a non-fixed 
past—one which could somehow be brought about by present actions.
Dummetf s ingenious approach to this perplexing question is to offer challenges, 
on behalf of the opponent of the open past, to the tribal chief and his belief i) that his
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dancing on the fifth and sixth day (and thus after the hunt has taken place) somehow 
affects the outcome of the hunt; and ii) that he is able to dance as he chooses. The 
challenges involve experiments in which the chief is supposed to dance after having 
learned that the young men were not brave. According to Dummett, as there is supposed 
to be something logically wr ong with the concept of bringing about the past, we should 
only consider the possible outcomes of these experiments which would most support the 
chiefs position. For if, indeed, it is logically impossible to bring about the past, then 
even such favorable results could not vindicate him. So Dummett imagines that each 
experiment results in one of the following outcomes: either a) the chief dances; or b) he is 
prevented fi om dancing by external circumstances (the sudden outbreak of war, he is 
bitten by a snake, etc.); or c) he performs the dances, but later discovers that the 
observers had (for whatever reason) lied to him, and that the young men had actually 
been brave. Although outcome a) counts against belief i), we can imagine that such an 
outcome would be infrequent enough so as not destroy the belief in i), for the dancing 
needn’t guarantee the bravery to be a causal factor in it. If outcome b) were very 
frequent, then this would certainly be grounds for denying belief ii); in which case, such a 
belief would have to give way to the belief that the cowardice causes the inability to 
dance, which would in turn refute belief i). Again, however, we can imagine that 
outcome b) was not a fr equent occmTence. And, of cour se, a sufficient frequency of 
outcome c) would confirm (or at least bolster) beliefs i) and ii) (the dancing really does 
have an effect).
As Dummett points out, though, we learn something else from the frequency of 
the occmTence of outcome c); namely, that the empirical evidence which led to belief i) 
(the reports of the observers) is now of a dubious natm e. If the chief, therefore, wishes to
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retain belief i), he must assume that he can never really verify whether or not the young 
men were brave, or at least his belief regar ding their bravery cannot be held 
independently of his intention to perform the dances. That is, his intention to perform the 
dances will not be dependent upon what the observers report (for they might report 
cowardice when the men had been brave), rather, he will come to think that his trust in 
the news he hears will be dependent upon his intention to dance. He will always choose 
to dance, believing that this is the only way to be m a position to believe that the young 
men were brave. Which means, in retaining beliefs i) and ii), the chief has had to 
abandon another belief, iii), that we would normally take for granted, namely, that it is 
possible for him to know about the past performance of the young men independently of 
his intentions. Obviously, we think that our* ability to know about past events has 
absolutely nothing to do with our intentions. Future events, however, are different.
If we believe, based on experience, that A causes B, and we believe that it is 
within our' power to do A, then we cannot predict whether B will occur independently of 
our intention to do A: the intention determines the prediction. So we cannot consistently 
hold beliefs like i), ii) and iii) for either future or past events, but we normally abandon 
beliefs like iii) for futur e events, and beliefs like i) for past events (we don’t, generally, 
believe that present actions can affect past events). And Dummett’s point is that this is 
what lies behind the claim that time is asymmetrical: which of the inconsistent triad we 
choose to abandon. And his further point with regard to the chief is that if it is merely a 
choice that we have to make, and one had sufficient empirical evidence, one could 
instead choose to abandon beliefs like iii) for both future and past events, and so 
consistently (if a little paradoxically) claim that time is symmetrically open.
1 8 0
Now, I do not wish to object too strongly to Dummett’s example. There ai'e those 
who have accused it of being over contrived and too implausible to justify such a startling 
conclusion as the claim that the past might be open.  ^ While I sympathize with some of 
these objections, they ar e not the focus of this chapter. Furthermore, I think it is certainly 
an interesting observation, and quite probably true, that anybody who wished to advocate 
a non-fixed past and future would have to abandon beliefs like iii) with regard to the 
occurr ence of all non-present events. Similarly, I should think that most of us only reject 
beliefs like iii) for future events, whereas we embrace them for past events; and this must, 
indeed, be a reflection of our conviction that past events are fixed and futme events are 
not yet fixed. My objection to Dummett, though, is that the rejection of beliefs like iii) 
for futm e events is merely a reflection of what we take to be a metaphysical fact, and in 
no way constitutes or conditions that fact. Nor is it simply a choice we have to make 
about which belief to abandon with respect to the past and futur e. Dummett obviously 
thinks that his scenario gives the chief empirical grounds for abandoning belief iii): the 
frequent (if not constant) conjunction of his continuing to dance and the bravery of the 
yormg men. But this fr equent conjunction of present actions and past events can no more 
establish that the latter is a consequence of the former, than can the fr equent conjimction 
of my use of an umbrella and the surfacing of earth worms (for both are consequences of 
heavy rainfall, and so are frequently conjoined, but neither is a consequence nor a 
condition of the other). So, while Dummett’s example may be effective in highlighting 
an interesting cormection between human agency and one’s temporal perspective, I 
remain skeptical that it can do the work that Dummett would like it to.
® For one such appraisal, see Schulte (1994).
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Let us now turn to Dummett’s presentation and refutation of the argument for a 
fixed past, and the supposed analogy with the argument for fatalism. Based on my 
assessment in Section II, if  we wish to defend the fixity of past events, then it seems to 
me that we had better not use the analogue of Dummett’s fatalistic argument. That 
argument acquired its initial plausibility fr om the representation of steps 2. and 3. as 
tautologies (via material implication), and we saw that such a representation was dubious. 
We also saw that what lay behind steps 2. and 3., was the notion that the present, or 
eternal, tmth of propositions about fiiture events somehow fixes those events. And even 
if  we allow Dummett’s refiitation to show that such a notion does not imply that one’s 
actions aie inefficacious, it is still open to the fatalist to claim that it does imply that one’s 
actions, though efficacious, are not freely willed. So if we now wish to avoid these 
implications in defense of a fixed past, then we should focus on some element of past 
events that determines their fixity, other than that propositions about tliem admit of a 
tmth value.
We concluded at the end of Part I that it is the existence of past events that fixes 
them, and in the Epilogue I will have more to say about this. For the purpose of this 
chapter, it will suffice to say that the argument for a fixed past should not hinge upon the 
fact that it is tiue to say now, that the young men were either brave or cowardly. For as 
long as the fixity (or lack of fixity) of events is thought to be determined by whether or 
not propositions about those events admit of a tiuth value, then it will always be open to 
the proponent of a symmetrical conception of time to claim Üiat time can only be 
asymmetrical if  ULD is false. Taylor and Dummett are two such proponents, but 
whereas Taylor is guilty of conflating the two distinct domains of logical detenninateness 
and fixity, by infemng their necessaiy coincidence in the future from then coincidence in
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the past; Dummett would have us do the opposite, by suggesting an analogy between the 
logically determinate yet unfixed futuie, and a logically deteiminate yet unfixed past. In 
light of these observations, although the proponent of a fixed past would certainly assent 
to 2) and 3), he or she should not tiy to use these statements as premises from which to 
infer the ineffectiveness of the chiefs continuing to dance. That ineffectiveness has 
nothing to do with—is not deteimined by—the tiuth of propositions about the past 
braveiy of the young tribesmen. This is why Dummett can show that the superfluity of 
the chiefs dancing does not follow fiom the tmth of the proposition Tf the young men 
were brave, then even if the chief doesn’t dance, they will still have been brave.’ 
According to the defender of a fixed past, the superfluity of the chiefs dancing is 
conditioned by an altogether different metaphysical fact—namely, the fact that past 
events have occurred, and are therefore fixed and cannot be altered!
So the prefeiTed argument for defending the fixity of past events should not be 
fashioned in the same mold as tlie aigument for the fixity of future events, because past 
events are different than futuie ones. In so fashioning the argument for a fixed past, 
Dummett assumes the symmetiy of time, and is therefore able to refute the argument and 
thus the asyimnetry of time. The preferred argument must not only call into question the 
presumed dependence of the fixity (or non-fixity) of events upon logical deteiminateness, 
but must also offer an account of what the fixity (or non-fixity) of events does depend 
upon.
Conclusion
In conclusion, then, we have seen that there is indeed an implicit metaphysical doctrine 
that underlies the Type I argument. It is the doctrine that there is a constant and 
necessaiy relationship between deteiminate tmth value and the fixity/non-fixity of events.
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But we have also seen that this doctrine requires an explicit defense, before we should 
allow it to be used by the Type I logical fatalist. For logical detenninateness is a property 
of propositions, and fixity is a property of events, and the two are therefore of a different 
logical character; and thus their constant conjunction cannot simply be assumed on the 
basis of their conjunction in respect of past propositions and events (nor can the constant 
conjunction of logical deteiminateness and MOM-fixity be infeiTed fiom their conjunction 
in respect of fiitm e propositions and events). And, if they are not constantly conjoined, 
then the way is open to embrace both a robust ULD, as well as the asymmetiy of fixity. 
Nevertheless, although that way is open, we have yet to fully ti'averse it. We have 
challenged the proponent of the symmetry of fixity to defend an, as yet, undefended 
assumption. We have not, however, fully refuted that assumption. In order to do so, and 
in order to provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the Type I argument, we should tiy 
to offer an account of i) why the ti'uth values of propositions do not fix their 
conesponding events, and ii) how events do get fixed. It is my hope that the pastist 
conception of time resulting fiom our discussion in Chapter 2 will provide the framework 
for answering these questions. In the Epilogue, I sketch a proposal for how it might 
achieve this.
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EPILOGUE 
PASTISM AND LOGICAL FATALISM 
Introduction
We now return to the pastist conception of time that I suggested at the end of Chapter 2. 
Recall that we were led to that conception because we concluded that a robust asymmetry 
of fixity requires an asymmetry of ontology according to which the past exists and the 
future does not; and because such an ontology, if it is going to do the work required of it 
in gi'ounding the asymmetiy of fixity, cannot simply be a presentist ontology in disguise, 
nor can it imply a B-Theoretic ontology. The claim that past events exist and are 
manifested in the continued existence of their thisnesses from the time of their becoming^ 
avoids implying a B-Theoretic ontology; and the claim that only past events exist clearly 
distinguishes my pastism fiom presentism. Fuitheimore, I claimed that the non-existence 
of present events is not as counter-intuitive as it might initially seem; since this is not to 
say that the present is unreal  ^but simply to say that the present should not be thought of 
as a temporal region that contains events. It is, rather, a temporal boundary that separates 
existing, fixed past events fiom a non-existing, non-fixed future.
That is a summaiy of where we stood at the end of Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 and 4 
we left the topic of temporal ontology, and its bearing on the asymmetry of fixity, in 
order to investigate whether the laws of logic thi'eaten that asymmetiy. And, though we 
went some distance towards showing that determinate truth about the future does not 
imply fatalism, we fell short of supplying a thoroughgoing refutation of that alleged 
implication. My intention in this epilogue is to pick up where we left off in Chapter 2, by 
sketching a more detailed account of pastism; one that not only clarifies and fills in some
' Or, more strictly, from the time that they have become.
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of the blanks, but one that also suggests answers to the questions we concluded Chapter 4 
with. To restate, those questions were i) why don’t the tmth values of propositions fix 
their corresponding events, and ii) how do events get fixed? It will also be of great 
benefit, however, to consider my conception of time in relation to a close relative, that of 
Tooley’s, so that my account emerges as one that is fully infoimed. Accordingly, in 
Section 11 will sketch my account and explain how I intend it to answer questions i) and 
ii), in Section III will compaie and contrast it with Tooley’s, and finally, I will conclude 
with some comments on what remains to be done.
I. A Pastist Conception of Time
A. Initial Statement of the Conception 
The pastist conception of time I will be sketching here is a hybrid A-B-Theoiy. This is 
because it claims that both static and dynamic aspects are constitutive of the concept of 
time, neither being reducible to the other. In espousing such a theory, am I having to 
compromise on the A-Theoretic intuitions that I have been taking so seriously thi’oughout 
this thesis? Not at all. According to my conception, there are eternally existing tenseless 
propositions (states of affairs) that are yet futme, but only some of these are tme, and so 
only some will occur; and only those that have fully occmi'ed are, properly speaking, 
events. The static aspect of time coiTesponds to the totality of tenseless propositions, the 
dynamic aspect coiTesponds to concrete, (past) tensed events. The latter are deteiminate 
entities that have occuiTed (or have become real), and therefore are the only events that 
exist simpliciter. Thus the A-Theoretic intuitions of objective temporal becoming and the 
non-existence/non-fixity of the future remain fully intact.
Now, in allowing a static aspect to also be constitutive of time, I am not claiming, 
as McTaggail (1908) did, that the order of all events in time is stmng out in a static B-
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series, and that the A-theoretic conception of temporal becoming merely adds to this the 
spotlight of the present mnning over the series. Although McTaggart’s conception is also 
a hybrid tlieory (at least until he infers the um eality of time), it assigns completely 
different roles to the static and dynamic aspects of time. The resulting combination, so 
McTaggart argued, leads to par adox. It is a common criticism of hybrid theories of time 
that they are susceptible to this paradox. As we will see, however, my assignment of 
roles to the static and dynamic aspects of time, and their resulting combination, can avoid 
McTaggart’s paradox. But before progressing to that discussion, I should say some more 
about my use of teiminology, and spell out in gr eater detail what I intend.
B. Terminology: States of Affairs, Propositions, and Events 
Given that my use, above, of the term ‘states of affahs’ may be deemed non-standard, in 
this sub-section I will provide some background and explanation of my use, and say how 
I take states of affairs to be related to propositions and events. Following Wolterstorff 
(1979), I take an event to be a distinct entity from a state of affairs. A state of affafrs is a 
proposition, and, if it exists at all, it exists necessarily and eternally. But, as Wolterstorff 
states, ‘of those [states of affairs] that exist, some are capable of occuning and some not; 
some do occiu' and some do not; and some occur* necessarily and some contingently’ 
(Wolterstorff, op.cit.: 178). So states of affairs that exist do so abstractly, and the 
prepositional content of these states of affairs can be true or false, and their tr uth or 
falsity can, in turn, be contingent or necessary. He goes on to point out that events are 
different, since there is no distinction between an event’s existing and occurring. So, for 
Wolterstorff (who is a presentist), an event is ‘an occurrence of a state of affairs’ (ibid.). 
Here, however, I part ways with Woltersorff, since my ontology does not include present 
events. So, I take an event to be a state of affairs that has occurred.
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Wolterstorff, following Chisholm, also thinks that states of affairs, though 
eternally existent, can vary over time in their tiuth values. Above, however, I 
characterized states of affairs as tenseless. What is my motivation for such a 
characterization, and does such a characterization conflict with my A-Theoretic intuitions 
and ontology? The answer to the latter question is ‘no’, since I agree with Tooley that 
one can embrace the concept of actuality at (or as of) a time, without giving up on the 
concept of tmth simpliciter (see Section II, below). As for the foimer question, the 
motivation for claiming that states of affairs are tenseless is precisely to allow for the 
coiTespondence of tiue states of affairs with events that will be (but have not yet been) 
actualized, i.e. with events which, from the temporal perspective, do not yet exist. I 
realize that in light of the standaid views about correspondence, this statement will sound 
incredible, but I will be providing a defense of it in Section I.C, below.
As for the distinction between states of affairs, thought of as propositions, on the 
one hand, and events on the other, I hope that the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 have 
sufficiently motivated this distinction, and the logical coming apart of these two entities.
I do not wish to suggest that the two are not intimately connected, for there is no question 
that tiuth must, in some way, supeivene on being. But, intuitively, tiuth is a property of 
propositions, and being, in this case, is the existence of events, where the foimer are 
abstract entities, and the latter concrete entities. Given, then, that a particulai* state of 
affairs S, and the event E described by it, are of a different logical chai acter, and given 
that S and E cannot share all the same properties, it is only natural to speak of them 
distinctly, even if, in many contexts, they are isomoiphic with one another.
There is another issue about teiminology that I should discuss briefly in this 
subsection, and that is the conception of ‘event’ that I intend. Thiee of the most
188
fundamental, and controversial, questions regarding the status of events are whether there 
really are any, whether they aie metaphysically basic or reducible, and what their nature 
and stmcture is. Clearly, given that the guiding intuition thioughout this thesis has been 
one about events, I think there are events, and I will not begin a defense of that position at 
this point in the thesis! I can only hope that the reader has shared this opinion, or at least 
indulged me in it, over the course of the thesis.
As to whether events are metaphysically basic or reducible, I am not convinced 
(not yet, at any rate) that this question has a substantial bearing on the cuirent project. 
Nevertheless, I will say that there is something highly intuitive about the idea that events 
are not fundamental items of ontology, and that they aie, instead, reducible to objects (or 
substances). Even if  this is right, however, I see no conti adiction in endorsing that 
position and maintaining all that I have said about events. In paiticular, I see no 
conti adiction between the reducibility, or derivability, of events, and maintaining that 
events are states of affairs that have occun ed. I will, therefore, provisionally endorse the 
position that events are reducible to objects (or substances), with the understanding that if  
persuaded that these views on the nature of events were contradictory, then I would be 
inclined to reject the reducibility of events.
As to the natui e and stractui’e of events, in addition to what I have already said 
about them, I take it that events are concrete particulars with non-zero duration. They are 
concrete because they aie spatio-temporally located and have substances as their 
constituents. They are particulars, as opposed to universals, in that they are not 
repeatable. And, in light of my argument (in Chapter 2, Section IV.D.) fr om ontic 
deteiminacy to the conclusion that only past events exist, I obviously am assuming that
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events must have some duration, however small? Furthermore, if there are instantaneous 
events, then it makes little sense to say that such events do not exist until they have frilly 
occuired. Here, however, I need to be carefiil, since the possibility of instantaneous 
events is largely assumed among philosophers, and so if I deny that possibility, I will 
need to provide some justification for the denial. I confess that I am not sui*e what the 
way forward is in this matter. Perhaps I could just bite the bullet and deny instantaneous 
events, or at least relegate them to the realm of theoretical entities, by claiming tliat there 
are no natural events that could be instantaneous. In support of this position, Simons 
(2003: 377) points out that modem physics appears to show that no event can be 
registered below the minimum time span of 10"^  ^seconds (the so-called Planck time). 
Alternatively, perhaps there is a way to incoiporate instantaneous events into a pastist 
ontology. Either way, some more work would have to be done, but it is work that I will 
leave for a future (not yet existent!) date.
C. Pastism and Logical Fatalism 
Having provided an initial statement of pastism, and having elaborated on my use of 
terminology in that statement, I am now in a position to sketch a more detailed account of 
the pastist conception of time, as well as state how I intend for it to supply the fr amework 
for a thoroughgoing refutation of logical fatalism. Given that pastism is a hybrid 
conception of time, whereby static and dynamic aspects are both constitutive of it, I will 
first sketch the nature of the static aspect, then the dynamic, then say how they combine 
to form a unified conception.
To remind the reader, I argued that if one denies the existence of future events and affirms the existence 
of present events, then present events have non-existent temporal parts. It was partly on the basis of this (as 
I see it) absurdity, that I concluded that tliere are no present events.
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As I stated above, according to the pastist conception, the static aspect of time is 
the abstract domain of tenseless, eternally existing states of affairs. Given that these 
states of affairs are both tenseless and eternal, their tmth values do not vary over time. 
Obviously, some of these states of affairs will express logical and atemporal necessary 
tmths (and impossibilities), and will therefore not be indexed to any particular time. But 
many others will express contingent tmths (and falsities) about events in time, and these 
willhQ time indexed. Of those states of affairs that are (eternally) tme, some have 
occuiTed and some will occm*. Notice, then, that on this conception, though there are no 
future events, there are ti*ue states of affairs that are friture directed. I giant that this 
picture might raise concerns regarding coiTespondence, and I will addiess these below, 
but it should not raise any other concerns. Events aie concrete entities that do not exist 
until they have fully occuiTed and are made determinately complete, and states of affairs 
are abstract entities that eternally exist and are deteiminately tiuth apt. So it should come 
as no suipiise that the latter are indexed to abstiact times that do not concretely exist.
I should also stress, here, that I am not making any epistemological claims about 
these states of affairs, I am simply postulating their existence. There is no reason to think 
that we could have access to all of the tme, tenseless, states of affairs that exist—in 
particular with respect to those that are future directed. But this epistemological 
restriction should not have any metaphysical ramifications. Presumably there exist tiuths 
(and falsities) even about worlds in which there are no intelligent beings capable of 
knowing them, so it should haidly be a restriction upon die existence of tme, future 
directed, states of affairs that they ai e inaccessible.
We now progress to the dynamic aspect of time, which is the temporal, concrete 
domain of events. All events are past and exist simpliciter. And, though this existence is
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a tenseless one, it is not—as it is in the case of states of affairs—an eternal one. Events 
exist simpliciter because they have occuiTed, and thus theii' tenseless existence is from a 
point in time. This existence is manifested in the logical traces of events, viz. their 
thisnesses. The thisness of an event E exists fi'om the moment that E has occuned, and at 
all subsequent times. The thisness ofE  is not only the logical trace, or manifestation, of 
£”s existence, it also provides a model for how such existence is possible. Such a model 
is advantageous, since one may well ask, ‘What can it mean for an entity to tenselessly 
exist fi'om a point in time, and how is it possible?’ And, if one allows that Adams’ 
account of thisnesses and time is possible, then these questions are easily answered.^
That is, if  one allows that it is possible that there are propeiües that are not pur ely 
qualitative, and that these properties only exist for actual, non-futme individuals, then it 
is clear ly possible that an entity can come into existence and continue to exist, even 
though its ontological basis ceases to exist. We can modify this general framework for 
the case of events, and claim that though they cease to occur, they continue to exist 
tenselessly; for if they did not continue to exist, then how could we account for the 
existence of their thisnesses?
Now, it is at this point that I must make some furfher modifications to the 
conclusions derived from Adams’ work on thisnesses. Adams, of course, is not a pastist 
(since he acknowledges present events), and so my interpretation of his position, and the 
conclusions I dr ew fiom that interpretation, do not entirely conform to my pastist 
conception of time. Recall that I interpreted Adams as holding that the thisnesses of past 
events exist presently (and at all times subsequent to their initial instantiation). What
See Chapter 2, Section IV.
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shall I say about this now, in light of my pastist ontology? There are, I thinlc, thr ee 
possible answers to this question.
The first is to retain the above account of thisnesses, and simply explain away the 
seeming contr adiction with pastism. The thought would be that even though the 
ontological basis of £ ’’s thisness (E"^ ) is a concrete entity, E"^  is an abstract entity, and the 
claim that only the past exists is a claim about concrete events. The second possible 
answer is to modify my view on the existence of thisnesses, and claim that they do not 
exist temporally at all, but are, instead, atemporal. That is to say, once E has occuiTed, 
and E* has been instantiated, then E* does not exist at all subsequent times, it exists 
eternally (in one direction, as it were). Would there then, in this case, be any real 
distinction between an event and its thisness, and would it not be redundant postulating 
the existence of the latter? Yes and no, respectively. An event is a concrete temporal 
entity that exists tenselessly fiom a point in time, an event’s thisness is an abstract entity 
that exists eternally fiom a point in time. The final possible answer is simply to jettison 
the whole concept of a thisness as being unhelpful in elucidating pastism. Here, again, I 
am uncertain as to the best way forward, though I am reluctant to endorse the final 
answer, as I find Adams’ ar guments for the existence and nature of thisnesses intuitively 
appealing and persuasive.
Now for the unification of the static and dynamic aspects of time, and the 
answering of questions i) and ii). Contingently tnie states of affairs are tenseless 
propositions indexed to a time. Though these states of affairs are static in the sense that 
they exist eternally and do not vary in tnith value, the events to which they correspond 
are dynamic, concrete entities that come into existence as time passes. An event is a state 
of affairs that has occurred. How, then, are true states of affairs made true? They are
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made true, of course, by coirespondence with the events that make them true. The 
difference, however, between truth as corr espondence on this view and on the 
conventional view, is simply that truth as correspondence on the pastist view is not 
subject to the artificial restriction of truth as simultaneous correspondence. I say 
‘artificial’ because nowhere is it argued that truth as correspondence is a relation that can 
only obtain between two co-existing entities, i.e. a true proposition and an event—it is 
merely pre-supposed. And this pre-supposition reveals a prejudice towards tr eating 
propositions and events as of the same logical character. But given the system outlined 
here, states of affairs and events, though intimately related, aru of a radically different 
logical character.
The objector, no doubt, will wish to respond that regardless of how different in 
logical character a state of affairs and its coiTCSponding event ar e, it is nonsense to 
suggest that a state of affairs can be made true now by an event that does not exist now. 
This, however, is not my claim, and the objection reveals the extent to which the objector 
fails to acknowledge the difference between static states of affairs and dynamic events. It 
is never the case that a state of affairs is true now, rather, a true state of affairs is true 
simpliciter—its truth is eterual, not temporal. Of cour se, strictly speaking in pastist 
terms, it is also not the case that an event is real now, since an event does not exist until it 
has occurred, and it then exists simpliciter. But, for this very reason, the existence 
simpliciter of an event is rooted in its temporality, whereas the truth simpliciter of a state 
of affairs is rooted in its eterualness. Given, then, the dispar ate domains of states of 
affairs and events, the simultaneous restriction on truth as correspondence is inapplicable 
and completely without justification.
194
So true states of affairs can only be true in virtue of the occurrence of their* 
corresponding events, but the former do not become true as the latter become real, rather, 
they are eternally tr*ue because they have occurred. Given this pastist framework, we are 
now in a position to answer questions i) and ii). Truth values of futme directed states of 
affairs do not fix their corresponding events because they ar e eternally made true (or 
false) by their corresponding events having occurred. For example, ‘E occurs on Jan. 1®\ 
2025’ is made eterually true by E’s having become real on that date. So truth super*venes 
on being, but in a surprisingly unconventional manner. As for question ii), given that 
events are not fixed by the truth values of their corresponding states of affairs, and given 
the arguments in Chapters 1 and 2, events are fixed by their having occurred, and in 
virtue of their existence simpliciter.
As for McTaggart’s Paradox, assuming its legitimacy, it should be evident that 
this par ticular* hybrid conception does not fall foul of it. Pastism says the only events that 
exist are past events, so they do not admit of such incompatible properties as past, 
present, and future—they are all and only past. Nor could one claim that events, on a 
pastist ontology, admit of different, and incompatible, degr ees of the proper*ty of pastness. 
Past existence is existence simpliciter, and so all events are ontologically on a par*.
II. Pastism and Tooley’s Hybrid Conception 
The pastist conception of time I have just sketched bears a resemblance to Tooley’s
(1997) conception in some respects, but it also is strikingly dissimilar* in others. In this 
section, I will briefly compar e and contr ast the two conceptions of time, beginning first 
with a summar*y of Tooley’s conception.
Tooley defends a theor*y of time that is fundamentally dynamic, but which denies 
five theses often associated with the A-Theory. The dynamic aspect of his theory is
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encapsulated in the claim that different events or states of affairs exist at different times. 
He says,
The tensed approach to time that I shall be defending involves the claim that, while the past and 
present are real, the future is not. The central idea underlying this view is that the passage of time 
involves events, or states of affairs, becoming actual, with the present—the boundary between the 
past the future—being the point at which tliat happens. (Tooley, op.ciL: 27)
The five theses that Tooley attributes to the conventional A-Theorrst and which he rejects
are as follows: i) that tenseless temporal concepts are to be analysed in terms of tensed
ones; ii) that the concepts of past, present, and future are semantically basic ones; iii) that
tensed statements do not, contr'ary to the B-Theorist’s claim, involve indexicals; iv) that
the idea of a conceptually basic, tenseless, existential quantifier that ranges over all
entities must be rejected; and v) that the concept of truth simpliciter must be abandoned
in favor of the concept of truth at a time {ibid.: 29). And, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2,
Tooley also thinks that causation is the most fundamental aspect of time, determining its
direction and natur e. This view is also contrary to most versions of the A-Theory.
How does my view compare and contrast? Clearly, I agree that the past exists and
the futme does not, but disagree that the present designates a temporal region at all. One
might think that Tooley and I do not really disagree on this point, since he claims that the
present is a boundary, and I have used this same metaphor in describing pastism. But
Tooley does acknowledge the reality of the present, and, in particular, the reality of
present events, so he obviously does not consider the ar gument from ontic determinacy
that I used against this position. I have also made clear* in Chapter 2 that I disagree with
Tooley’s views on the relation between time and causation, and have argued that the
proponent of a dynamic theory of time cannot use causation as the foundation of temporal
asymmetry. What of the five dieses, regarding the relation between tensed and tenseless
concepts, that Tooley rejects? I essentially agr ee with Tooley that these theses should be
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rejected on a pastist conception of time. Nevertheless, there is a some disagreement 
between us in the details, and a discussion of this disagreement will help shed light on my 
view.
Tooley endorses the concept of truth at a time and truth simpliciter. He thinks 
the concept of actuality at a time, a concept which he takes to be primitive and 
unanalyzable, demands the former endorsement, but he offers an analysis of tensed 
propositions in tenseless XQvms,plus the concept of actuality at a time, to show that all 
propositions ar e also true or false simpliciter (but not all true or false at a time)."^  I will 
not get into the details of the analysis here, but I think Tooley presents a good case for the 
claim that, given the unanalyzability of the concept of actuality at a time, the truth of 
tensed propositions superwenes on the truth of tenseless ones. Despite, this, however, 
Tooley thinks he still requires tensed propositions and truth at a time to allow for 
correspondence. And, since he requires truth at a time, he must allow that classical logic 
fails for some tensed propositions (yiz. those about the futme).
This is where I part company with Tooley, since, according to my pastism, the 
states of affahs that constitute the static aspect of time ar e all tenseless. So I endorse 
Tooley's helpful analysis of tensed propositions, but given that very analysis, I think the 
concept of truth at a time, and the counterintuitive rejection of bivalence that attends it, is 
unnecessary. As I said, Tooley’s motivation for retaining truth at a time is that 
correspondence, together with the concept of actuality at a time, demands it. But I have 
suggested that on an unconventional rendering of correspondence, the concept of 
actuality at a time does not require the concept of truth at a time. In essence, then.
See Tooley (1997: 189-212).
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Tooley bites the bullet on bivalence, whereas I bite the bullet on the conventional 
rendering of tmth as correspondence.
Conclusion
That is a sketch of pastism and its suggested role in providing a thoroughgoing refutation 
of logical fatalism without abandoning classical logic. Obviously, a great deal more 
work is required. As I have noted, I need to either accommodate, or defend a rejection 
of, instantaneous events, and I need to say more on the role that the thisnesses of past 
events play in a pastist conception of time. In addition to these points, it would be 
beneficial to provide a thorough treatment of Tooley’s reduction of tensed propositions, 
as well as ar gue more substantively that his reliance on truth at a time, in light of that 
reduction, is not required by a dynamic conception of time.
Finally, I am desirous of grafting the pastist conception of time into a theistic 
framework, and then applying it specifically to the problem of theological fatalism. The 
natural thought would be that the static domain of tenseless states of affaks exists in the 
mind of God, and that his knowledge of those states of affairs that are contingently true is 
conditioned by their conusponding events having occuned. In addition to offering a 
thoroughgoing rehrtation of theological fatalism, my hope is that this accoimt of the 
relationship between God’s knowledge of events and the ontological status of those 
events, will also provide fertile ground for a discussion of God’s eteiual/temporal natur e. 
It would also be beneficial in this context to research Aquinas’ views more thoroughly, 
since he seems to share similar* views on truth as conespondence and truth simpliciter. It 
is to these endeavors that I desire next to turu my attention.
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